Disinformation Literature

2020 to February 2024

420 open access publications on disinformation, misinformation & fake news experiences & (counter)strategies in more than 100 countries worldwide

Particularly commendbale guides, handbooks and other remarkable publications are shaded in grey.

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Disinformation, Misinformation, Fake News
GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

1. Joshua Machleder, Shannon Maguire et al.:

Disinformation Primer. USAID, 2021, 96 pp.

"This primer presents an overview of disinformation culture to give readers a sense of key concepts, terminology, select case studies, and programmatic design options. Disinformation is by no means new. Although social media platforms have emerged as the most efficient spreaders of false information, disinformation is also spread through analog media such as radio, television, and newspapers. It is, however, the combination of traditional analog media, in concert with new digital technologies, that allows information to spread faster and more broadly (even across borders) in unprecedented ways. Experts have described this phenomenon as "information disorder," a condition in which truth and facts coexist in a milieu of misinformation and disinformation—conspiracy theories, lies, propaganda, and halftruths. They have labeled its ability to undermine democracy and individual autonomy "a wicked problem," i.e., a problem that is difficult and complex, such as poverty or climate change. Despite the immensity of the challenge, there are promising ways that journalists, civil society organizations, technology specialists, and governments are finding to prevent and counter misinformation and disinformation. This primer presents several programmatic ideas to consider for stand-alone or integrative approaches as part of democracy and governance-related programming." (p.1)
https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00XFKF.pdf

2. **Misinformation Review.** Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy; Harvard Kennedy School, 2020

"The HKS Misinformation Review is a new format of peer-reviewed, scholarly publication. Content is produced and "fast-reviewed" by misinformation scientists and scholars, released under open access licensing, and geared towards emphasizing real-world implications. All content is targeted towards a specialized audience of researchers, journalists, fact checkers, educators, policy makers, and other practitioners working in the information, media, and platform landscape. We review and publish high-quality interdisciplinary research that examines misinformation from different perspectives, from its prevalence and impact to the effectiveness of possible interventions. We currently publish six regular issues per year. We also publish special issues on themes of particular relevance curated by guest editors. Every other month, we distribute a bimonthly digest to our subscribers. The bimonthly Digests contain all articles published in the previous two months on the HKS Misinformation Review." (Our mission)
https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/

3. Samantha Bradshaw, Hannah Bailey, Philip N. Howard: **Industrialized Disinformation: 2020 Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation.** Oxford: University of Oxford, Oxford Internet Institute, 2020, 23 pp.

"Our 2020 report highlights the recent trends of computational propaganda across 81 countries and the evolving tools, capacities, strategies, and resources used to manipulate public opinion around the globe. We identify three key trends in this year's inventory of disinformation activity: 1. Cyber troop activity continues to increase around the world. This year, we found evidence of 81 countries using social media to spread computational propaganda and disinformation about politics. This has increased from last years' report, in which we identified 70 countries with cyber troop activity. 2. Over the last year, social media firms have taken important steps to combat the misuse of their platforms by cyber troops. Public announcements by Facebook and Twitter between January 2019 and November 2020 reveal that more than 317,000 accounts and pages have been removed by the platforms. Nonetheless, almost US $10 million has still been spent on political advertisements by cyber troops operating around the world. 3. Private firms increasingly provide manipulation campaigns. In our 2020 report, we found firms operating in forty-eight countries, deploying computational propaganda on behalf of a political actor. Since 2018 there have been more than 65 firms offering computational propaganda as a service. In total, we have found almost US $60 million was spent on hiring these firms since 2009." (Executive summary)
https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2021/01/CyberTroop-Report-2020-v.2.pdf

4. Irene V. Pasquetto, Eaman Jahani, Alla Baranovsky, Matthew A. Baum: **Understanding Misinformation on Mobile Instant Messengers (MIMs) in Developing**

Countries. Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy, 2020, 27 pp.

"We conducted a mixed-methods research project in Nigeria, India, and Pakistan consisting of surveys, survey experiments, and semi-structured interviews, to better understand the spread and impact of misinformation, and in particular of misinformation on mobile messaging apps (MIMs). One of our goals was to evaluate the relevance and prevalence of viral false claims in each country. We found evidence that popular "false claims" debunked by fact-checking companies are widely recognized, but, unsurprisingly, news from mainstream media are more widely recognized than the false claims. This is certainly a good sign, which confirms similar trends reported elsewhere. However, we also found preliminary evidence that misinformation circulates wide on messaging apps. When asked whether and where they encountered researcher-selected false claims, participants reported to be exposed to more false claims than "mainstream claims" (i.e., true) on messaging apps, while this was not the case for traditional media, such as newspapers and TV News. While others have found false claims to be more prevalent on social media than on mainstream media, this is the first systematic evidence that messaging apps might be the primary source for spread of misinformation." (Executive summary)
https://shorensteincenter.org/misinformation-on-mims/

5. Daniel Arce: **Disinformation Strategies.** In: Defence and Peace Economics, 2024, 14 pp.

"Disinformation is a form of offensive counterintelligence via deception and neutralization in order to strategically manipulate an audience or create further fractures in existing divisions. Disinformation strategies include leaking, lying, seeding, and smearing. These strategies vary according to whether the information conveyed is true or false, and whether the source uses or hides its identity. This study characterizes the strategic relationship between lying and leaking, and the extent true and false sources of disinformation are believed. Additional characterizations include noisy and neutralizing disinformation, the importance of medium versus message, echo chambers, and the half-life of secrets." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2024.2302236

6. Michael Hameleers: **Disinformation as a context-bound phenomenon: toward a conceptual clarification integrating actors, intentions and techniques of creation and dissemination.** In: Communication Theory, vol. 33, nr. 1, 2023, pp. 1-10

"Although disinformation has become a popular concept, we lack an integrative conceptualization that connects the actors, intentions and techniques underlying deceptive information. In this article, we conceptualize disinformation as a context-bound deliberate act for which actors covertly deceive recipients by de-contextualizing, manipulating or fabricating information to maximize utility with the (targeted) outcome of misleading recipients. This conceptualization embeds fragmented accounts of disinformation in a networked and participatory information logic, and offers a comprehensive account of the conditions under which different actors may decide to deceive, how they deceive, and what they aim to achieve by deceiving recipients. Our conceptualization may inform (machine-learning) techniques to detect disinformation and interventions that aim to trigger suspicion by breaking through the truth-default state." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1093/ct/qtac021

7. Aldo Kleemann: **Deepfakes – When We Can No Longer Believe Our Eyes and Ears. Media Manipulation in Conflict: Challenges and Responses.** Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 2023, 6 pp.

"Deception and media manipulation have always been an integral part of wartime propaganda. But never before has it been so easy to create high-quality fabrications of images as well as sound and video recordings. The tendency to react emotionally to these media opens up a whole new possibility for abuse by their creators. A call to surrender by President Volodymyr Zelensky, which was immediately exposed as a deepfake, is the first attempt to use the new technology in an armed conflict. The quality of such fabrications is improving, detecting them is becoming increasingly complex and there is no end in sight to these developments. Banning deepfakes would be futile. It is therefore time to look at current and potential applications and possible counter-strategies." (p.1)

https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2023C52_Deepfakes.pdf

8. Weng Marc Lim: **Fact or Fake? The Search for Truth in an Infodemic of Disinformation, Misinformation, and Malinformation with Deepfake and Fake News.** In: Journal of Strategic Marketing, 2023, 37 pp.

"This article aims to shed light on the infodemic of disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation in the digital era of a new normal where deepfake and fake news are omnipresent. To do so, this article establishes a general theory of information and engages in big data analytics involving a scientometrics (bibliometrics) analysis with topic modeling of the major trends in the field. In doing so, this article reveals three noteworthy findings. First, infodemic is multifaceted in terms of its content, platform, manifestation, and solution. Second, infodemic research delivers the richest insights on misinformation, followed by fake news, disinformation, infodemic solutions, and malinformation. Third, interest in the dissemination of false information is greater than its creation, with the task of ascertaining the intrinsic elements (e.g. maliciousness in disinformation and malinformation) being more challenging than that of extrinsic elements (e.g. truth of misinformation). The article concludes with implications for theory and practice as well as directions for future research." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1080/0965254X.2023.2253805

9. Marta Pérez Escolar, Darren Lilleker, Alejandro Tapia Frade: **A Systematic Literature Review of the Phenomenon of Disinformation and Misinformation.** In: Media and Communication, vol. 11, nr. 2, 2023, pp. 76-87

"How does academia understand the disinformation problem, and are we equipped to offer solutions? In response to this question, our study provides an overview of the general definitions, trends, patterns, and developments that represent the research on disinformation and misinformation. We conducted a systematic review of N = 756 publications covering eight years, 2014–2022. This period captures phenomena such as Trump's emergence as a candidate for the US presidency, his term in office, as well as the leadership of figures such as Erdogan in Turkey, Bolsonaro in Brazil, Modi in India, and various similar populist and nationalist leaders across a range of democratic and semi-democratic societies. This period is also one that witnessed the first global pandemic, when misinformation and disinformation not only threatened societal cohesion but the lives of people. This systematic review explores the critical terminology used, the areas of social life where disinformation is identified as problematic, the sources identified as creating or circulating this material, as well as the channels studied, the targets, and the persuasiveness of the discourse. What this article offers, then, is an overview of what we know about disinformation and what gaps in research should be pursued. We conclude that given the problems that misinformation and disinformation are seen to cause for democratic societies, we need to assess the contribution of social science in providing a foundation for scientific knowledge." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v11i2.6453

10. Teresa Weikmann, Sophie Lecheler: **Visual disinformation in a digital age: A literature synthesis and research agenda.** In: New Media & Society, vol. 25, nr. 12, 2023, pp. 3696-3713

"Visuals are expected to amplify the impact of disinformation, but it is rarely specified how, and what exactly distinguishes them from text. This article is one of the first to treat visual disinformation as its own type of falsehood, arguing that it differs from textual disinformation in its production, processing and effects. We suggest that visual disinformation is determined by varying levels of modal richness and manipulative sophistication. Because manipulated visuals are processed differently on a psychological level, they have unique effects on citizens' behaviours and attitudes." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448221141648

11. Monika Benkler, Annika S. Hansen, Lilian Reichert: **Protecting the truth: Peace operations and disinformation.** Berlin: Center for International Peace Operations, 2022, 18 pp.

"This study discusses how and to what extent peace operations are affected

by digital disinformation and how international organisations (UN, EU, OSCE and NATO) as mandating bodies for peace operations have responded to limit the effect of disinformation or even prevent it. Based on this assessment of the current situation, the study identifies areas in need of action and suggests options for peace operations. These focus on four areas [Situational awareness; Response; Resilience; Cooperation] and include both short- and long-term measures." (Introduction)

https://reliefweb.int/report/world/protecting-truth-peace-operations-and-disinformation

12. Heather Mann (coord.): **History Under Attack: Holocaust Denial and Distortion on Social Media.** Paris: UNESCO, 2022, 68 pp.

"This publication is the first report from UNESCO and the United Nations to specifically address Holocaust denial and distortion. It details the ways in which social media is fertile ground for hate and prejudice - and proposes actions we can take in response. Based on the data of billions of Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Telegram users, the report outlines what information English, French, Spanish, and German speakers encounter about the Holocaust. Almost half of all Holocaust-related content on Telegram, for example, is false, misleading, or distorted. Holocaust denial and distortion are often present alongside other types of online hate speech and misinformation such as homophobia, misogyny, xenophobia, conspiracy theory and COVID-19 denial. This co-presence indicates that these issues should not necessarily be addressed in isolation." (Foreword)

https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000382159

13. Albert Trithart: **Disinformation Against UN Peacekeeping Operations.** New York: International Peace Institute (IPI), 2022, 15 pp.

"Over the past few years, a growing barrage of disinformation has targeted UN peacekeeping operations, particularly the missions in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Mali (MINUSMA), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). This includes false allegations that UN peacekeepers are trafficking weapons to armed groups, supporting terrorists, and exploiting natural resources. This disinformation makes it harder for peacekeeping operations to implement their mandates and has put the safety of peacekeepers at risk ... But considering how quickly this challenge has grown in scale, missions are still playing catch-up. They need greater capacity and coordination to monitor and analyze disinformation both online and offline. They need more streamlined approval processes that allow them to respond to disinformation more quickly. In the longer term, they also need to shift toward preventive approaches, including by proactively reshaping narratives about the UN and contributing to a healthier information environment through support to local journalists." (Executive summary)

https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/2212_Disinformation-against-UN-Peacekeeping-Ops.pdf

14. Jason Chumtong, Christina Stolte: **Cyber Capabilities as a New Resource of Power Conflicts in the Digital Sphere.** In: International Reports <Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung>, nr. 1, 2021, pp. 95-105

"Interestingly, traditional sources of power, such as military and economic strength, are not a prerequisite for success in cyberspace. It is true that the premier league of cyber powers also includes many traditional major powers in its ranks. But states need very few resources to build their cyber capabilities and exploit them to project influence, as the examples of international outsiders like Iran and Venezuela demonstrate. In some ways, cyber capabilities even seem ideally suited to allowing small and medium-sized countries to increase their influence because they represent an effective tool of asymmetric warfare. Even though they require relatively few resources and low-threshold technology, they have the potential to inflict considerable damage when deployed against other countries Attacks on poorly protected public authorities, businesses, or even infrastructure can cause serious damage to other countries. The risks for the attacker are reasonably low because attribution of the attacks is usually difficult and time-consuming. On top of this, the evidence is seldom clear, and consistent denial of any involvement is part and parcel of cyber warfare. This is also one of the key differences from previous power struggles at the international level. While the global battle for power and influence has always been accompanied by visible demonstrations of power and the accumulation of status symbols, the struggle in cyberspace takes place under the radar. This makes it especially difficult to identify shifts of power occurring today. Particularly in the field of information warfare, an area of growing importance in both national and international conflicts, states that were never previously on the radar as global players are now increasing their international influence. Yet, these countries recognised the potential of digital technologies at an early stage and are exploiting them with great success. Many of them have a wealth of experience in this respect due to having deployed the tools of information warfare against their own citizens and political opponents for many years. They can now direct this expertise towards other countries to wield global influence." (Conclusion, p.103)

https://www.kas.de/en/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/cyber-capabilities-as-a-new-resource-of-power

15. Alyt Damstra, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, Elena Broda et al.: **What Does Fake Look Like? A Review of the Literature on Intentional Deception in the News and on Social Media.** In: Journalism Studies, vol. 22, nr. 14, 2021, pp. 1947-1963

"This paper focuses on the content features of intentional deceptive information in the news (i.e., fake news) and on social media. Based on an extensive review of relevant literature (i.e., political journalism and communication, computational linguistics), we take stock of existing knowledge and present an overview of the structural characteristics that are indicative of intentionally deceptive information. We discuss the strength of underlying empirical evidence and identify underdeveloped areas of research. With this paper, we aim to contribute to the systematic study of intentional deception in the news and on social media and to help setting up new lines of research in which intentionally deceptive news items can be operationalized in consistent ways." (Abstract)

https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2021.1979423

16. Philip N. Howard, Lisa-Maria Neudert, Nayana Prakash: **Digital Misinformation / Disinformation and Children.** UNICEF, 2021, 35 pp.

"Children can be targets and objects of mis/disinformation, spreaders or creators of it, and opponents of mis/disinformation in actively seeking to counter falsehoods. There is insufficient data available to researchers and policymakers to get a clear and comprehensive picture of how susceptible children are to mis/disinformation and how it affects their development, well-being and rights. Approaches for ameliorating the harmful effects of mis/disinformation on children are emerging, but current efforts are falling short of protecting and empowering children. Children's rights – such as to freedom of expression and access to information – can be infringed by over-zealous attempts, including regulations, to restrict access to online content and communities. The mis/disinformation ecosystem can only be adequately addressed through a multi-pronged approach by a range of stakeholders that cooperate globally to protect children from the harms that stem from mis/disinformation." (Synopsis, p.4-5)

https://www.unicef.org/globalinsight/media/2096/file/UNICEF-Global-Insight-Digital-Mis-Disinformation-and-Children-2021.pdf

17. Ján Visnovský, Jana Radosinská (eds.): **Fake News is Bad News: Hoaxes, Half-Truths and the Nature of Today's Journalism.** Intech Open, 2021, 260 pp.

"The publication is focused on the ways fake news, disinformation, misinformation and hateful statements are spread across society, predominantly within the online environment. Its main ambition is to offer an interdisciplinary body of scholarly knowledge on fake news, disinformation and propaganda in relation to today's journalism, social development, political situation and cultural affairs happening all around the world." (Publisher description)

https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.87790

18. Marlie Celliers, Marie Hattingh: **A Systematic Review on Fake News Themes Reported in Literature.** In: M. Hattingh, M. Matthee, H. Smuts, I. Pappas, Y. K. Dwivedi, M. Mäntymäki (eds.): Responsible Design, Implementation and Use of Information and Communication Technology. I3E 2020. International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP), 2020, pp. 223-234

"In this systematic literature review, a study of the factors involved in the spreading of fake news, have been provided. In this review, the root causes of the spreading of fake news are identified to reduce the encouraging of

such false information. To combat the spreading of fake news on social media, the reasons behind the spreading of fake news must first be identified. Therefore, this literature review takes an early initiative to identify the possible reasons behind the spreading of fake news. The purpose of this literature review is to identify why individuals tend to share false information and to possibly help in detecting fake news before it spreads." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45002-1_19

19. Deen Freelom, Chris Wells: **Disinformation as Political Communication.** In: Political Communication, vol. 37, nr. 2, 2020, pp. 145-156

"This introduction to the special issue "Beyond Fake News: The Politics of Disinformation" contains four main sections. In the first, we discuss the major sociopolitical factors that have allowed disinformation to flourish in recent years. Second, we review the very short history of disinformation research, devoting particular attention to two of its more extensively studied conceptual relatives: propaganda and isinformation. Third, we preview the seven articles in this issue, which we divide into two types: studies of disinformation content and of disinformation reception. We conclude by advancing a few suggestions for future disinformation research." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2020.1723755

20. Ralf Hohlfeld, Michael Harnischmacher, Elfi Heinke, Lea Sophia Lehner, Michael Sengl (eds.): **Fake News und Desinformation: Herausforderungen für die vernetzte Gesellschaft und die empirische Forschung.** Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020, 361 pp.

"Desinformation ist eine Konstante der politischen Kommunikation. Doch mit der Wahl Donald Trumps zum Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten und der Brexit-Abstimmung in Großbritannien erhielten bewusst lancierte Falschnachrichten eine neue gesellschaftliche Bedeutung. Denn nun wurde sichtbar, welche Wirkungen Falschmeldungen für demokratische Systeme haben. Der Band geht diesem Phänomen auf den Grund, indem er herausarbeitet, was "Fake News" sind. Er geht der Frage nach, wie, warum und von wem sie eingesetzt werden und reflektiert, was man gesellschaftlich und persönlich dagegen tun kann. Das Buch gibt zu diesem Zweck einen Überblick über den aktuellen Stand der empirischen Forschung zu Fake News und Desinformation, besonders mit Blick auf deren Verbreitung, Erkennbarkeit und Wirksamkeit. Zugleich diskutiert er in einer Mischung aus Essays, theoretischen Erörterungen und empirischen Studien die Herausforderungen von Desinformation für unsere Gesellschaft und beleuchtet so das Thema von allen Seiten." (Verlagsbeschreibung)
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748901334

21. Hannah Smith, Katherine Manstead: **Weaponised Deep Fakes: National Security and Democracy.** Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), International Cyber Policy Centre, 2020, 18 pp.

"Any technology that can be used to generate false or misleading content, from photocopiers and Photoshop software to deep fakes, can be weaponised. This paper argues that policymakers face a narrowing window of opportunity to minimise the consequences of weaponised deep fakes. Any response must include measures across three lines of effort: 1. investment in and deployment of deep fake detection technologies; 2. changing online behaviour, including via policy measures that empower digital audiences to critically engage with content and that bolster trusted communication channels; 3. creation and enforcement of digital authentication standards." (p.4)
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/weaponised-deep-fakes

22. Jonathan Tanner: **10 Things to Know About Misinformation and Disinformation.** London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2020, 13 pp.

"By accident or design, the internet and social media have created the ideal conditions for a huge increase in false information and conspiracy theories. This can cause real harm offline, especially because digital literacy and digital policy are both currently unable to keep up with the pace of change. In recent years, major democracies have had to investigate foreign interference in their digital information ecosystems. Over a third of Europeans now encounter so-called 'fake news' every day. In late June this year, the World Health Organization (WHO) held its first-ever conference

looking at 'infodemiology' in response to misinformation related to Covid-19. Now established fact-checking organisations are emerging across the world and major media organisations have misinformation and disinformation (MDI) reporters. Here are 10 things you need to know about MDI and how it can be tackled." (p.2)
https://odi.org/en/publications/10-things-to-know-about-misinformation-and-disinformation/

23. Yariv Tsfati, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, Jesper Strömbäck, Rens Vliegenthart, Alyt Damstra, Elina Lindgren: **Causes and Consequences of Mainstream Media Dissemination of Fake News: Literature Review and Synthesis.** In: Annals of the International Communication Association, vol. 44, nr. 2, 2020, pp. 157-173

"Research indicates that the reach of fake news websites is limited to small parts of the population. On the other hand, data demonstrate that large proportions of the public know about notable fake news stories and believe them. These findings imply the possibility that most people hear about fake news stories not from fake news websites but through their coverage in mainstream news outlets. Thus far, only limited attention has been directed to the role of mainstream media in the dissemination of disinformation. To remedy this, this article synthesizes the literature pertaining to understand the role mainstream media play in the dissemination of fake news, the reasons for such coverage and its influences on the audience." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1080/23808985.2020.1759443

24. Lejla Turcilo, Mladen Obrenovic: **Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation: Causes, Trends, and Their Influence on Democracy.** Sarajevo: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2020, 38 pp.

"The aim of this paper is to investigate the phenomena of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation, as well as their impact on the political sphere. In addition, the paper attempts to explain the harmful influence of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation on public debates, democratic processes, and civil society engagement." (Introduction)
https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/2020-08/200825_E-Paper3_ENG.pdf

AFRICA, SUB-SAHARAN

25. Burgert Senekal, Susan Brokensha: **Is ChatGPT a Friend or Foe in the War on Misinformation? A South African Perspective.** In: Communicare: Journal for Communication Studies in Africa, vol. 42, nr. 2, 2023, pp. 3-16
https://doi.org/10.36615/jcsa.%0D%0Av42i2.2437

26. Elena Gadjanova, Gabrielle Lynch, Ghadafi Saibu: **Misinformation Across Digital Divides: Theory and Evidence from Northern Ghana.** In: African Affairs, vol. 121, nr. 483, 2022, pp. 161-195
https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adac009

27. **Fake News Misinformation and Hate Speech in Ethiopia: A Vulnerability Assessment.** Brussels: European Institute of Peace, 2021, 22 pp.
https://www.eip.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Fake-News-Misinformation-and-Hate-Speech-in-Ethiopia.pdf

AMERICAS & CARIBBEAN

28. Joao V. S. Ozawa, Samuel C. Woolley, Joseph Straubhaar, Martin J. Riedl, Katie Joseff, Jacob Gursky: **How Disinformation on WhatsApp Went From Campaign Weapon to Governmental Propaganda in Brazil.** In: Social Media + Society, 2023, 11 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051231160632

29. Rose Marie Santini, Marcio Borges: **Desinformação e a campanha contra a imprensa:**

https://www.medienanstalt-nrw.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Bericht__Studie_Vorsicht_Desinformation

45. Vera Tolz, Stephen Hutchings: **Truth with a Z: disinformation, war in Ukraine, and Russia's contradictory discourse of imperial identity.** In: Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 39, nr. 5, 2023, pp. 347-365
https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2023.2202581

46. **Social Media and the Information War in the Balkans.** Brussels: Balkan Free Media Initiative, 2022, 52 pp.
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/607edb92071ad0422f427dcb/t/624470ff70635447e17d786c/1648652553350/Social%20Media%20Report%20BFMI.pdf

47. **Ukrainekrieg auf Telegram: Rechtsextremer Knotenpunkt für Desinformationen und Verschwörungserzählungen.** Mainz: jugendschutz.net, 2022, 9 pp.
https://www.jugendschutz.net/mediathek/artikel/report-ukrainekrieg-auf-telegram

48. Amelie Bendheim, Jennifer Pavlik (eds.): **"Fake News" in Literatur und Medien: Fakten und Fiktionen im interdisziplinären Diskurs.** Bielefeld: transcript, 2022, 235 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783839460191

49. Jana Laura Egelhofer, Ming Boyer, Sophie Lecheler, Loes Aaldering: **Populist attitudes and politicians' disinformation accusations: effects on perceptions of media and politicians.** In: Journal of Communication, vol. 72, nr. 6, 2022, pp. 619-632
https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqac031

50. Jelena Kleut et al.: **Mapping Disinformation in the Serbian Media.** Beograd: CRTA, 2022, 98 pp.
https://crta.rs/en/report-mapping-disinformation-in-the-serbian-media/

51. Dolors Palau-Sampio: **Pseudo-Media Disinformation Patterns: Polarised Discourse, Clickbait and Twisted Journalistic Mimicry.** In: Journalism Practice, vol. 17, nr. 10, 2022, pp. 2140-2158
https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2022.2126992

52. Marianna Karakoulaki, Giulia Dessi: **Antisemitism and Anti-Vax Discourse in Europe: A Report on Conspiracy Ideologies and Anti-Jewish Hatred on Facebook and Twitter.** Media Diversity Institute, 2021, 57 pp.
https://www.media-diversity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Antisemitism-and-anti-vax-discourse-in-Europe_MDI_GTTO.pdf

53. Ilda Londo: **Hate Narratives and Disinformation in Online Media in Albania.** Tirana: South East European Network for Professionalization of Media (SEENPM), 2021, 27 pp.
https://seenpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Resilience-research-publication-2-Albania-English.pdf

54. Lennart Maschmeyer: **Digital Disinformation: Evidence from Ukraine.** Zürich: ETH Zürich, Center for Security Studies (CSS), 2021, 4 pp.
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000463741

55. Semir Dzebo, Dumitrita Holdis, Jozef Michal Mintal, Judit Szakacs: **The Unbearable Ease of Misinformation.** Budapest: Center for Media, Data and Society (CMDS), 2020, 163 pp.
https://cmds.ceu.edu/sites/cmcs.ceu.hu/files/attachment/article/1943/theunbearableeaseofmisinformation.pdf

56. Samuel Greene, Gregory Asmolov, Adam Fagan, Ofer Fridman, Borjan Gjuzelov: **Mapping Fake News and Disinformation in the Western Balkans and Identifying Ways to Effectively Counter Them.** European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, 2020, 101 pp.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/653621/EXPO_STU(2020)653621_EN.pdf

57. Ilda Londo: **Hate Speech, Propaganda and Disinformation in Albanian Media.** Tirana; Ljubljana: South East European Network for Professionalization of Media (SEENPM); Peace Institute; Albanian Media Institute, 2020, 27 pp.
https://seenpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Resilience-research-publication-1-ALB-ENG.pdf

58. Andriy Yurichko: **Fake News Addicts: How Disinformation and its Mongers Strive in Ukraine 2020.** Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 2020, 10 pp.
https://bit.ly/3Iy4SIl

MIDDLE EAST / WESTERN ASIA & NORTH AFRICA

59. **The Fragility of Freedom: Online Holocaust Denial and Distortion.** London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD); Coalition to Counter Online Antisemitism (CCOA), 2024, 37 pp.
https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/the-fragility-of-freedom-online-holocaust-denial-and-distortion/

60. Marina Ayeb, Tiziano Bonini: **"It Was Very Hard for Me to Keep Doing That Job": Understanding Troll Farm's Working in the Arab World.** In: Social Media + Society, 2024, 10 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051231224713

61. Deborah Schnabel, Eva Berendsen: **Die TikTok-Intifada – Der 7. Oktober & die Folgen im Netz: Analyse & Empfehlungen der Bildungsstätte Anne Frank.** Frankfurt: Bildungsstätte Anne Frank, 2024, 38 pp.
https://www.bs-anne-frank.de/mediathek/publikationen/die-tiktok-intifada-der-7-oktober-die-folgen-im-netz

62. Mirna Ghanem: **Lebanon's Information Environment: Exploring Appropriate Responses.** Metn: Samir Kassir Foundation; National Endowment for Democracy (NED), 2023, 32 pp.
https://www.skeyesmedia.org/documents/bo_filemanager/Lebanons-Information-Environment_EN_20230619.pdf

63. **Deadly Disinformation: How Online Conspiracies About Syria Cause Real-World Harm.** Syria Campaign; Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD); Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), 2022, 27 pp.
https://deadlydisinformation.org/source/Deadly_Disinformation_EN.pdf

64. Aida Al-Kaisy: **Disinformation in Iraqi Media.** London: LSE Middle East Centre; Conflict Research Programme (CRP), 2021, 21 pp.
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/112476/1/MEC_paper_55_disinformation_in_the_iraqi_media.pdf

65. Baris Kirdemir: **Exploring Turkey's Disinformation Ecosystem: An Overview.** Istanbul: Edam Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy

Studies, 2020, 28 pp.

https://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Exploring-Turkeys-Disinformation-Ecosystem-by-Baris-Kirdemir.pdf

Climate Change Communication & Climate Change Reporting

GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

66. Deny, Deceive, Delay (vol.2): Exposing New Trends in Climate Mis- and Disinformation at COP27. Climate Action Against Disinformation, 2023, 43 pp.

"Analysis of over 850 advertisers between 1 September and 23 November 2022 showed a small cohort drove the majority of false or greenwashed advertising on Facebook, with activity peaking in the weeks preceding and during COP27. Common techniques included 'nature-rinsing', to distract and mislead audiences on net zero targets, as well as denial of climate science and emotional messaging around livelihoods, national security and sovereignty in relation to fossil fuels. Given the advertising spend identified, it is probable these messages were viewed by a wide audience at a key juncture in the climate agenda". (p.10) ... "At COP26, outright denialism was seemingly outpaced by subtler 'discourses of delay' and attacks on climate action. In 2022, denialist content made a stark comeback on Twitter in particular, with the hashtag #ClimateScam spiking out of nowhere in July 2022. Since then, CAAD analysis has recorded over 362k mentions (including retweets) originating from over 91k unique users, with daily mentions never dropping below 1000 posts. The term often appears to be trending despite data that shows more activity and engagement on other hashtags such as #ClimateCrisis and #ClimateEmergency. The source of its virality, including explicit promotion via Twitter's recommendation algorithm, is therefore unclear, and again highlights the need for transparency on how and why platforms surface content to users." (p.17)

https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Deny-Deceive-Delay-Vol.-2.pdf

67. Tobias Meilicke, Cornelius Strobel (eds.): Aufgeheizt: Verschwörungserzählungen rund um die Klimakrise. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (bpb), 2023, 169 pp.

"Dürren, Waldbrände, Überschwemmungen – die Klimakrise ist in vollem Gange. Trotz der vollkommenen Offensichtlichkeit dieser existenziellen Bedrohung blühen die Mythen rund um das Thema: Die Daten würden gefälscht, die Bevölkerung hinters Licht geführt, alle Maßnahmen gegen die Klimakrise seien in Wahrheit nur Teil des „großen Plans der unsichtbaren Eliten". Dieser Band nimmt solche Mythen in den Blick. Was wird von wem auf welche Art verbreitet? Was bewirken diese Verschwörungserzählungen, welche Funktion übernehmen sie für diejenigen, die an sie glauben? Und welche Herausforderungen bringt der Glaube daran für die unterschiedlichsten Professionen mit sich, von den Sicherheitsbehörden, über die politische Bildung bis hin zur psychosozialen Beratung? Das alles will der Band „Aufgeheizt. Verschwörungserzählungen rund um die Klimakrise" beleuchten, und er will verdeutlichen, was diese Verschwörungserzählungen anrichten – mit der Gesellschaft im Gesamten, aber auch direkt mit denjenigen, die sich gegen die Klimakrise stemmen." (Verlagsbeschreibung)

https://www.bpb.de/system/files/dokument_pdf/bpb_002_SR_Verschwoerungserzaehlungen_online.pdf

68. Jennie King, Lukasz Janulewicz, Francesca Arcostanzo: Deny, Deceive, Delay: Documenting and Responding to Climate Disinformation at COP26 and Beyond. Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD); CASM Technology, 2022, 115 pp.

"In February 2022, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) took an unprecedented step, citing mis- and disinformation and the "politicization of science" as key barriers to action. For the first time, a document accepted by all Member Governments stated that rhetoric from "vested economic and political interests… undermines climate science" and in turn has driven "public misperception of climate risks and polarised public support for climate actions". The diagnosis was explicit, and built on a growing body of evidence produced across the environmental and research sectors in recent years: to solve the climate crisis, we must also tackle the information crisis. Drawing on research compiled over the past 18 months, and especially in the margins and aftermath of COP26, we have clear evidence of the challenge at hand: the failure to stem mis- and disinformation online has allowed junk science, climate delayism and attacks on climate figures to become mainstreamed. Our analysis has shown how a small but dedicated community of actors boast disproportionate reach and engagement across social media, reaching millions of people worldwide and bolstered by legacy print, broadcast and radio outlets. Far from helping to mitigate this issue, tech platform systems appear to be amplifying or exacerbating the spread of such content. Moreover, the taxonomy of harm relating to climate mis- and disinformation has been poorly defined to date, providing an inadequate basis for response. This report is a collective effort to quantify the problem and establish concrete responses for the months and years ahead. It is a data-driven examination of the landscape, actors, systems and approaches that are combining to prevent action on climate." (https://www.isdglobal.org)

https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Summative-Report-COP26.pdf

69. Rose Marie Santini, Carlos Eduardo Barros: Negacionismo climático e desinformação online: Uma revisão de escopo. In: Liinc em Revista <Rio de Janeiro>, vol. 18, nr. 1, e5948, 2022, 27 pp.

"Esforços de síntese de evidências vêm apontando para o avanço das formas organizadas de desinformação e negação do conhecimento científico sobre a mudança climática global. Em vários países do mundo, há um forte debate sobre a difusão dessas narrativas no ambiente online e seus impactos políticos, sociais e econômicos. Neste trabalho, realizamos uma revisão de escopo aplicada às bases Web of Science e Scopus, a fim de mapear como a literatura acadêmica internacional vem descrevendo as relações entre o negacionismo da ciência sobre mudanças climáticas e o uso de campanhas de desinformação no século XXI, assim como as possíveis lacunas e apontamentos desses estudos para a agenda de pesquisas. Em todos os tipos de mídias estudados nos 31 artigos selecionados, foi identificada uma predominância de discursos contrários ao consenso científico sobre o tema, alavancada por campanhas de desinformação organizadas, inclusive, por atores governamentais. Observamos um crescimento significativo do campo nos últimos anos, assim como transformações estratégicas nas comunicações negacionistas tendendo a uma disputa maior da opinião pública sobre a ciência." (Resumo)

https://doi.org/10.18617/liinc.v18i1.5948

AMERICAS & CARIBBEAN

70. Panorama da infodemia socioambiental: Análise multiplataforma do ecossistema brasileiro de mídia digital 2021-2022. NetLab, 2023, 75 pp.

https://www.netlab.eco.br/post/panorama-da-infodemia-socioambiental

71. Débora Salles, Priscila Muniz de Medeiros, Rose Marie Santini, Carlos Eduardo Barros: The Far-Right Smokescreen: Environmental Conspiracy and Culture Wars on Brazilian YouTube. In: Social Media + Society, 2023, 22 pp.

https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051231196876

Consumption & Perception of Disinformation, User (Dis-)Trust, Psychology of Fake News

GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

72. Survey on the impact of online disinformation and hate speech. Paris: UNESCO; Ipsos, 2023, 35 slides

"On average in the 16 countries surveyed, 56% of internet useres frequently use social media to stay informed about current events, far ahead of television (44%). However, it is worth noting that differences exist among population groups: tlevision is the primary source in the most developed countries (55% compared to 37% for social media), while it lags significantly in countries with high (42% vs 63%) or medium/low levels of Human Development Index (HDI) (37% vs 68%) ... The significance of social media as a source of information, especially during election campaigns, is even

more crucial given that citizens believe disinformation is highly prevalent there. Across all 16 countries, 68% of internet users told us that social media is the place where disinformation is most widespread, far ahead of groups on online messaging apps (38%) and media websites/apps (20%). This sentiment is overwhelmingly prevalent in all countries, age groups, social backgrounds, and political preferences. This is even more important and citizens feel that the issue of disinformation is a real threat: 85% express concern about the impact and influence of disinformation on their fellow citizens." (Analysis of key results)

73. Anke K. Finger, Manuela Wagner (eds.): **Bias, Belief, and Conviction in an Age of Fake Facts.** London; New York: Routledge, 2023, xiii, 212 pp.

"In this book, authors engage in an interdisciplinary discourse of theory and practice on the concept of personal conviction, addressing the variety of grey zones that mark the concept. Bias, Belief, and Conviction in an Age of Fake Facts discusses where our convictions come from and whether we are aware of them, why they compel us to certain actions, and whether we can change our convictions when presented with opposing evidence, which prove our personal convictions "wrong". Scholars from philosophy, psychology, comparative literature, media studies, applied linguistics, intercultural communication, and education shed light on the topic of personal conviction, crossing disciplinary boundaries and asking questions not only of importance to scholars but also related to the role and possible impact of conviction in the public sphere, education, and in political and cultural discourse. By taking a critical look at personal conviction as an element of inquiry within the humanities and social sciences, this book will contribute substantially to the study of conviction as an aspect of the self we all carry within us and are called upon to examine." (Publisher description)

74. Aaron M French, Storey Veda C., Linda Wallace: **The Impact of Cognitive Biases on the Believability of Fake News.** In: European Journal of Information Systems, 2023, 22 pp.

"Modern technologies, especially social networks, contribute to the rapid evolution and spread of fake news. Although the creation of fake news is a serious issue, it is the believability of fake news and subsequent actions that produce negative outcomes that can be harmful to individuals and society. Prior research has focused primarily on the role of confirmation bias in explaining the believability of fake news, but other biases are likely. In this research, we use theories of truth and a taxonomy of 10 cognitive biases to conduct an exploratory, qualitative survey of social media users. Five cognitive biases (herd, framing, overconfidence, confirmation, and anchoring) emerge as the most influential. We then propose a Cognitive Bias Mitigation Model of methods that could reduce the believability of fake news. The mitigation methods are grouped according to three themes as they relate to the five biases." (Abstract)

75. Markus Appel, Fabian Prietzel: **The detection of political deepfakes.** In: Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, vol. 27, nr. 4, zmac008, 2022, 13 pp.

"In this article, a theoretical model on the detection of deepfakes by ordinary citizens is introduced. The authors conducted three studies in which deepfakes with political content were presented. The deepfakes showed UK's Prime Minister Boris Johnson or Barack Obama. In the deepfake videos, the two politicians said things they had never said in real life. The authors expected that people who regularly and automatically reflect on information they see (analytic thinking) are more likely to identify deepfakes correctly than people who tend to be less reflective, more intuitive. The authors further expected that interest in politics is positively related to detecting political deepfakes. Indeed, the higher participants' scores on analytic thinking (Studies 1-2) and political interest (Study 1), the better participants identified the deepfakes. Moreover, people with high analytic thinking and political interest were better at identifying a fake news article to be inaccurate (whether or not a warranting deepfake video was presented, Study 3). It is discussed how researchers, everyday people, and whole societies can deal with deepfakes." (Lay summary)

76. Gizem Ceylan, Ian A. Anderson, Wendy Wood:

Sharing of Misinformation is Habitual, Not Just Lazy or Biased. In: PNAS, vol. 120, nr. 4, e2216614120, 2022, 8 pp.

"Why do people share misinformation on social media? In this research (N = 2,476), we show that the structure of online sharing built into social platforms is more important than individual deficits in critical reasoning and partisan bias—commonly cited drivers of misinformation. Due to the reward-based learning systems on social media, users form habits of sharing information that attracts others' attention. Once habits form, information sharing is automatically activated by cues on the platform without users considering response outcomes such as spreading misinformation. As a result of user habits, 30 to 40% of the false news shared in our research was due to the 15% most habitual news sharers. Suggesting that sharing of false news is part of a broader response pattern established by social media platforms, habitual users also shared information that challenged their own political beliefs. Finally, we show that sharing of false news is not an inevitable consequence of user habits: Social media sites could be restructured to build habits to share accurate information." (Abstract)

77. Andrew Chadwick, James Stanyer: **Deception as a Bridging Concept in the Study of Disinformation, Misinformation, and Misperceptions: Toward a Holistic Framework.** In: Communication Theory, vol. 32, nr. 1, 2022, pp. 1-24

"We propose deception as a bridging concept that will enhance the study of misinformation, disinformation, and misperceptions. As we set it out here, the concept integrates insights from multiple social science disciplines and uniquely connects actors' intentions, information, and attitudinal or behavioral outcomes. A focus on deception will enrich research that describes the existence of false and misleading information but stops short of identifying their influence. Equally, through its focus on how actors' deceptive strategies are important in attempts to exercise power, it can augment the study of the cognitive and attitudinal biases that render people susceptible to misperceptions. We identify the main themes in the study of deception: media-systemic distortions in information supply; the relational interactions that both produce and activate cognitive biases; and the attributes, strategies, and techniques of deceptive entities. We conclude with a summary typology of 10 principal variables and their 57 focal indicators." (Abstract)

78. Aleksi Knuutila, Lisa-Maria Neudert, Philip N. Howard: **Who is Afraid of Fake News? Modeling Risk Perceptions of Misinformation in 142 Countries.** In: Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, vol. 3, nr. 3, 2022, 13 pp.

"Using survey data from 154,195 respondents in 142 countries, we investigate internet user perceptions of the risks associated with being exposed to misinformation. We find that: 1) The majority of regular internet users globally (58.5%) worry about misinformation, and young and low-income groups are most likely to be concerned. 2) Risk perception among internet users varies starkly across regions whereby concern is highest in Latin America and the Caribbean (74.2%), and lowest in South Asia (31.2%). 3) Differences are unrelated to the prevalence of misinformation, yet concern is highest in countries with liberal democratic governments. We discuss implications for successful policy and platform interventions." (Abstract)

79. Tahir Mumtaz Awan, Mahroz Aziz, Aruba Sharif, Tehreem Raza Ch., Taha Jasam, Yusra Alvi: **Fake news during the pandemic times: A systematic literature review using PRISMA.** In: Open Information Science, vol. 6, 2022, pp. 49-60

"The purpose of this systematic literature review is to review the major studies about misinformation and fake news during COVID-19 on social media. A total of 144 articles studies were retrieved from ScienceDirect, Scopus, and Web of Science databases and 20 relevant articles were selected using the PRISMA technique. It was found that altruism, instant news sharing, self-promotion, and socialization are predictors of fake news sharing. Furthermore, the human mind plays a significant role in spreading misinformation while the role of critical thinking of individuals is very much

important in controlling the flow of misinformation." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1515/opis-2022-0131

80. Tom Buchanan: **Trust, personality, and belief as determinants of the organic reach of political disinformation on social media.** In: The Social Science Journal, 2021, 12 pp.

"False political information spreads far and fast across social media, with negative consequences for society. Individual users play a key role in sharing such material, extending its range through the phenomenon of organic reach. An online experiment tested the hypotheses that higher trust in the source of false information, and lower agreeableness of the person encountering it, would predict their likelihood of extending its reach. One hundred and seventy-two participants saw real examples of disinformation stories that had been posted to social media and rated their likelihood of sharing and interacting with it in other ways. Neither trust in the source nor agreeableness influenced organic reach. However, people lower in conscientiousness rated themselves as more likely to extend its reach, as did people who believed the stories more likely to be true." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1080/03623319.2021.1975085

81. Rainer Greifeneder, Mariela Elena Jaffé, Eryn Newman, Norbert Schwarz (eds.): **The Psychology of Fake News: Accepting, Sharing, and Correcting Misinformation.** London; New York: Routledge, 2021, x, 239 pp.

"In a general climate where facts and misinformation blur, and are intentionally blurred, this book asks what determines whether people accept and share (mis)information, and what can be done to counter misinformation? All three of these aspects need to be understood in the context of online social networks, which have fundamentally changed the way information is produced, consumed, and transmitted. The contributions within this volume summarize the most up-to-date empirical findings, theories, and applications and discuss cutting-edge ideas and future directions of interventions to counter fake news." (Publisher description)
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429295379

82. Gordon Pennycook, David G. Rand: **The Psychology of Fake News.** In: Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 25, nr. 5, 2021, pp. 388-402

"We synthesize a burgeoning literature investigating why people believe and share false or highly misleading news online. Contrary to a common narrative whereby politics drives susceptibility to fake news, people are 'better' at discerning truth from falsehood (despite greater overall belief) when evaluating politically concordant news. Instead, poor truth discernment is associated with lack of careful reasoning and relevant knowledge, and the use of heuristics such as familiarity. Furthermore, there is a substantial disconnect between what people believe and what they share on social media. This dissociation is largely driven by inattention, more so than by purposeful sharing of misinformation. Thus, interventions can successfully nudge social media users to focus more on accuracy. Crowdsourced veracity ratings can also be leveraged to improve social media ranking algorithms." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2021.02.007

83. Samuel C. Wolley, Katie Joseff: **Demand for Deceit: How the Way We Think Drives Disinformation.** Washington DC: National Endowment for Democracy (NED), 2020, 38 pp.

"Just because the effectiveness of disinformation may be tied to innate aspects of human psychology does not mean that democratic societies are powerless to respond. Rather, civil society, journalists, and other stakeholders invested in the freedom and openness of the global information space should develop innovative adaptations to the contemporary, disinformation-rich information landscape by bearing in mind key insights from the 'demand' side of this challenge: passive and active demand for disinformation; disinformation as a global phenomenon; accounting for psychology in fact-checking initiatives; mistrust vs. media literacy; the impact of emerging technologies on the disinformation crisis." (Executive summary)
https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Demand-for-Deceit.pdf

AFRICA, SUB-SAHARAN

84. Joel Cariolle, Yasmine Elkhateeb, Mathilde Maurel: **Misinformation technology: Internet use and political misperceptions in Africa.** In: Journal of Comparative Economics, 2024, 34 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2024.01.002

85. Dani Madrid-Morales, Herman Wasserman et al.: **Motivations for Sharing Misinformation: A Comparative Study in Six Sub-Saharan African Countries.** In: International Journal of Communication, vol. 15, 2021, pp. 1200-1219
https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/14801

86. Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny, Edem Selormey: **Double-Edged Sword? Ghanaians See Pros, Cons of Social Media, Want Access But Not Fake News.** Afrobarometer, 2020, 12 pp.
http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ad366-fake_news_and_social_media_in_ghana-7june20.pdf

AMERICAS & CARIBBEAN

87. Darren L. Linvill, Patrick L. Warren, Amanda E. Moore: **Talking to Trolls—How Users Respond to a Coordinated Information Operation and Why They're so Supportive.** In: Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, vol. 27, nr. 1, zmab022, 2022, 19 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1093/jcmc/zmab022

ASIA & PACIFIC

88. Samuel Doveri Vesterbye, Shairbek Dzhuraev, Andreas Marazis: **Central Asian Media Consumption and Disinformation: A Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment in the Context of Geo-Politics.** Internews; European Neighbourhood Council (ENC), 2023, 62 pp.
https://internews.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/2023-03-ENC-Report-ENG-V8-POST-PRINT.pdf

89. Michael Hameleers, Darian Harff, Désirée Schmuck: **The Alternative Truth Kept Hidden From Us: The Effects of Multimodal Disinformation Disseminated by Ordinary Citizens and Alternative Hyper-Partisan Media. Evidence From the US and India.** In: Digital Journalism, 2023, 22 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2023.2210616

90. Carol Soon, Shwan Goh: **Singaporeans' Susceptibility to False Information.** Singapore: National University of Singapore, Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), 2021, 141 pp.
https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/ips/ips-exchange-series-19.pdf

91. **FactShala User Study: Executive Summary. Baseline Status of Internet Users in India.** Internews; DataLEADS; fact India Media Literacy Network, 2020, 29 pp.
https://internews.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/FactShala_User_Study_Report_2020_v10.pdf

EUROPE

92. Kai Unzicker: **Disinformation: A Challenge for Democracy. Attitudes and perceptions in Europe.** Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung; Upgrade Democracy,

2023, 38 pp.

"Fifty-four percent of EU citizens reported being "often" or "very often" unsure whether a piece of information they saw on the internet in recent months was true. Only 4 % reported never being unsure of information they saw. Thirty-nine percent of respondents reported consciously encountering disinformation, while only ten percent said they did not encounter any disinformation at all. Respondents with a university-level degree are more likely to report being unsure and encountering disinformation than respondents with no formal education. Younger respondents tend to feel unsure less often than older respondents, but these young people also report encountering disinformation more often. Respondents in Spain and Italy show a comparatively higher frequency of uncertainty and reported encounters with disinformation, while respondents in the Netherlands show the lowest values in both cases [...] The study allows us to infer the following four recommendations for action: (1) establish an effective system for monitoring disinformation both in Germany and across Europe; (2) raise public awareness about the issue of disinformation; (3) promote media literacy among people of all age groups; (4) ensure consistent and transparent content creation on digital platforms." (Key findings, p.4-5)
https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/disinformation-a-challange-for-democracy

93. Felipe Bonow Soares, Anatoliy Gruzd, Philip Mai: **Falling for Russian Propaganda: Understanding the Factors that Contribute to Belief in Pro-Kremlin Disinformation on Social Media.** In: Social Media + Society, 2023, 10 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051231220330

94. Andrew Chadwick, Cristian Vaccari, Nathalie-Anne Hall: **What Explains the Spread of Misinformation in Online Personal Messaging Networks? Exploring the Role of Conflict Avoidance.** In: Digital Journalism, 2023, 20 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2023.2206038

95. Georgi Dragolov, Klaus Boehnke, Kai Unzicker: **Verschwörungsmentalität in Krisenzeiten.** Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2023, 15 pp.
https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/UD_Verschoerungsmentalitaet_2023_deu.pdf

96. Zea Szebeni, Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti, Jan-Erik Lönnqvist, Zsolt Péter Szabó: **The price of (dis)trust – profiling believers of (dis)information in the Hungarian context.** In: Social Influence, vol. 18, nr. 1, 2023, 27 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15534510.2023.2279662

97. Kai Unzicker: **Desinformation: Herausforderung für die Demokratie. Einstellungen und Wahrnehmungen in Europa.** Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2023, 38 pp.
https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/ST-DZ_Desinformation_Herausforderung_fuer_die_Demokratie_Europa_2023.pdf

98. Michael Hameleers, Anna Brosius, Franziska Marquardt, Andreas C. Goldberg, Erika van Elsas, Claes H. de Vreese: **Mistake or Manipulation? Conceptualizing Perceived Mis- and Disinformation among News Consumers in 10 European Countries.** In: Communication Research, vol. 49, nr. 7, 2022, pp. 919-941
https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650221997719

99. Pia Lamberty, Corinne Heuer, Josef Holnburger: **Belastungsprobe für die Demokratie: Pro-russische Verschwörungserzählungen und Glaube an Desinformation in der Gesellschaft.** Berlin: Center für Monitoring, Analyse und Strategie (CeMAS), 2022,

9 pp.
https://cemas.io/publikationen/belastungsprobe-fuer-die-demokratie/

MIDDLE EAST / WESTERN ASIA & NORTH AFRICA

100. Nidal Ayoub: **Mis- and Disinformation: Media Perception and Consumption of Fake News in Lebanon.** Metn: Samir Kassir Foundation, 2023, 20 pp.
https://www.skeyesmedia.org/documents/bo_filemanager/Disinformation-FG-report-EN_20230530.pdf

101. Giselle Rampersad, Turki Althiyabi: **Fake news: Acceptance by demographics and culture on social media.** In: Journal of Information Technology & Politics, vol. 17, nr. 1, 2020, pp. 1-11
https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2019.1686676

Countering Disinformation, Hate Speech & Extremist Media

GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

102.Jon Bateman, Dean Jackson: **Countering Disinformation Effectively: An Evidence-Based Policy Guide.** Washinton, DC: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2024, vii, 119 pp.

"This report offers a high-level, evidence-informed guide to some of the major proposals for how democratic governments, platforms, and others can counter disinformation. It distills core insights from empirical research and real-world data on ten diverse kinds of policy interventions, including fact-checking, foreign sanctions, algorithmic adjustments, and counter-messaging campaigns. For each case study, we aim to give policymakers an informed sense of the prospects for success—bridging the gap between the mostly meager scientific understanding and the perceived need to act. This means answering three core questions: How much is known about an intervention? How effective does the intervention seem, given current knowledge? And how easy is it to implement at scale?" (Summary, p.1)
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Carnegie_Countering_Disinformation_Effectively.pdf

103. **Countermeasures for Mitigating Digital Misinformation: A Systematic Review.** Zurich: International Panel on the Information Environment (IPIE), 2023, 40 pp.

"This Synthesis Report provides a formal systematic review of scientific literature on countermeasures for mitigating digital misinformation. 588 peer-reviewed global publications from many disciplines were the focus of this study in order to highlight the most effective countermeasures for mitigating potential effects of misinformation, disinformation, and a range of related phenomena. According to the report's selected publications, the four most often endorsed countermeasures are corrective information materials, information and media literacy content, content moderation, and content labeling. More than 10% of the analyzed publications validated these countermeasures. Research reveals several patterns in the investigation of countermeasures for combating misinformation across disciplines. Social sciences emerge as a leading area of scholarship in exploring various strategies, with one exception: content moderation, which is more actively tested in publications from the physical sciences. Simultaneously, experiment-based methodologies highlight content labeling and content reporting as the most effective countermeasures. There is no substantial geographic variation in what researchers are finding. Five important limitations in current research were identified: 1. Few publications test specific countermeasures with real-world data; 2. Some of the solutions offered in the literature are too broad to be tested; 3. Methods that are more likely to bring critical perspectives, such as interviews, focus groups, and discourse analysis, are used less often than quantitative methods; 4. Some countermeasures are understudied in particular disciplines. For example, redirection, or information and media literacy are understudied in the health and physical sciences; 5. The literature in English that is analyzed pays insufficient attention to the problem beyond a few Western countries." (Synopsis)
https://assets-global.website-

104. Jon Roozenbeek, Eileen Culloty, Jane Suiter: **Countering Misinformation: Evidence, Knowledge Gaps, and Implications of Current Interventions.** In: European Psychologist, vol. 28, nr. 3, 2023, pp. 189-205

"This paper provides researchers and policymakers with an overview of which individual-level interventions are likely to influence the spread of, susceptibility to, or impact of misinformation. We review the evidence for the effectiveness of four categories of interventions: boosting (psychological inoculation, critical thinking, and media and information literacy); nudging (accuracy primes and social norms nudges); debunking (fact-checking); and automated content labeling. In each area, we assess the empirical evidence, key gaps in knowledge, and practical considerations. We conclude with a series of recommendations for policymakers and tech companies to ensure a comprehensive approach to tackling misinformation." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000492

105. Craig Matasick, Carlotta Alfonsi et al.: **Good Practice Principles for Public Communication Responses to Mis- and Disinformation.** Paris: OECD, 2022, 43 pp.

"1. Institutionalisation: Governments should consolidate interventions into coherent approaches guided by official communication and data policies, standards and guidelines ... 2. Public interest driven: Public communication should strive to be independent from politicization in implementing interventions to counteract mis- and disinformation ... 3. Future-proofing and profressionalisation: Public institutions should invest in innovative research and use strategic foresight to anticipate the evolution of technology and information ecosystems and prepare for likely threats ... 4. Governments should strive to communicate in an honest and clear manner, with institutions comprehensively disclosing information, decisions, processes and data within the limitations of relevant legislation and regulations ... 5. Timeliness: Public institutions should develop mechanisms to act in a timely manner by identifying and responding to emerging narratives, recognising the speed at which false information can travel ... 6. Prevention: Government interventions should be designed to pre-empt rumours, falsehoods, and conspiracies to stop mis- and disinformation narratives from gaining traction ... 7. Evidence-based: Government interventions should be designed and informed by trustworthy and reliable data, testing, and audience and behavioural insights ... 8. Inclusiveness: Interventions should be designed and diversified to reach all groups in society ... 9. Whole-of-society collaboration: Government efforts to counteract information disorders should be integrated within a whole-of-society approach, in collaboration with relevant stakeholders, including the media, private sector, civil society, academia and individuals." (Good practice principles overview, p.4)
https://www.oecd.org/governance/good-practice-principles-for-public-communication-responses-to-mis-and-disinformation-6d141b44 -en.htm

106. Herman Wasserman (ed.): **Meeting the Challenges of Information Disorder in the Global South.** Rondebosch: University of Cape Town, Centre for Film and Media Studies; International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 2022, 256 pp.

"Despite information disorder being a widespread problem in countries in the Global South, the study of this phenomenon remains dominated by examples, case studies, and models from the Global North. Knowledge about the various manifestations of information disorder, the range of responses, and the success rate of interventions to counter the disorder remains fragmented and partial. In order to gain a better understanding of the knowledge gaps and areas where further research is required, as well as to identify opportunities for inter- and intra-regional cooperation, a scoping study of efforts to counter information disorder in the Global South was needed. The project that was subsequently launched had three interconnected objectives: 1. To map the actors currently working to counter information disorder and to identify the frameworks upon which such interventions are based; 2. To learn from current approaches, tools, and methods used to counter information disorder; 3. To gain an overview of the research landscape and to identify key issues and questions for further research. This scoping study provides an overview of key stakeholders and

regional networks and a wide overview of approaches, tools, and methods being used currently. On the basis of the information gathered through this scoping, an agenda for further research and areas for intervention has been identified." (Introduction, p.7)
https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/60954/IDL-60954.pdf

107. **GFMD Impact: Disinformation.** Global Forum for Media Development (GFMD); USAID, 2021

"On 17th June 2021 GFMD's International Media Policy and Advisory Centre hosted a meeting of 54 media development donors, practitioners and academics to discuss effective responses to disinformation. Disinformation was chosen after it was selected as a priority in a survey of those engaged with GFMD IMPACT's activities, as well as in previous consultations with media development actors ... The meeting report summarises the presentations and discussions that took place in the breakout groups and main session. Ideas put forward on how to make media development responses more effective included: the need for coordination and coalition building; emphasizing the "do no harm" principle, reframing the discussion on disinformation to focus resources on support for journalism; how to effectively make the case for journalism support. Language barriers and sustainability were identified as challenges for fact-checking programmes. Fact-checking services adopting critical media literacy approaches was among many suggestions on how to more effectively engage vulnerable/polarised communities. Research and researchers on disinformation need to be broader and more diverse. Creative solutions were proposed for improving data & information sharing. More research is needed on "production" disinformation. Support to journalism must address: the fact that newsrooms and journalists themselves can be obstacles to building resilience in societies; polarization within journalism. A working paper on measuring and evaluating disinformation programmes identified five key challenges for evaluators and argues for building a community of practice around countering disinformation; carrying out a comparative, impact study; creating a diagnostic tool for program design." (Main takeaways)
https://impact.gfmd.info/meetings/disinformation

108. **Sticking to the Facts, Building trust: Our Cure for Disinformation.** Lausanne: Fondation Hirondelle, 2021, 9 pp.

"Fondation Hirondelle's approach to disinformation centres on the fundamental principles of journalism and on the lessons learned from over 25 years of applying these principles in highly fragile contexts, where access to reliable information for the majority is not a given, and where rumours, hate speech and propaganda undermine peace building and development. Our response to disinformation is based on two complementary axes: sticking to the facts and building trust." (Our approach, p.2)
https://www.hirondelle.org/en/our-news/1461-sticking-to-the-facts-building-trust-our-cure-for-disinformation

109. Irene Khan: **Disinformation and freedom of opinion and expression: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression.** United Nations, General Assembly, 2021, 20 pp.

"In the present report, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression examines the threats posed by disinformation to human rights, democratic institutions and development processes. While acknowledging the complexities and challenges posed by disinformation in the digital age, the Special Rapporteur finds that the responses by States and companies have been problematic, inadequate and detrimental to human rights. She calls for multidimensional and multi-stakeholder responses that are well grounded in the international human rights framework and urges companies to review their business model and States to recalibrate their responses to disinformation, enhancing the role of free, independent and diverse media, investing in media and digital literacy, empowering individuals and rebuilding public trust." (Summary)
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3925306

110. James Pamment: **Resist 2: Counter-Disinformation Toolkit.** Government Communication Service (GCS), 2021, 59 pp.

"This refreshed version of the RESIST toolkit reflects the new realities of the

threat that mis- and disinformation poses today. It explores new techniques and tactics, and how organisations can effectively identify, monitor and respond. The toolkit takes a systematic, evidence-based approach for helping organisations build societal and individual resilience to disinformation." (Foreword, p.3)

https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/RESIST-2-counter-disinformation-toolkit.pdf

111. Daniel Arnaudo, Bret Barrowman, Julia Brothers, Lisa Reppell, Victoria Scott, Amy Studdart, Kip Wainscott, Vera Zakem: **Countering Disinformation: A Guide to Promoting Information Integrity.** Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS); USAID, 2020

"This resource combines the collective wisdom of organizations on the front lines of combatting disinformation globally. This living project provides an outline of what's being done to address the challenge in key areas and provides a searchable database of the organizations around the world engaged in making the digital landscape safe for democracy. Effective democracies require that citizens have access to accurate and impartial electoral and political information. Disinformation campaigns spread cynicism, distort political processes and hinder citizens' ability to make sound political decisions. Together we seek to identify what works, and expand the community engaged in this effort." (Publisher description)

https://counteringdisinformation.org/

112. Kalina Bontcheva, Julie Posetti (eds.): **Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation While Respecting Freedom of Expression.** Geneva: Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development; International Telecommunication Union (ITU); UNESCO, 2020, 346 pp.

"[This publication] uses the term 'disinformation' to describe false or misleading content with potentially harmful consequences, irrespective of the underlying intentions or behaviours in producing and circulating such messages. The focus is not on definitions, but on how States, companies, institutions and organisations around the world are responding to this phenomenon, broadly conceived. The work includes a novel typology of 11 responses, making holistic sense of the disinformation crisis on an international scale, including during COVID-19. It also provides a 23-step tool developed to assess disinformation responses, including their impact on freedom of expression. The research concludes that disinformation cannot be addressed in the absence of freedom of expression concerns, and it explains why actions to combat disinformation should support, and not violate, this right. It also underlines that access to reliable and trustworthy information, such as that produced by critical independent journalism, is a counter to disinformation. Additionally, the study has produced a framework for capturing the complete disinformation life cycle - from instigation and creation, to the means of propagation, to real-life impact, with reference to: 1. Instigators 2. Agents 3. Messages 4. Intermediaries 5. Targets/Interpreters - shortened to the acronym 'IAMIT'." (Executive summary, p.8)

https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000379015

113. Stephan Lewandowsky, John Cook, Ullrich Ecker et al.: **The Debunking Handbook 2020.** Databrary, 2020, 19 pp.

"The handbook is a consensus document that was created by an innovative process that involved a series of predefined steps, all of which were followed and documented and are publicly available. The authors were invited based on their scientific status in the field, and they all agreed on all points made in the handbook. We therefore believe that the new Handbook reflects the scientific consensus about how to combat misinformation. Read more about the consensus process. The Handbook distills the most important research findings and current expert advice about debunking misinformation and contains information about these topics available in four excerpts." (https://digitalcommons.unl.edu)

https://doi.org/10.17910/b7.1182

114. Kirvin Larios: **Desinformación al descubierto: Aprendizajes, retos y recomendaciones.** Fundación Gabo; Proyecto Desconfío, 2024, 36 pp.

"Echando mano de ejemplos de buenas prácticas y de casos de proyectos especializados que se ubican en la primera línea contra la desinformación, esta guía propone una conversación, necesaria y urgente, a partir de una selección de lo sucedido en la edición 2023 de la Cumbre Global sobre Desinformación, en la que se presentaron ponencias, análisis y rondas de proyectos que dejaron pistas sobre cómo encarar este desafío." (p.5)

https://mailchi.mp/fundaciongabo/e-book-desinformacin-2024

115. Mark Boukes, Michael Hameleers: **Fighting Lies with Facts or Humor: Comparing the Effectiveness of Satirical and Regular Fact-Checks in Response to Misinformation and Disinformation.** In: Communication Monographs, vol. 90, nr. 1, 2023, pp. 69-91

"This study tested the effectiveness of fact-check format (regular vs.satirical) to refute different types of false information. Specifically, we conducted a pre-registered online survey experiment (N = 849) that compared the effects of regular fact-checkers and satirist refutations in response to mis- and disinformation about crime rates. The findings illustrated that both fact-checking formats – factual and satirical – were equally effective in lowering issue agreement and perceived credibility in response to false information. Instead of a backfire effect, moreover, the regular factcheck was particularly effective among people who agreed with the fact-check information; for satirical fact-checking, the effect was found across-the-board. Both formats were ineffective in decreasing affective polarization; it rather increased polarization under specific conditions (satire; agreeing with the fact-check)." (Abstract)

https://doi.org/10.1080/03637751.2022.2097284

116. Mauritius Dorn, Solveig Barth: **Vorsicht, manipuliert! Ein Leitfaden für Kommunikationsverantwortliche aus Abgeordnetenbüros, Ministerien und Behörden.** Berlin: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2023, 32 pp.

"Das Ausmaß an Desinformation hat in den vergangenen Jahren stark zugenommen. Vor diesem Hintergrund ermöglicht dieser Leitfaden Kommunikationsverantwortlichen aus Abgeordnetenbüros, Ministerien und Behörden einen niedrigschwelligen Einstieg in den strategisch-kommunikativen Umgang mit Informationsmanipulation. Im Gegensatz zur Desinformation umfasst Informationsmanipulation auch weitere manipulative Aktivitäten wie zum Beispiel die Verbreitung propagandistischer Inhalte oder die Einrichtung von Bot-Netzwerken. Der Leitfaden stützt sich dabei zum Teil auf wissenschaftliche Befunde, zum Teil auf normative Annahmen und Erfahrungswerte im Rahmen der Projektarbeit." (Zu diesem Leitfaden)

https://isdgermany.org/vorsicht-manipuliert/

117. Kristian Kiili, Juho Siuko, Manuel Ninaus: **Tackling Misinformation with Games: A Systematic Literature Review.** In: Interactive Learning Environments, 2023, 16 pp.

"Misinformation and fake news are severe threats to society. The role of critical reading skills is crucial in the battle against misinformation. Despite the promising results of game-based interventions to mitigate the effects of misinformation, the corpus of research on games supporting critical reading skills needs an overview. Therefore, a systematic literature review was conducted to analyze how games have been used to tackle misinformation and reveal game design trends. A total of 15 papers eventually met the defined inclusion criteria and were analyzed. The review revealed that the use of games in critical reading education had emerged recently and focused mainly on fake news. Most games were grounded on inoculation theory and consequently designed to expose players to weakened doses of the misinformation manipulation techniques to build resistance against them. So far, the games have been studied mainly in informal settings and with adult participants. The median sample size was 196, and the median playing time was 15 min across the studies reported in the papers. Although all the reviewed papers reported positive outcomes, the game-based learning research on the critical reading domain is not yet mature enough to generalize findings." (Abstract)

https://doi.org/10.1080/10494820.2023.2299999

118. Daniel Russo, Shane Peter Kaszefski-Yaschuk, Jacopo Staiano, Marco Guerini: **Countering**

Misinformation via Emotional Response Generation. In: arXiv, nr. 2311.10587, 2023, 17 pp.

"The proliferation of misinformation on social media platforms (SMPs) poses a significant danger to public health, social cohesion and ultimately democracy. Previous research has shown how social correction can be an effective way to curb misinformation, by engaging directly in a constructive dialogue with users who spread – often in good faith – misleading messages. Although professional fact-checkers are crucial to debunking viral claims, they usually do not engage in conversations on social media. Thereby, significant effort has been made to automate the use of fact-checker material in social correction; however, no previous work has tried to integrate it with the style and pragmatics that are commonly employed in social media communication. To fill this gap, we present VerMouth, the first large-scale dataset comprising roughly 12 thousand claim-response pairs (linked to debunking articles), accounting for both SMP-style and basic emotions, two factors which have a significant role in misinformation credibility and spreading. To collect this dataset we used a technique based on an author-reviewer pipeline, which efficiently combines LLMs and human annotators to obtain high-quality data. We also provide comprehensive experiments showing how models trained on our proposed dataset have significant improvements in terms of output quality and generalization capabilities." (Abstract)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2311.10587

119. Deborah Schnabel, Meron Mendel (eds.): **Safer TikTok: Strategien im Umgang mit Antisemitismus und Hassrede auf TikTok.** Frankfurt: Bildungsstätte Anne Frank, 2023, 53 pp.

"Verschwörungstheoretiker*innen, Antisemit*innen und Rassist*innen haben sich ein Standbein auf TikTok gebaut – das berichten Expert*innen und bildungspolitische Akteur*innen immer wieder. Besonders in Krisenzeiten hat diese Art Content Konjunktur – so etwa während der Corona-Pandamie oder der erneuten Eskalation des Nahostkonflikts im Mai 2021. Auch wir als Bildungsstätte Anne Frank beobachten, dass hier nahezu keinerlei Zurückhaltung mehr herrscht: Regelmäßig werden auch unsere Videos mit sexistischen und antisemitischen Kommentaren geflutet ... TikTok verweist gerne auf die eigenen Community-Richtlinien, die natürlich Hass, Beleidigungen und Mobbing auf der Plattform verbieten; die Plattform wirbt immer wieder damit, wie viele Videos aus dem Verkehr gezogen wurden. Dennoch: Antisemitismus, Rassismus, Sexismus, Queerfeindlichkeit, Ableismus und Verschwörungserzählungen sind auf TikTok omnipräsent. Ohne ein aktives und qualifiziertes Engagement von Influencer*innen, Institutionen und Nutzer*innen ist ihre Bekämpfung unter den aktuellen Bedingungen nicht möglich." (Vorwort, S.2-3)

https://www.bs-anne-frank.de/mediathek/publikationen/safer-tiktok-strategien-im-umgang-mit-antisemitismus-und-hassrede-auf-tikt ok

120. Molly Lesher, Hanna Pawelec, Arpitha Desai: **Disentangling untruths online: Creators, spreaders and how to stop them.** Paris: OECD, 2022, 38 pp.

"While false rumours, inaccurate reporting, and conspiracy theories have existed for as long as there were people to create and spread them, the Internet has reshaped and amplified the ability to produce and perpetuate false and misleading content. Stopping the creators and spreaders of untruths online is essential to reducing political polarisation, building public trust in democratic institutions, improving public health, and more generally improving the well-being of people and society. This Going Digital Toolkit note discusses the importance of access to accurate information online and presents a novel typology of the different types of untruths that circulate on the Internet. It considers how untruths are spread online as well as the consequences, and it surveys the evidence base of false and misleading information online. It concludes by identifying approaches to fighting untruths online and mitigating their negative effects." (Summary)
https://doi.org/10.1787/84b62df1-en

121. United Nations Secretary General: **Countering disinformation for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.** United Nations, General Assembly, 2022, 19 pp.

"The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 76/227. In it, the Secretary-General describes the challenges posed by disinformation and the responses to it, sets out the relevant international legal framework and discusses measures that States and technology enterprises reported to have taken to counter disinformation. The Secretary-General notes that countering the different manifestations of disinformation requires addressing underlying societal tensions, fostering respect for human rights, online and offline, and supporting a plural civic space and media landscape." (Summary)

https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3987886

122. Chiara Varazzani, Michaela Sullivan-Paul, Lauryn Conway, Andrea Colasanti, Nicholas Diamond: **Misinformation and disinformation: An international effort using behavioural science to tackle the spread of misinformation.** Paris: OECD; OPSI, 2022, 31 pp.

"The OECD convened a first-of-its kind international partnership on behavioural science and misinformation between the Canadian and the French governments to develop and disseminate behaviourally-informed and evidence-based solutions that can guide government response to misinformation. The study tested 1,872 Canadians' intentions to share false COVID-related headlines online with two behavioural interventions: an accuracy evaluation prompt and digital media literacy prompt. The data generated by this partnership show that the digital media literacy tips reduced intentions to share fake news online by 21% compared to the control group – having the greatest impact on online users. These insights can enable policy makers to enact measures that defend and empower online users against environments designed to exploit certain natural but maladaptive tendencies and place the control back into the hands of online users. Relying solely on traditional top-down approaches that aim to regulate content are insufficient at limiting the immediate dangers of misinformation. Innovative policy-making tools such as behavioural science can help provide immediate and long-term solutions to misinformation and should be considered as part of a holistic and comprehensive strategy to offset the threats of misinformation. Governments should conduct rigorous policy experiments in collaboration with other countries, like the one presented here, before enacting policy that affects a larger population to address the crossborder nature of misinformation." (Key policy messages, p.4)

https://www.oecd.org/publications/an-international-effort-using-behavioural-science-to-tackle-the-spread-of-misinformation-b7709d4f- en.htm

123. Samantha Bradshaw, Lisa-Maria Neudert: **The Road Ahead: Mapping Civil Society Responses to Disinformation.** Washington, DC: National Endowment for Democracy (NED), 2021, 27 pp.

"Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) bring a wide range of skill sets to the problem of digital disinformation. Some organizations focus on digital media literacy and education; others engage in advocacy and policy work. Another segment has developed expertise in fact-checking and verification. Other organizations have developed refined technical skills for extracting and analyzing data from social media platforms. This research yielded several clear observations about the state of CSO responses to disinformation and, in turn, suggests several recommendations for paths forward. • Prioritize Skill Diffusion and Knowledge Transfer. Civil society organizations seeking funding for counter-disinformation initiatives should emphasize the importance of skill diffusion and knowledge-transfer initiatives. The siloed nature of disinformation research points to a growing need to blend technical expertise with deep cultural and political knowledge. • CSO researchers lack sufficient access to social media data. Survey respondents identified insufficient access to data as a challenge. Sometimes data are not made available to CSOs; in other instances, data are made available in formats that are not workable for meaningful research purposes. Unequal access to the data that private companies do provide can exacerbate regional inequities, and the nature of data sharing by social media platforms can unduly shape the space for inquiry by civil society and other researchers. Funders, platforms, and other key actors should develop approaches that provide more consistent, inclusive data access to CSOs. • Duplicative programming hampers innovation. CSOs drawing on similar tools, approaches, and techniques to meet similar goals pointed to three main factors preventing more specialized, innovative initiatives: lack of coordination, lack of specific expertise, and lack of flexible funding. Community building and collaboration among relevant organizations deserve more investment, as do initiatives that partner larger, established organizations with smaller or growing ones, or pool efforts, skill sets, and expertise to encourage diverse research by design rather than by coincidence. • Relationships with tech platforms vary across regions.

Surveyed CSOs often held simultaneously skeptical and positive opinions about their relationships with social media companies. Some receive preferential access to data and even funding for their work (raising concerns about independence), while others report a lack of responsiveness from company representatives. In the Global South and Eastern Europe, many CSOs expressed concern that platforms failed to meaningfully engage with them on issues of critical concern. • More flexible funding and more diverse research are both necessary. To encourage greater platform accountability across varied geographic contexts, CSOs and their funders should draw on the perspectives of specific, under-analyzed communities." (Executive summary, p.3-4)

https://www.ned.org/mapping-civil-society-responses-to-disinformation-international-forum/

124. Botambu Collins, Dinh Tuyen Hoang, Ngoc Thanh Nguyen, Dosam Hwang: **Trends in combating fake news on social media: A survey.** In: Journal of Information and Telecommunication, vol. 5, nr. 2, 2021, pp. 247-266

"This study explores the various methods of combating fake news on social media such as Natural Language Processing, Hybrid model. We surmised that detecting fake news is a challenging and complex issue, however, it remains a workable task. Revelation in this study holds that the application of hybrid-machine learning techniques and the collective effort of humans could stand a higher chance of fighting misinformation on social media." (Abstract)

https://doi.org/10.1080/24751839.2020.1847379

125. Laura Courchesne, Julia Ilhardt, Jacob N. Shapiro: **Review of social science research on the impact of countermeasures against influence operations.** In: Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, vol. 2, nr. 5, 2021, 17 pp.

"Based on key term searches and forward and backward citation mapping, we constructed a review of 223 studies published since 1972 related to countermeasures designed to combat influence operations. Each identified study included: (1) a source of variation in exposure to countermeasures; (2) a clearly defined outcome of interest for some specified population; (3) relevance to thinking about the potential of an intervention to impact real-world behavior; and (4) enough detail to evaluate the credibility of the findings. This approach amounts to sampling the foundational research surrounding countermeasures and thus incorporates the collective judgement of this emerging field. All of the studies we identified examined user-focused countermeasures, i.e., those aimed at the consumers of disinformation. None looked at countermeasures aimed at impacting the influence operations directly. There exists a mismatch between the major interventions taken by platforms - algorithmic downranking, content moderation, redirection, and deplatforming accounts - and those studied by the research community. Most papers we reviewed focus on one particular method for countering information operations: fact-checking and its many offshoots. The types of interventions employed by social media companies on actual users are understudied. We recommend further research on four key areas: (1) measuring the impact of the most common interventions by social media platforms, (2) assessing the impact of countermeasures on real-world behaviors (both online and offline), (3) evaluating the efficacy of countermeasures in non-Western contexts, and (4) studying countermeasures that target the creators of disinformation content in addition to studying consumer-facing policies." (Essay summary)

https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-79

126. Adam Fivenson: **Disinformation Toolkit 2.0: How Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organizations Can Combat Harmful Mis- and Disinformation.** InterAction, 2021, 49 pp.

"This report includes framing context to strategically understand and respond to disinformation in the aid sector (part 1), followed by three separate but linked sets of analyses, recommendations, and tools (parts 2, 3, and 4) spanning core perspectives relevant to InterAction Member organizations. Finally, this document includes relevant resources, databases of potential counter-disinformation partners, and policy perspectives among the annexes. With the exception of part 1, each section of this report includes tools, examples, and recommendations for organizations and individuals targeted by disinformation or confronting its harmful impact in the context of their civil society, development, or humanitarian work." (Introduction, p.1)

https://www.interaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Disinformation-Toolkit-2.0-11-02-21.pdf

127. Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer: **Effective state practices against disinformation: Four country case studies.** Helsinki: European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), 2021, 30 pp.

" ... this Research Report has selected four country case studies: Sweden, Canada, the United Kingdom, and France. Obviously, other cases would have been interesting, particularly the United States. But the United States is already at the centre of other works, including by Hybrid CoE. Being diverse in terms of power, geopolitical situation, and systems of government, the four selected countries offer a good sample of what liberal democracies, different in colour, shape and size, can propose to counter disinformation. Finally, this Research Report will attempt to draw some general lessons from these four cases, on what an effective state response to disinformation should involve." (p.9)

https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-research-report-2-effective-state-practices-against-disinformation-four-country-case -studies/

128. Ben Kaiser, Jerry Wei, Eli Lucherini, Kevin Kevin Lee, J. Nathan Matias, Jonathan Mayer: **Adapting Security Warnings to Counter Online Disinformation.** USENIX Security Symposium, 2021, 18 pp.

"Disinformation is proliferating on the internet, and platforms are responding by attaching warnings to content. There is little evidence, however, that these warnings help users identify or avoid disinformation. In this work, we adapt methods and results from the information security warning literature in order to design and evaluate effective disinformation warnings. In an initial laboratory study, we used a simulated search task to examine contextual and interstitial disinformation warning designs. We found that users routinely ignore contextual warnings, but users notice interstitial warnings—and respond by seeking information from alternative sources. We then conducted a follow-on crowdworker study with eight interstitial warning designs. We confirmed a significant impact on user information-seeking behavior, and we found that a warning's design could effectively inform users or convey a risk of harm. We also found, however, that neither user comprehension nor fear of harm moderated behavioral effects. Our work provides evidence that disinformation warnings can—when designed well—help users identify and avoid disinformation. We show a path forward for designing effective warnings, and we contribute repeatable methods for evaluating behavioral effects. We also surface a possible dilemma: disinformation warnings might be able to inform users and guide behavior, but the behavioral effects might result from user experience friction, not informed decision making." (Abstract)

https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/kaiser

129. Ann Cathrin Riedel: **How to Counter Disinformation: 10 Strategic Demands.** Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 2021, 8 pp.

1 Words matter: Use the correct terms -- 2 Images and emotions: Understanding the entire range of disinformation -- 3 Creating structures for the digital education of every age group -- 4 Securing the freedom of expression: Smart regulation against overblocking -- 5 A modern constitutional state -- 6 Focus on technology: Greater responsibility of platform operators -- 7 Social media councils: Binding integration of the civil society -- 8 Strengthening journalism for the 21st century -- 9 Diplomacy in the Digital Age: Prioritising cyber foreign policy -- 10 Prevention of threats: Better communication, civic tech and transparency

https://bit.ly/43fVanJ

130. Kevin Sheives: **Toward a Globally Networked Counter-Disinformation Response.** Global Insights, 2021, 8 pp.

"A loosely connected, constantly learning global network of counter-disinformation responders—with the benefit of greater access to platforms and additional resources from funders—can serve as a bulwark against evolving threats to the integrity of the information space. Although these threats travel across borders rapidly, civil society organizations countering them can respond by learning from one another's innovations, successes, and failures. New innovations in the field include media development in

closed messaging platforms like WhatsApp, addressing offline sources of disinformation, empowering investigative journalism to hunt down disinformation networks, and better equipping under-threat organizations in illiberal and authoritarian settings." (p.4)

https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Toward-A-Globally-Networked-Counter-Disinformation-Response-Kevin-Sheives.pdf

131. Viviane Bianco et al.: **Countering Online Misinformation Resource Pack.** UNICEF Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia, 2020, 26 pp.

"The pack provides easy access to various types of resources (tools, reports, toolkits, journal articles, etc.) that can support the development of tactics and plans to counter misinformation. The pack also provides a summary of what the research indicates as potential solutions to tackle misinformation." (About tis resource pack)

https://www.unicef.org/eca/media/13636/file

132. Nicole Harper, Debora Albu, Janaina Costa, Thayane Guimarães: **Cómo combatir la desinformación: Estrategias de empoderamiento de la ciudadanía digital.** Barcelona: Digital Future Society, 2020, 67 pp.

"Partiendo de la premisa de que se puede y se debe empoderar a la ciudadanía si se mejora la producción, el consumo y la circulación de la información, este informe analiza en profundidad dos cuestiones: ¿Qué instrumentos, iniciativas y políticas actuales ayudan a la ciudadanía a formarse un mejor criterio a la hora de consumir información? ¿Cómo transmitir mejor a los responsables de formulación de políticas y los profesionales enfoques sistémicos que les permitan hacer frente a largo plazo a la desinformación? Para responder a estas preguntas, la investigación se centra en el análisis de cinco casos de iniciativas puestas en marcha por diversos actores que tratan de hacer frente al problema de la desinformación desde una perspectiva multidimensional." (Resumen ejecutivo, p.9)

https://itsrio.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Informe-C%C3%B3mo-combatir-la-desinformaci%C3%B3n.pdf

133. Katarina Kertysova: **Artificial Intelligence and Disinformation: How AI Changes the Way Disinformation is Produced, Disseminated, and Can be Countered in Security and Human Rights.** In: Security and Human Rights, vol. 29, nr. 1/4, 2020, pp. 55-81

"This article explores the challenges and opportunities presented by advances in artificial intelligence (AI) in the context of information operations. The article first examines the ways in which AI can be used to counter disinformation online. It then dives into some of the limitations of AI solutions and threats associated with AI techniques, namely user profiling, micro-targeting, and deep fakes. Finally, the paper reviews a number of solutions that could help address the spread of AI-powered disinformation and improve the online environment. The article recognises that in the fight against disinformation, there is no single fix. The next wave of disinformation calls first and foremost for societal resilience." (Abstract)

https://doi.org/10.1163/18750230-02901005

134. Craig Matasick, Carlotta Alfonsi, Alessandro Bellantoni: **Governance responses to disinformation: How open government principles can inform policy options.** Paris: OECD, 2020, 45 pp.

"This paper provides a holistic policy approach to the challenge of disinformation by exploring a range of governance responses that rest on the open government principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation. It offers an analysis of the significant changes that are affecting media and information ecosystems, chief among them the growth of digital platforms. Drawing on the implications of this changing landscape, the paper focuses on four policy areas of intervention: public communication for a better dialogue between government and citizens; direct responses to identify and combat disinformation; legal and regulatory policy; and media and civic responses that support better information ecosystems. The paper concludes with proposed steps the OECD can take to build evidence and support policy in this space." (Abstract)

https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/d6237c85-en

135. Tina McCorkindale: **Help Stop the Spread of Disinformation! A Guide and 10-Point Checklist to Help People Think Before They Link.** Institute for Public Relations, 2020, 6 pp.

"Advancements in technology have made it difficult for people to discern real posts, sites, or videos from fake ones. To help, IPR has created "10 Ways to Identify Disinformation—A Checklist" to help people think before they link: 1. Who is the author or source? 2. How current is the source? 3. Who shared this source? 4. Does the headline match the content? 5. Are the topics trying to create division or distrust? 6. How did the post make you feel? 7. What evidence supports the claim? 8. Does it sound like a joke? 9. Have you verified the information? 10. "Do I really know enough to share this?" (https://instituteforpr.org)

https://instituteforpr.org/wp-content/uploads/Identify-Disinformation-v5.pdf

136. Amy O'Hara, Jodi Nelson: **Combatting Digital Disinformation: An Evaluation of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation's Disinformation Strategy.** Hewlett Foundation, 2020, 29 pp.

"The Hewlett Foundation's decision to add a focus on disinformation to its 2017 US Democracy strategy was motivated by a desire to figure out how best to encourage social media platforms to reduce polarization exacerbated by disinformation.1 The foundation invested in two major efforts to support this ambition: a multi-funder partnership with Facebook to create data access for independent researchers to study the impact of social media on democracy and elections; and a grant making portfolio conceived to build an academic field to deepen the understanding of disinformation and identify policy solutions that mitigate its spread and impact on society . We found compelling the suggestion that disinformation is better considered a topic than a coherent field, and that multi-disciplinarity brings richness in framing, methods, and applications. Among Hewlett grantees, scholars self-identify as members of different fields that carry with them important epistemological and philosophical differences. We found evidence that there are perceived gaps between researchers, platforms, journalists, policy makers, civil society and others that obstruct the development of policy solutions. The missing competency among many academics to translate research findings for use, and of the need for tighter connections between scholars and decision makers were additional insights we gained about important gaps in the current landscape. During the two-year grantmaking period, the disinformation portfolio invested in varied policy and academic institutions and supported a diverse group of principal investigators. This is in contrast to the perceptions we heard about the foundation's lack of a diverse grantee portfolio and approach. We learned from key informants and secondary research that there is an inextricable link between disinformation, racial and social equity and justice. A stronger communication strategy about the foundation team's approach to diversity, equity and inclusion is warranted, as is a deliberate effort to showcase the work of all their grantees and their distinct perspectives. The foundation's significant role in creating momentum for this body of work was widely noted, as was the need for continued leadership and support." (Executive summary, p.2-3)

https://hewlett.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Final-Hewlett-evaluation-report-on-disinformation-.pdf

AFRICA, SUB-SAHARAN

137. Sékou Doumbia, Zoumana Kone: **Evaluation finale: « Projet renforcement de la résilience communautaire à la désinformation dans les régions du nord et du centre du Mali ».** Search for Common Ground, 2023, 57 pp.

https://cnxus.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Search_Rapport_Evaluation_Finale_Tabale_Kunkan.pdf

138. Peter Cunliffe-Jones, Assane Diagne, Alan Finlay, Sahite Gaye, Wallace Gichunge, Chido Onumah, Cornia Pretorius, Anya Schiffrin: **Misinformation Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: From Laws and Regulations to Media Literacy.** London: University of Westminster Press, 2021, 220 pp.

https://doi.org/10.16997/book53

AMERICAS & CARIBBEAN

139. Iria Puyosa, Mariví Marín Vázquez, Adam Fivenson: **Deepening the Response to Authoritarian Information Operations in Latin America.** Washington DC: National Endowment For Democracy (NED), 2023, 29 pp.
https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/NED_FORUM-Deepening-Response-Latin-America.pdf.pdf

140. Commission on Information Disorder: **Final Report.** Aspen Institute, 2021, 78 pp.
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Aspen-Institute_Commission-on-Information-Disorder_Final-Report.pdf

141. Mariela Torrealba, Pablo Paz, Ysabel Viloria (eds.): **Desmontando la mentira: Dos años bajo la lupa del OVFN Observatorio Venezolano de Fake News.** Caracas: Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (UCAB); abediciones; Medianálisis, 2021, 210 pp.
https://fakenews.cotejo.info/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/DESMONTANDO-LA-MENTIRA-WEB-2021.pdf

ASIA & PACIFIC

142. Yvonne T. Chua, Nicole Curato, Jonathan Corpus Ong: **Information Dystopia and Philippine Democracy: Protecting the Public Sphere from Disinformation.** Internews, 2021, 98 pp.

"The Philippines is one of the first countries where the potential for online disinformation threats to undermine democratic processes, especially during elections, was noticed ... This report takes a deep look at an online survey that Internews conducted, explores the cultural and emotional dimensions of disinformation and how they form part of the broader political transformations taking place in the Philippines, examines how the Philippine disinformation ecosystem fits into the regional landscape, looks into financial incentives and legislation, and formulates a set of strategic and programmatic recommendations to better tackle the issue of disinformation in the Philippines." (https://internews.org)
https://internews.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy/2021-02/Internews_report_information_dystopia_Philippine_democracy_2021-01-upda ted.pdf

143. Rachel E. Khan, Yvonne T. Chua: **Countering Disinformation Tools and Initiatives in the Philippines.** Copenhagen: International Media Support (IMS), 2023, 37 pp.
https://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Countering-disinformation-tools-and-initiatives-in-the-Philippines-May2023 .pdf

144. Nalaka Gunawardene et al.: **A Strategy for Effective Counterspeech Against Online Hate and Disinformation in Sri Lanka.** Dehiwala: National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka (NCEASL), 2022, 78 pp.
https://www.minormatters.org/storage/app/uploads/public/62f/b69/89b/62fb6989b7546375578970.pdf

145. Ayee Macaraig, Michael Hameleers: **#DefendPressFreedom: Paradigm Repair, Role Perceptions and Filipino Journalists' Counterstrategies to Anti-Media Populism and Delegitimizing Threats.** In: Journalism Studies, vol. 23, nr. 16, 2022, pp. 2078-2096
https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2022.2138949

146. **USAID-BRAC Bangladesh Digital Ecosystem Activity: After Action Review Report.** Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC); Light Castle Partners, 2021, 50 pp.
https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00XF59.pdf

147. Md Mahfuzul Haque, Mohammad Yousuf, Ahmed Shatil Alam, Pratyasha Saha, Syed Ishtiaque Ahmed, Naeemul Hassan: **Combating Misinformation in Bangladesh: Roles and Responsibilities as Perceived by Journalists, Fact-checkers, and Users.** In: Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, vol. 4, nr. CSCW2, Article 130, 2020, 32 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3415201

EUROPE

148. Johannes Christiern Santos Okholm, Amir Ebrahimi Fard, Marijn ten Thij: **Debunking and exposing misinformation among fringe communities: Testing source exposure and debunking anti-Ukrainian misinformation among German fringe communities.** In: Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, vol. 5, nr. 1, 2024, 13 pp.
https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-134

149. Katja Muñoz: **Mobilizing Social Media Influencers: A European Approach to Oversight and Accountability.** Berlin: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP), 2023, 9 pp.
https://dgap.org/system/files/article_pdfs/dgap-policy%20brief-2023-11-en.pdf

150. Olga Tokariuk: **Humour as a Strategic Tool Against Disinformation: Ukraine's Response to Russia.** Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2023, 35 pp.
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2023-12/RISJ%20Project_OlgaT_HT23_Final.pdf

151. Minna Horowitz, Stephen Cushion, Marius Dragomir, Sergio Gutiérrez, Manjón Pantti, Mervi Pantti: **A Framework for Assessing the Role of Public Service Media Organizations in Countering Disinformation.** In: Digital Journalism, vol. 10, nr. 5, 2022, pp. 843-865
https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2021.1987948

152. **Courage Against Hate.** Facebook, 2021, 128 pp.
https://assets.zara.or.at/media/files/Facebook-Courage-Against-Hate.pdf

153. Jan Kirchner, Christian Reuter: **Countering Fake News: A Comparison of Possible Solutions Regarding User Acceptance and Effectiveness.** In: Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, nr. CSCW2, Article 140, 2020, 27 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3415211

154. Martin Steinebach, Katarina Bader, Lars Rinsdorf, Nicole Krämer, Alexander Roßnagel (eds.): **Desinformation aufdecken und bekämpfen: Interdisziplinäre Ansätze gegen Desinformationskampagnen und für Meinungspluralität.** Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2020, 217 pp.
https://d-nb.info/1204710171/34

MIDDLE EAST / WESTERN ASIA & NORTH AFRICA

155. **Guide de la lutte contre la désinformation: Références, pratiques et outils.** Rabat: Haute

Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle (HACA), 2022, 54 pp.

https://www.haca.ma/sites/default/files/upload/Guide%20fake%20news%20VFR.pdf

Digital Platforms & Disinformation: Algorithms, Content Moderation, Governance

GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

156. **Platform Responses to Misinformation: A Meta-Analysis of Data.** Zurich: International Panel on the Information Environment (IPIE), 2023

"This Synthesis Report examines the effectiveness of countermeasures against misinformation on social media platforms, focusing on the two most examined remedies: content labeling and corrective information interventions. A meta-analysis is a research process for synthesizing and aggregating the findings of many, independent studies, using statistical methods to calculate overall effects from multiple data sources. A meta-analysis of 43 studies from 18 peer-reviewed manuscripts was selected from a comprehensive database of 4,798 publications. First, there is an emerging scientific consensus that content labels and corrective information help people evaluate misinformation on social media platforms. Other mitigation strategies may be viable, but there is less consensus about their effectiveness. Second, understanding the global information environment requires more research: (i) from countries around the world, (ii) about user experiences in languages other than English, (iii) with genuine access to social media data from firms, (iv) that allows scientists to standardize measures and definitions for robustly reporting the results of independent research." (Synopsis)

https://www.ipie.info/research/sr2023-2

157. Guy Berger, Alison Gillwald, Elizabeth Orembo, Dominique Diouf, Juan Manual Garcia: **Platform Problems and Regulatory Solutions: Findings from a Comprehensive Review of Existing Studies and Investigations.** Paris: UNESCO; Research ICT Africa, 2023, 17 pp.

"The proliferation of hate speech and disinformation on online platforms has serious implications for human rights, trust and safety as per international human rights law and standards. The mutually-reinforcing determinants of the problems are: 'attention economics'; automated advertising systems; external manipulators; company spending priorities; stakeholder knowledge deficits; and flaws in platforms' policies and in their implementation. How platforms understand and identify harms is insufficiently mapped to human rights standards, and there is a gap in how generic policy elements should deal with local cases, different rights and business models when there are tensions. Enforcement by platforms of their own terms of service to date has grave shortfalls, while attempts to improve outcomes by automating moderation have their limitations. Inequalities in policy and practice abound in relation to different categories of people, countries and languages, while technology advances are raising even more challenges. Problems of 'solo-regulation' by individual platforms in content curation and moderation are paralleled by harms associated with unilateral state regulation. Many countries have laws governing content online, but their vagueness fuels arbitrary measures by both authorities and platforms. Hybrid regulatory arrangements can help by elaborating transparency requirements, and setting standards for mandatory human rights impact assessments." (Key messages)

https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000385813

158. Maria Ressa, Marietje Schaake, Delphine Halgand-Mishra, Iris de Villars, Jenny Domino, Dan She et al.: **Working Group on Infodemics: Policy Framework.** Forum on Information & Democracy, 2020, 127 pp.

"The Forum on Information & Democracy proposes a number of policy steps to democratic governments and their supporters. Transparency and accountability need to be shored up and content moderation should be done according to democratic mandates and oversight. The impact of new platforms where disinformation can go viral, such as private messenger services, needs to be understood. Through a global democratic coalition, a meaningful alternative should be offered instead of the two dominant models of technology governance: the privatized and the authoritarian. Through the intergovernmental Partnership on Information & Democracy, democratic leaders recognize the information and communication space as a 'public good'. Now they have to implement their commitments in policies on the national and international level. Our recommendations are designed to shape and support their policy agenda." (Foreword, p.13)

https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ForumID_Report-on-infodemics_101120.pdf

159. **Digital Platform Governance and the Challenges for Trust and Safety. Part 1: Why Lies and Hatred Proliferate on Digital Platforms.** Research ICT Africa; UNESCO, 2023, 21 pp.

"Online and platform content that may cause harm through the breach of human rights is sufficiently widespread to have raised concerns about the potentially severe implications for the future of trust, safety, democracy and sustainable development. A certain amount of this content is curbed by the dominant commercial platforms' content moderation mechanisms. Much still escapes their nets and in worst cases is algorithmically amplified and even supported by advertising. Some smaller platforms expressly allow hatred and conspiracy theories, even facilitating the organisation of offline attacks on democracy. The roots of the problems lie in : 'attention economics', automated advertising systems, external manipulators, company spending priorities and stakeholder knowledge deficits. Of value in addressing these problems will be the development of guidelines for regulating platforms, centred on safeguarding human rights, promoting transparency and limiting the business processes and technical mechanisms that underpin potentially harmful content online." (Key trends uncovered, p.2)

https://researchictafrica.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Part-1-.pdf

160. **Digital Platform Governance and the Challenges for Trust and Safety. Part 2: Platform's Own Policies and Practices: What Problems Need Changing?** Research ICT Africa; UNESCO, 2023, 7 pp.

"Platform policies lack clarity about the relationship between them, and also about how policies should be applied at global and local levels. How platforms understand and identify harms is insufficiently mapped to human rights standards, and there is a gap in how policy elements should deal with different rights or with business models when there are tensions. Policies are not always transparent and do not provide sufficiently for risk assessment. Implementation and enforcement by platforms have serious shortfalls, while attempts to improve outcomes by automating moderation have their limits. Inequalities in policy and practice abound in relation to different categories of people, countries and languages. Of value in addressing these problems could be the development of guidance for the governance and regulation of frameworks that sets out suggested standards and parameters for platform policies and related operations." (Key trends uncovered, p.2)

https://researchictafrica.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Part-2.pdf

161. **Digital Platform Governance and the Challenges for Trust and Safety. Part 3: Possible Regulatory Solutions to Address Concerns with the Platforms.** Research ICT Africa; UNESCO, 2023, 19 pp.

"Platform problems are linked to the fact that they are not self-governing according to agreed industry standards but mainly 'solo-governing' when it comes to content curation and moderation. Reaction to the failure of current platform efforts to regulate content includes the danger of over-regulation by state entities, which carries real risks to freedom of expression. The purview of what may need to be part of new regulatory arrangements includes the interplay between policy, practice, business models and technology. There is a pluralism of platforms and other actors in the "tech stack", who have different roles in the online content landscape, with concomitant implications for regulatory arrangements. Independent media, whistle-blowers and civil society organisations are significant factors in pushing platform accountability but mechanisms of transparency should be considered for regulatory protections and support. New technology is raising new challenges for platforms' content moderation. Platform policy and practice is especially significant for elections." (Key trends uncovered, p.2)

https://researchictafrica.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Part-3-.pdf

162. Intégrité de l'information sur les plateformes numériques. Nations Unies, 2023, 29 pp.

"... la présente note d'orientation expose les principes potentiels d'un code de conduite qui aidera à guider les États Membres, les plateformes numériques et les autres parties prenantes dans les efforts qu'ils déploient pour rendre l'espace numérique plus inclusif et plus sûr pour tous et toutes, tout en défendant vigoureusement le droit à la liberté d'opinion et d'expression ainsi que le droit d'accès à l'information. Le code de conduite portant sur l'intégrité de l'information diffusée sur les plateformes numériques est en cours d'élaboration dans le cadre des préparatifs du Sommet de l'avenir. J'espère qu'il servira de guide dans la formulation de mesures de renforcement de l'intégrité de l'information. Les plateformes numériques sont des outils essentiels qui ont transformé les interactions sociales, culturelles et politiques partout dans le monde, en mettant en relation des citoyens préoccupés par des questions importantes. Grâce à elles, les Nations Unies informent le public et dialoguent directement avec les personnes qui oeuvrent en faveur de la paix, de la dignité et de l'égalité sur une planète saine. Ces plateformes ont donné de l'espoir aux peuples pendant les périodes de crise et de lutte, elles ont amplifié des voix qui n'étaient pas entendues auparavant et fait naître des mouvements mondiaux." (Objet de la présente note, p.2)
https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/our-common-agenda-policy-brief-information-integrity-fr.pdf

163. Adeline Hulin, João Brant: Social Media 4 Peace: Local Lessons for Global Practices. Paris: UNESCO Office Brussels, 2023, 69 pp.

"The three countries [Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, and Kenya] provide evidence of online hate speech and disinformation affecting human rights offline. The evidence is not comprehensive yet clear enough to raise serious concerns. Online gender-based violence is also reported as critical in the three countries. In the three countries, national legislation to address harmful content shows some degree of inconsistency in comparison to international standards, notably in relation to the protection of freedom of expression. The reasons for such inconsistency vary among countries. The effective enforcement of legal frameworks is uneven in all three countries. Social and cultural inequalities are often reproduced in government or judicial decisions, and vagueness in legislation opens space for discretionary decisions. Platform companies have offices in Indonesia and Kenya, but not in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the three countries, there is a lack of transparency in how companies allocate the roles of moderation tasks, including the number of different language moderators and their trusted partners and sources. Companies do not process content moderation in some of the main local languages and community standards are not entirely or promptly available in local languages." (Executive summary)
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000386777

164. Richard Rogers (ed.): The Propagation of Misinformation in Social Media: A Cross-Platform Analysis. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2023, 246 pp.

"In a cross-platform analysis of Google Web Search, Facebook, YouTube, Reddit, Twitter, Instagram, 4chan and TikTok, we found that hyperpartisan web operators, alternative influencers and ambivalent commentators are in ascendency. The book can be read as a form of platform criticism. It puts on display the current state of information online, noting how social media platforms have taken on the mantle of accidental authorities, privileging their own on-platform performers and at the same time adjudicating between claims of what is considered acceptable discourse." (Publisher description)
https://doi.org/10.1515/9789048554249

165. Federica Urzo, Elisabetta Panico, Salvatore Custureri: Policy Brief: Ensuring Ethical AI Practices to Counter Disinformation. MediaFutures; Luiss Data Lab, 2023, 15 pp.

"In particular we recommend to strengthen collaboration (platforms should adopt a collaborative approach involving various stakeholders, including governments, civil society organisations, and fact-checkers, to counter the spread and impact of disinformation. This can include sharing information, best practices, and resources to develop effective strategies); enhance transparency (platforms should prioritise transparency by providing clear and comprehensive information on their policies, algorithms, and content moderation processes. Users should have a better understanding of how their data is used, and how algorithms work to prevent the amplification of false and misleading narratives); implement effective content moderation (platforms need to allocate sufficient resources to effectively monitor and moderate harmful content. This includes investing in advanced AI systems and human moderation teams to detect and remove disinformation in a timely manner. Transparent and consistent guidelines should be in place to ensure fairness and accountability in content moderation decisions); promote fact-based information (platforms should prioritise the promotion of fact-based information from reliable sources. This can be done by partnering with credible news organizations and fact-checkers to provide accurate information and combat false narratives. Advertising promoting climate change denial or other forms of misinformation should be prevented); improve the access to data for researchers (platforms should make efforts to provide access to data for independent researchers to evaluate the effectiveness of their policies and initiatives in countering disinformation. This will enable better analysis and understanding of the impact of disinformation and the effectiveness of countermeasures); comply with regulatory frameworks (platforms should fully comply with regulatory frameworks, such as the Digital Services Act (DSA) or other relevant International, EU and National laws and regulations, that provide for obligations on addressing disinformation and mitigating associated risks, the Code of Practice on Disinformation that aims to commit signatories to a range of actions to counter disinformation. These actions include providing transparency reports on political advertising, restricting advertising placements on disinformation websites, disrupting advertising revenue for purveyors of disinformation, and enabling user feedback and fact-checking mechanisms. In this framework, compliance should not be limited to large platforms but extended, with adjustments, to smaller platforms to ensure a comprehensive approach)." (Recommendations, p.6)
https://mediafutures.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/MediaFutures_Policy-Briefs_Ensuring-Ethical-AI-Practices-to-counter-Disinformati on.pdf

166. Content Moderation and Freedom of Expression: Bridging the Gap Between Social Media and Local Civil Society. Article 19; UNESCO, 2022, 46 pp.

"This report presents a summary analysis of research on current practices of content moderation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, and Kenya, with a specific focus on 'harmful content' such as 'hate speech' and disinformation. The methodology combined desk research with qualitative interviews with key informants (representatives from local stakeholders). Findings from the country reports indicate that social media platforms, rather than serving as spaces for democratic debate and participatory citizenship, have increased ethnic-driven disinformation and politically motivated hatred, and reinforced the exclusion of marginalised groups. Given the importance of social media platforms, in countries where such tensions have in the past caused real-life violence, addressing the weaknesses of content moderation practices is of the utmost importance to ensure sustainable peace and enduring democracies." (Executive summary)
https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Summary-report-social-media-for-peace.pdf

167. Angel Díaz, Laura Hecht-Felella: Double Standards in Social Media Content Moderation. New York: Brennan Center For Justice, 2022, 39 pp.

"While social media companies dress their content moderation policies in the language of human rights, their actions are largely driven by business priorities, the threat of government regulation, and outside pressure from the public and the mainstream media. This report demonstrates the impact of content moderation by analyzing the policies and practices of three platforms: Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. Our evaluation compares platform policies regarding terrorist content (which often constrict Muslims' speech) to those on hate speech and harassment (which can affect the speech of powerful constituencies), along with publicly available information about enforcement of those policies." (Introduction, p.3)
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/Double_Standards_Content_Moderation.pdf

168. Ana Laura Pérez Bertrán, Carolina Martínez Elebi: Moderación privada de contenidos en Internet y su impacto en el periodismo. Montevideo: Observacom, 2022, 43 pp.

"El presente documento aborda la problemática de la moderación de contenidos en las plataformas haciendo hincapié en su impacto

fundamental en el periodismo y teniendo como eje los derechos a la libertad de prensa y la libertad de expresión." (Introducción, p. 5)
https://www.observacom.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Moderacion-y-Periodismo.pdf

169. Craig Silverman, Ruth Talbot, Jeff Kao, Anna Klühspies: **How Google's Ad Business Funds Disinformation Around the World.** ProPublica, 2022

"The largest-ever analysis of Google's ad practices on non-English-language websites reveals how the tech giant makes disinformation profitable." (Introduction)
https://www.propublica.org/article/google-alphabet-ads-fund-disinformation-covid-elections

170. **No Excuse for Abuse: What Social Media Companies Can Do Now to Combat Online Harassment and Empower Users.** PEN America, 2021, 7 pp.

"To ensure that social media becomes safer, more open, and more equitable for all users, platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram must prioritize curbing online harassment. In this report, PEN America proposes concrete, actionable changes that social media companies should make immediately to the design of their products to better protect people from online abuse—without jeopardizing free expression." (Introduction)
https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/no-excuse-for-abuse-executive-summary-FINAL.pdf

171. **Recommended Reading: Amazon's Algorithms, Conspiracy Theories and Extremist Literature.** London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2021, 22 pp.

"The role of algorithms in propelling conspiracy theories and radicalisation has been brought into sharp focus by the interlocking crises of the past 12 months. Social media platforms have sought to tamp down on algorithmic recommendation of conspiracy theories and extremist content, for example by preventing conspiracy-linked hashtags from trending or stopping certain groups and pages from being recommended to other users." (Introduction)
https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Amazon-1.pdf

172. Jesse McCrosky, Brandi Geurkink: **YouTube Regrets: A Crowdsourced Investigation Into YouTube's Recommendation Algorithm.** Mozilla, 2021, 39 pp.

"YouTube is the second-most visited website in the world, and its algorithm drives 70% of watch time on the platform—an estimated 700 million hours every single day. For years, that recommendation algorithm has helped spread health misinformation, political disinformation, hateful diatribes, and other regrettable content to people around the globe. YouTube's enormous influence means these films reach a huge audience, having a deep impact on countless lives, from radicalization to polarization ... 37,380 YouTube users stepped up as YouTube watch dogs, volunteering data about the regrettable experiences they have on YouTube for Mozilla researchers to carefully analyze. As a result, Mozilla gained insight into a pool of YouTube's tightly-held data in the largest-ever crowdsourced investigation into YouTube's algorithm. Collectively, these volunteers flagged 3,362 regrettable videos, coming from 91 countries, between July 2020 and May 2021. This report highlights what we learned from our RegretsReporter research. Specifically, we uncovered three main findings: 1. YouTube Regrets are disparate and disturbing. Our volunteers reported everything from Covid fear-mongering to political misinformation to wildly inappropriate "children's" cartoons. The most frequent Regret categories are misinformation, violent or graphic content, hate speech, and spam/scams. 2. The algorithm is the problem. 71% of all Regret reports came from videos recommended to our volunteers by YouTube's automatic recommendation system. Further, recommended videos were 40% more likely to be reported by our volunteers than videos that they searched for. And in several cases, YouTube recommended videos that actually violate their own Community Guidelines and/or were unrelated to previous videos watched. 3. Non-English speakers are hit the hardest. The rate of YouTube Regrets is 60% higher in countries that do not have English as a primary language (with Brazil, Germany and France being particularly high), and pandemic-related Regrets were especially prevalent in non-English languages." (Executive summary)
https://assets.mofoprod.net/network/documents/Mozilla_YouTube_Regrets_Report.pdf

173. **Report on the Facebook Third-Party Fact-Checking Programme.** London: Full Fact, 2020, 33 pp.

"Full Fact first started working with Facebook on the Third-Party Fact-Checking programme in January 2019. When we joined the programme we committed to reporting regularly on its operation. Our first report, published in July 2019, covered January to June 2019.1 This second report details our experience from July 2019 to December 2020 [...] Broadly, our views are that: This is a valuable programme. It made a significant difference to our ability to tackle misinformation during the 2019 UK election, and to Facebook's ability to respond. Facebook's global network of fact checking partners meant it had options for responding to misinformation related to the pandemic that other internet companies did not have. Other internet companies should emulate the Third-Party Fact-Checking programme. In particular, from what we can tell, YouTube stands out as particularly being able to benefit from a similar programme to the Third-Party Fact-Checking programme. A partnership such as the Third-Party Fact-Checking programme can only be one part of an effective response to misinformation and disinformation. Other decisions the internet companies make are critical and need scrutiny and oversight: from product design, to advertising standards, to rules for user behaviour. Our two main concerns continue to be transparency and scale. Explaining the programme and its results is Facebook's responsibility. These independent reports from Full Fact seek to add to the information Facebook provides, not act as a substitute. Most internet companies are trying to use AI to scale fact checking and none is doing so in a transparent way with independent assessment. This is a growing concern." (Introduction, p.5-6)
https://fullfact.org/media/uploads/tpfc-2020.pdf

174. Ann Cathrin Riedel: **Behind Closed Curtains: Disinformation on Messenger Services.** Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 2020, 30 pp.

"Several studies analysed in this paper show that messenger services facilitate and exacerbate the spread of disinformation. Any solution must make allowances for the complexity with which information spreads. The case studies show that a lack of trust in government is a key factor in the proliferation of disinformation, as is an increase in nationalism and its epiphenomena, including racism, sexism and anti-semitism. Additionally, a general loss of trust in journalism poses a problem. The infodemic surrounding the novel coronavirus highlights the urgency of the topic. A nuanced and comprehensive discourse on disinformation is crucial, and it is no longer adequate to discuss disinformation as a problem predominantly concerning social media platforms and politics. Addressing the issue can only be achieved by a society as a whole: we need broad social discourse and cannot outsource the solution to social media companies alone. This paper includes six recommendations designed to provide guidelines for political decisions and as a basis for further discourse." (Executive summary, p.4)
https://bit.ly/3PjfL4v

ASIA & PACIFIC

175. **Content Moderation and Local Stakeholders in Indonesia.** London: Article 19, 2022, 77 pp.
https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Indonesia-country-report.pdf

176. Shmyla Khan et al.: **Policy Paper: Unpacking Content Moderation in Pashto and Dari.** Meedan; Digital Rights Foundation (DRF), 2022, 25 pp.
https://digitalrightsfoundation.pk/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Meedan-final-report-November-2022.pdf

EUROPE

177. **The Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation 2022.** European Commission, 2022, 40 pp.

"The Code of Practice on Disinformation is a first-of-its kind tool through which relevant players in the industry agreed - for the first time in 2018 - on self-regulatory standards to fight disinformation. Its revision process was launched in June 2021 and, after the signature and presentation of the revised Code on 16 June 2022, the new Code will become part of a broader

regulatory framework, in combination with the legislation on Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising and the Digital Services Act (DSA). For signatories that are Very Large Online Platforms, the Code aims to become a mitigation measure and a Code of Conduct recognised under the co-regulatory framework of the DSA. The strengthened Code of Practice contains 44 commitments and 128 specific measures, in the following areas: demonetisation - cutting financial incentives for purveyors of disinformation; transparency of political advertising; ensuring the integrity of services; empowering users; empowering researchers; empowering the fact-checking community; transparency centre and Task-force; strengthened monitoring framework."

https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation

178. Beatriz Botero Arcila, Rachel Griffin: **Social Media Platforms and Challenges for Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights.** Brussels: European Parliament, Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2023, 151 pp.

https://doi.org/10.2861/672578

179. Iva Plasilova, Jordan Hill, Malin Carlberg, Marion Goubet, Richard Procee: **Study for the "Assessment of the Implementation of the Code of Practice on Disinformation": Final Report.** Brussels: European Commission, 2020, 130 pp.

https://www.imap-migration.org/sites/default/files/Publications/2020-07/Studyfortheassessmentofthecodeofpracticeagainstdisinformat ion.pdf

MIDDLE EAST / WESTERN ASIA & NORTH AFRICA

180. Ralph Baydoun et al.: **WhatsApp 360: A Look into the WhatsApp News Ecosystem in Lebanon Focusing on Misinformation and Hate Speech.** Metn: Samir Kassir Foundation, 2023, 39 pp.

https://www.freiheit.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/fnf-whatsapp-360-report.pdf

Disinformation Literacy, Psychological Inoculation, Serious Gaming

GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

181. John Cook, Heather Mann, Isabel Tamoj: **Addressing Conspiracy Theories: What Teachers Need to Know.** Paris: UNESCO, 2022, 18 pp.

"This document is a first introduction for educators, working in and outside of formal schooling, on how to identify, prevent and address conspiracy theories in education settings. It seeks to provide educators with key definitions and essential knowledge to grasp the complexity of the phenomenon and alert learners about the key characteristics and harmful effects of conspiracy theories for a first, immediate response. To support educators in this endeavour, this document outlines strategies to prevent the belief in conspiracy theories as well as to engage with learners who already believe in them." (Back cover)

https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000381958

182. **Youth Media Literacy Fact-Checking Manual.** Africa Check; Internwes; Advancing Rights in Southern Africa (ARISA), 2024, 31 pp.

"This dis- and misinformation fact-checking toolkit was developed by Africa Check for young journalism students and members of NGOs and CSOs with a focus on youth-led organisations. It aims to equip members of the youth with the knowledge and practical tips to stop the spread of false information. This toolkit ... provides an easily understandable overview of fact-checking with a focus on health information." (About this toolkit)

https://internews.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Youth-Media-Literacy-Program-Fact-Checking-Manual-final.pdf

183. Rebecca Barabas: **What's the News About Bad News? A Review of Bad News Games as a Tool to Teach Media Literacy.** In: Libri, vol. 73, nr. 4, 2023, pp. 283-292

"This paper examines the Bad News series of games, created by the Cambridge University Social Decision Making Lab and DROG Group, as an educational tool. More specifically, it considers Bad News as a persuasive game, within the umbrella of gamification. After considering the history and context of the game, the educational, motivational, and informational theoretical frameworks of the games, research, and criticisms, this paper concludes that the games are not, in themselves, transformative." (Abstract)

https://doi.org/10.1515/libri-2023-0043

184. Toni Van der Meer, Michael Hameleers, Jakob Ohme: **Can Fighting Misinformation Have a Negative Spillover Effect? How Warnings for the Threat of Misinformation Can Decrease General News Credibility.** In: Journalism Studies, vol. 24, nr. 6, 2023, pp. 803-823

"In the battle against misinformation, do negative spillover effects of communicative efforts intended to protect audiences from inaccurate information exist? Given the relatively limited prevalence of misinformation in people's news diets, this study explores if the heightened salience of misinformation as a persistent societal threat can have an unintended spillover effect by decreasing the credibility of factually accurate news. Using an experimental design (N = 1305), we test whether credibility ratings of factually accurate news are subject to exposure to misinformation, corrective information, misinformation warnings, and news media literacy (NML) interventions relativizing the misinformation threat. Findings suggest that efforts like warning about the threat of misinformation can prime general distrust in authentic news, hinting toward a deception bias in the context of fear of misinformation being salient. Next, the successfulness of NML interventions is not straight forward if it comes to avoiding that the salience of misinformation distorts people's creditabilityaccuracy. We conclude that the threats of the misinformation order may not just be remedied by fighting false information, but also by reestablishing trust in legitimate news." (Abstract)

https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2023.2187652

185. Alberto Acerbi, Sacha Altay, Hugo Mercier: **Research Note: Fighting Misinformation or Fighting for Information?** In: Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, vol. 3, nr. 1, 2022, pp. 1-15

"A wealth of interventions have been devised to reduce belief in fake news or the tendency to share such news. By contrast, interventions aimed at increasing trust in reliable news sources have received less attention. In this article, we show that, given the very limited prevalence of misinformation (including fake news), interventions aimed at reducing acceptance or spread of such news are bound to have very small effects on the overall quality of the information environment, especially compared to interventions aimed at increasing trust in reliable news sources. To make this argument, we simulate the effect that such interventions have on a global information score, which increases when people accept reliable information and decreases when people accept misinformation." (Abstract)

https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-87

186. Nicole Fournier-Sylvester: **Addressing Hate Speech: Educational Responses.** Paris: UNESCO, 2022, 14 pp.

"This paper will discuss the challenges and opportunities of addressing both online and offline hate speech through education and recommend comprehensive approaches for effective educational strategies. Incorporating context-based teaching and learning practices that promote responsible global citizenship are important first steps that must be accompanied by a whole school- and community-based approach to creating civic spaces that embrace different perspectives and opinions, respect difference and work towards a shared sense of belonging." (Introduction, p.3)

https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000382290

187. Jordan Hill: **Policy responses to false and misleading digital content: A snapshot of children's media literacy.** Paris: OECD, 2022, 81 pp.

"This paper has four parts. First, it outlines current research and definitions relating to false and misleading digital content and looks at children's behaviour in the digital environment. Second, the concepts of media literacy, digital literacy and other relevant competencies are discussed.

Third, research on children's experiences of false and misleading digital content and their perceived levels of digital media literacy is analysed. Finally, policies and practices which deliver media literacy are discussed. Research limitations and other barriers, such as teacher training, are described." (Abstract, p.4)

https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/1104143e-en

188. Jon Roozenbeek, Sander van der Linden, Beth Goldberg, Steve Rathja, Stephan Lewandowsky: **Psychological Inoculation Improves Resilience Against Misinformation on Social Media.** In: Science Advances, vol. 8, nr. 34, 2022, 12 pp.

"Online misinformation continues to have adverse consequences for society. Inoculation theory has been put forward as a way to reduce susceptibility to misinformation by informing people about how they might be misinformed, but its scalability has been elusive both at a theoretical level and a practical level. We developed five short videos that inoculate people against manipulation techniques commonly used in misinformation: emotionally manipulative language, incoherence, false dichotomies, scapegoating, and ad hominem attacks. In seven preregistered studies, i.e., six randomized controlled studies (n = 6464) and an ecologically valid field study on YouTube (n = 22,632), we find that these videos improve manipulation technique recognition, boost confidence in spotting these techniques, increase people's ability to discern trustworthy from untrustworthy content, and improve the quality of their sharing decisions. These effects are robust across the political spectrum and a wide variety of covariates. We show that psychological inoculation campaigns on social media are effective at improving misinformation resilience at scale." (Abstract)

https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.abo6254

189. Jon Roozenbeek, Cecilie S. Traberg, Sander Van der Linden: **Technique-Based Inoculation Against Real-World Misinformation.** In: Royal Society Open Science, vol. 9, nr. 211719, 2022, 13 pp.

"In recent years, numerous psychological interventions have been developed to reduce susceptibility to misinformation. Inoculation theory has become an increasingly common framework for reducing susceptibility to both individual examples of misinformation (issue-based inoculation) and to the techniques and strategies that are commonly used to mislead or misinform people (technique-based inoculation). In this study, we address two open questions related to technique-based inoculation in two separate experiments (total n = 2188; convenience sample recruited via the Bad News online game platform): (i) Can technique-based inoculation effectively reduce susceptibility to real-world misinformation that went viral on social media? And (ii) can technique-based inoculation confer cross-protection against misinformation that does not make use of any of the techniques against which people were inoculated? We find that playing a 15 min game confers psychological resistance against real-world misinformation that makes use of manipulation techniques against which people were inoculated (Cohen's d = 0.37, Cohen's U3 = 64.4%, p <0.001), and that cross-protection is achieved but at a reduced effect size (d = 0.10, U3 = 54.0%, p = 0.001)." (Abstract)

https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.211719

190. **Digital Resistance: An Empowering Handbook for Teachers on How to Support Their Students to Recognise Fake News and False Information Found in the Online Environment.** Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2020, 88 pp.

"This handbook and additional dossiers, freely available at the Digital Resistance project homepage (www.digi-res.eu), provide all the information teachers need to conduct a short module on the topic of "fake news" in the classroom or other settings with a group of students aged between 14 and 20 years. The methodology suggested in this handbook can easily be adapted by other actors in the educational sector working in different learning contexts. It begins by providing background knowledge about the topic of fake news and digital competences, followed by guiding steps on how to work on this topic with students in a short module. The learning methodology used is based on enquiry-based learning, so students can be supported to conduct a small-scale research project on a self-chosen topic connected to fake news. Information on this can be found in Chapter 3 of this handbook. In Chapter 5, the concept of peer-to-peer learning is used to set up learning processes between students attending the short module."

(Executive summary, p.5)
https://rm.coe.int/digital-resistance-handbook-21012021/1680a1269d

191. Andrew M. Guessa, Michael Lernerb, Benjamin Lyonsd, Jacob M. Montgomerye, Brendan Nyhanf, Jason Reiflerg, Neelanjan Sircarh: **A digital media literacy intervention increases discernment between mainstream and false news in the United States and India.** In: PNAS, vol. 117, nr. 27, 2020, 10 pp.

"Using data from preregistered survey experiments conducted around recent elections in the United States and India, we assess the effectiveness of an intervention modeled closely on the world's largest media literacy campaign, which provided "tips" on how to spot false news to people in 14 countries. Our results indicate that exposure to this intervention reduced the perceived accuracy of both mainstream and false news headlines, but effects on the latter were significantly larger. As a result, the intervention improved discernment between mainstream and false news headlines among both a nationally representative sample in the United States (by 26.5%) and a highly educated online sample in India (by 17.5%). This increase in discernment remained measurable several weeks later in the United States (but not in India). However, we find no effects among a representative sample of respondents in a largely rural area of northern India, where rates of social media use are far lower." (Abstract)
https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.1920498117

192. Jon Rozeenbeek, Sander Van der Linden: **Breaking Harmony Square: A Game That "Inoculates" Against Political Misinformation.** In: Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, vol. 1, nr. 8, 2020, 26 pp.

"We present Harmony Square, a short, free-to-play online game in which players learn how political misinformation is produced and spread. We find that the game confers psychological resistance against manipulation techniques commonly used in political misinformation: players from around the world find social media content making use of these techniques significantly less reliable after playing, are more confident in their ability to spot such content, and less likely to report sharing it with others in their network." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-47

AFRICA, SUB-SAHARAN

193. Kathryn L. Hopkins, Chelsey Lepage, Wendy Cook et al.: **Co-Designing a Mobile-Based Game to Improve Misinformation Resistance and Vaccine Knowledge in Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda.** In: Journal of Health Communication, vol. 28, nr. suppl. 2, 2023, pp. 49-60
https://doi.org/10.1080/10810730.2023.2231377

194. Theodora Dame Adjin-Tettey: **Combating Fake News, Disinformation, and Misinformation: Experimental Evidence for Media Literacy Education.** In: Cogent Arts & Humanities, vol. 9, nr. 2037229, 2022, 17 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2022.2037229

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195. Michael Hameleers, Toni van der Meer: **Striking the balance between fake and real: Under what conditions can media literacy messages that warn about misinformation maintain trust in accurate information?** In: Behaviour & Information Technology, 2023, 13 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0144929X.2023.2267700

196. Jeffrey Lees, John A. Banas, Darren Linvill, Patrick C. Meirick, Patrick Warren: **The *Spot the Troll Quiz* game increases accuracy in discerning

between real and inauthentic social media accounts. In: PNAS Nexus, vol. 2, nr. 4, 2023, pp. 1-11

https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgad094

197. Nadia Naffi, Charest, Mélodie Charest, Sarah Danis et al.: **Empowering Youth to Combat Malicious Deepfakes and Disinformation: An Experiential and Reflective Learning Experience Informed by Personal Construct Theory.** In: Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 2023, 22 pp.

https://doi.org/10.1080/10720537.2023.2294314

198. **Media Literacy, Disinformation & Misinformation in the Caribbean.** Public Media Alliance; UNESCO; Media Institute of the Caribbean; Association of Caribbean Media Workers, 2022, 78 pp.

https://www.publicmediaalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Media_Information_Literacy_Caribbean-2022.pdf

ASIA & PACIFIC

199. Annu Anand, Alok Srivastava: **FactShala Media Literacy Initiative in India: An Impact Evaluation.** Center for Media Studies, 2022, 103 pp.

https://internews.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/25x25-Factshala-Final-20220316.pdf

200. Tamar Kintsurashvili: **Media Literacy and Disinformation Perception Survey.** Tbilisi: Media Development Foundation (MDF), 2022, 37 pp.

https://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads//MedialiteracyReport-ENG.pdf

Effects of Disinformation on Democracy

GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

201. Edda Humprecht: **The Role of Trust and Attitudes toward Democracy in the Dissemination of Disinformation—a Comparative Analysis of Six Democracies.** In: Digital Journalism, 2023, 18 pp.

"Trust lies at the heart of the disinformation crisis, as citizens must decide which narratives to follow and whether to accept "alternative truths." Therefore, trust in institutions that publish reliable information can act as a shield against disinformation. This comparative study investigates the role of trust in news media and political actors and general attitudes toward democracy in the willingness to spread disinformation (i.e., likes, shares, or comments). Findings of this study show that news media trust plays a subordinate role but that trust in social media news has a strong relationship with willingness to spread disinformation. In 2020, citizens in the United States and United Kingdom who had high trust in their governments were more willing to spread disinformation, whereas in France and Belgium, citizens who trusted opposition leaders were more likely to do so. Moreover, citizens who were satisfied with democracy appeared to be less vulnerable to disinformation, with the exception of those in the United States. Therefore, political actors bear great responsibility for the current (dis)information crisis because they can exploit citizens' trust to their advantage." (Abstract)

https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2023.2200196

202. Carme Colomina, Héctor Sánchez Margalef, Richard Youngs: **The Impact of Disinformation on Democratic Processes and Human Rights in the World.** Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, 2021, 54 pp.

"Disinformation undermines human rights and many elements of good quality democracy; but counter-disinformation measures can also have a prejudicial impact on human rights and democracy. COVID-19 compounds both these dynamics and has unleashed more intense waves of disinformation, allied to human rights and democracy setbacks. Effective responses to disinformation are needed at multiple levels, including formal laws and regulations, corporate measures and civil society action. While the EU has begun to tackle disinformation in its external actions, it has scope to place greater stress on the human rights dimension of this challenge. In doing so, the EU can draw upon best practice examples from around the world that tackle disinformation through a human rights lens. This study proposes steps the EU can take to build counter-disinformation more seamlessly into its global human rights and democracy policies." (Abstract)

https://doi.org/10.2861/59161

203. Kathleen Kuehn, Leon A. Salter: **Assessing Digital Threats to Democracy, and Workable Solutions: A Review of the Recent Literature.** In: International Journal of Communication, vol. 14, 2020, pp. 2589-2610

"Concerns surrounding the threats that digital platforms pose to the functioning of Western liberal democracies have grown since the 2016 U.S. election. Yet despite a preponderance of academic work in this area, the precise nature of these threats, empirical solutions for their redress, and their relationship to the wider digital political economy remain undertheorized. This article addresses these gaps with a semisystematic literature review that identifies and defines four prominent threats—fake news, filter bubbles/echo chambers, online hate speech, and surveillance—and constructs a typology of "workable solutions" for combating these threats that highlights the tendency to silo technical, regulatory, or culturally embedded approaches." (Abstract)

https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/12959/3082

204. Marianne Elliott, Jess Berentson-Shaw, Kathleen Kuehn, Leon Salter, Ella Brownlie: **Digital Threats to Democracy.** The Workshop; Law Foundation; Luminate Foundation, 2019, 244 pp.

"At the heart of the challenges to democracy posed by digital media are three core problems: 1. Platform monopolies: two or three corporations control not only our means of communication, but also the content which is distributed, both of which are core aspects of our democracy. Whilst the market power and global mobility of these companies make it possible for them to avoid national regulatory measures, either by moving operations elsewhere or simply ignoring them; 2. Algorithmic opacity: algorithmic engines are using huge quantities of personal data to make ever more precise predictions about what we want to see and hear, and having ever increasing influence over what we think and do, with little transparency about how they work or accountability for their impact; and 3. Attention economy: the dominant business model of digital media prioritises the amplification of whatever content is best at grabbing our attention, while avoiding responsibility for the impact that content has on our collective wellbeing and our democracy. The negative impact is brutally clear from both the literature and the world around us." (Introduction, p.14)

https://www.digitaldemocracy.nz/

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205. Guadalupe López Bustillo, Bernardo Poma Ulo, Erick Torrico Villanueva: **Desinformación y conflictividad en Bolivia 2019-2021.** La Paz: Fundación UNIR, 2022, 77 pp.

https://www.unirbolivia.org/noticias/desinformacion-y-conflictividad-en-bolivia-2019-2021/

EUROPE

206. Ágnes Urbán, Gábor Polyák, Kata Horváth: **How Public Service Media Disinformation Shapes Hungarian Public Discourse.** In: Media and Communication, vol. 11, nr. 4, 2023, pp. 62-72

https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v11i4.7148

207. Serena Giusti, Elisa Piras (eds.): **Democracy and Fake News.** London; New York: Routledge, 2021, xiv, 232 pp.

https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003037385

Election Campaigns: Disinformation

GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

208. Daniel Arnaudo, Samantha Bradshaw, Hui Hui Ooi, Kaleigh Schwalbe, Amy Studdart, Vera Zakem, Amanda Zink: **Combating Information Manipulation: A Playbook for Elections and Beyond.** National Democratic Institute (NDI); International Republican Institute (IRI); Stanford Internet Observatory, 2021, 59 pp.

"The playbook approach consists of how to (1) identify ongoing information manipulation campaigns; (2) develop real-time and short-term responses; and (3) build long-term resilience to information manipulation. While we outline three distinct steps in this playbook, the process for combating information manipulation is circular, with each step overlapping and reinforcing the others. Planning timelines will vary based on context, but—if at all possible—we encourage proactive rather than reactive planning to effectively counter electoral information manipulation. The playbook's three-part strategy can help you develop rapid and real-time responses, as well as establish long-term and sustainable approaches to building resilience in order to maintain the integrity of elections and strengthen democratic processes." (p.3)
https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/infomanip_playbook_updated_final-1.pdf

209. Freek van Gils, Wieland Müller, Jens Prüfer: **Microtargeting, voters' unawareness, and democracy.** In: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, nr. ewae002, 2024, 20 pp.

"Recent technological developments have raised concerns about threats to democracy because of their potential to distort election outcomes: (a) data-driven voter research enabling political microtargeting and (b) growing news consumption via social media and news aggregators that obfuscate the origin of news items, leading to voters' unawareness about a news sender's identity. We provide a theoretical framework in which we can analyze the effects that microtargeting by political interest groups and unawareness have on election outcomes in comparison to "conventional" news reporting. We show which voter groups suffer from which technological development (a) or (b). While both microtargeting and unawareness have negative effects on voter welfare, we show that only unawareness can flip an election. Our model framework allows the theory-based discussion of policy proposals, such as to ban microtargeting or to require news platforms to signal the political orientation of a news item's originator." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewae002

210. **Information Integrity to Sustain Peace during Electoral Processes. Sustaining Peace during Electoral Processes (SELECT) Project.** New York: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2023, 48 pp.

"The purpose of this report is to gain a better understanding of the pertinent dynamics and to bolster the design of programming to support the information ecosystem around elections. In aid of this, UNDP sought information through a number of channels, in a review of the relevant literature, a series of regional consultations, expert meetings and a survey ... The various sources all conclude there remains no single panacea to the ills that information pollution brings upon elections. Rather, there is a variety of information pollution programming around elections, each with its own benefits and deficiencies. In order to support the design of a holistic information integrity strategy, this report suggests that programmes seek to address one or more of the following three concerns (1) prevention—to address the supply side of information pollution by preventing or deterring the creation of information pollution, (2) resilience—building public resilience to information pollution limiting the ability of users to be influenced or co-opted by information pollution and (3) countering—identifying and attempting to counter information pollution." (Summary, p.8-9)
https://www.undp.org/publications/information-integrity-sustain-peace-during-electoral-processes

AFRICA, SUB-SAHARAN

211. Idayat Hassan: **Dissemination of disinformation on political and electoral processes in Nigeria: An exploratory study.** In: Cogent Arts & Humanities, vol.

10, nr. 2216983, 2023, 11 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2023.2216983

212. Phumzile van Damme et al.: **A Race to the Bottom: Populism, Mis/Disinformation and South Africa's 2021 Election.** Anti-Disinformation Project, 2021, 103 pp.
https://civicsignal.africa/static/docs/A%20race%20to%20the%20bottom%20_%20SA%20Elections%202021%20_Disinfo%20Project.pdf

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213. Rafael Rubio, Vitor de Andrade Monteiro: **Preserving trust in democracy: The Brazilian Superior Electoral Court's quest to tackle disinformation in elections.** In: South African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 30, nr. 3, 2023, pp 497-520
https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2023.2274860

214. **Acompanhamento da desinformação durante as eleições 2022.** NetLab; Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), 2022, 39 slides
"Narrativas de desinformação - principais achados: 1. Entre alegações de
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376609809_Acompanhamento_da_Desinformacao_Durante_as_Eleicoes_2022

215. **Conteúdo nocivo: A Meta protege a integridade eleitoral no Brasil?** Netlab; Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), 2022, 12 pp.
https://bit.ly/49Jc6oS

216. **Primeiro turno: Eleiçoes 2022. Especial mensageria: Narrativas, estratégias e fluxo de desinformação.** Netlab; Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), 2022, 60 slides
https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/718c9ffd-7ac0-47a5-a022-fb9e318ca156/Resultados_%201o%20turno.pdf

217. Aline Rezende Peres Osorio, Frederico Franco Alvim, Giselly Siqueira et al.: **Brazil's Electoral Justice Permanent Program on Countering Disinformation: Strategic Plan Elections 2022.** Brasilia: Brazil Superior Electoral Court; Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), 2022, 61 pp.
https://international.tse.jus.br/en/misinformation-and-fake-news/brazil-electoral-justice-permanent-program-on-countering-disinform ation

218. Ricardo Ribeiro Ferreira: **Liquid Disinformation Tactics: Overcoming Social Media Countermeasures through Misleading Content.** In: Journalism Practice, vol. 16, nr. 8, 2022, pp. 1537-1558
https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2021.1914707

219. Julieta Schisano, Laura Zommer, Milena Rosenzvit: **Secuencia didáctica de alfabetización mediática informacional para nivel medio: Combatir la desinformación electoral y promover la participación de los jóvenes en América Latina y el Caribe.** Montevideo: UNESCO, 2022, 35 pp.
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000380592

220. **Respuestas para combatir la desinformación en procesos electorales en Perú.** Lima: UNESCO, 2021, 72 pp.
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000378233

221. Felipe Bonow Soares, Raquel Recuero: **Hashtag Wars: Political Disinformation and Discursive Struggles on Twitter Conversations During the**

2018 Brazilian Presidential Caauthor(s). In: Social Media + Society, 2021, 13 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051211009073

222. Tatiana Dourado, Susana Salgado: **Disinformation in the Brazilian pre-election context: Probing the content, spread and implications of fake news about Lula da Silva.** In: Communication Review, vol. 24, nr. 4, 2021, pp. 297-319
https://doi.org/10.1080/10714421.2021.1981705

223. Fabiola Mendonça de Vasconcelos: **Mídia, desinformação e democracia: Como os meios de comunicação influenciam as eleiçoes presidenciais no Brasil.** In: Revista Observatório, vol. 6, nr. 6, 2020, 24 pp.
http://dx.doi.org/10.20873/uft.2447-4266.2020v6n6a1pt

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224. Fatima Gaw, Jon Benedik A. Bunquin, Samuel I. Cabbuag, Jose Mari H. Lanuza, Noreen H. Sapalo, Yusoph Al-Habbyel B.: **Political Economy of Covert Influence Operations in the 2022 Philippine Elections.** Internews, 2023, 168 pp.

"This report investigates the political economy of covert influence in the 2022 Philippine Elections, with a focus on social media influencers involved in covert political campaigning. This interdisciplinary research (1) examines political influencers and peripheral actors in the field engaged in political campaigning using qualitative field research methods, (2) maps and evaluates evidence of their participation in covert influence operations through computational social science methods, and (3) estimates political spending on the presumed commissioned influencers through economic modeling. Our research is the first empirical work to produce an assembly of data-informed approximations of the scope and scale of the political economy of covert influence operations. Specifically, it is the first to estimate the economic 'cost' of commissioned influencers for electoral influence operations in the Philippines. It also provides a complex but nuanced account of influencers as 'gray' political actors who exercise agency in their complicity to covert political campaigning given commensurate economic and political incentives. Amidst undocumented transactions and opaque operations, our research establishes multiple, cross-platform proxy measures of malicious political influencing, beyond established detection mechanisms. We find that thousands of political influencers are presumed to be commissioned to perform covert political campaigning in the 2022 Philippine Elections for top national positions, funded by massive financing by political intermediaries in a largely unstructured and unregulated economic market characterized by asymmetrical political relations." (Executive summary, p.11)
https://internews.org/resource/political-economy-of-covert-influence-operations-in-the-2022-philippine-elections/

225. Rossine Fallorina, Jose Mari Hall Lanuza, Juan Gabriel Felix, Ferdinand Sanchez, Jonathan Corpus Ong, Nicole Curato: **From Disinformation to Influence Operations: The Evolution of Disinformation in Three Electoral Cycles.** Internews, 2023, 56 pp.
https://internews.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/InternewsPH-June-2023-The-Evolution-of-Disinformation-in-Three-Electoral-Cycles.p df

226. Korbkusol Neelapaichit, Ekmongkhon Puridej (eds.): **State-Sponsored Online Disinformation: Impact on Electoral Integrity in Thailand.** Bangkog: Asia Centre, 2023, vii, 42 pp.
https://asiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/State-Sponsored-Online-Disinformation-Impact-on-Electoral-Integrity-in-Thailand.pdf

227. Jonathan Corpus Ong, Rossine Fallorina, Jose Mari Hall Lanuza (et al.): **Parallel Public Spheres: Influence Operations in the 2022 Philippine Elections.** Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy; Internews, 2022, 52 pp.
https://mediamanipulation.org/sites/default/files/media-files/Parallel-Public-Spheres.pdf

228. Korbkusol Neelapaichit, Ekmongkhon Puridej, Pemtat Chanhom (ed.): **Youth and Disinformation in Malaysia: Strengthening Electoral Integrity.** Bangkog: Asia Centre, 2022, vii, 44 pp.
https://asiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/Youth-and-Disinformation-in-Malaysia-Strengthening-Electoral-Integrity-1.pdf

229. Jonathan Corpus Ong, Nicole Curato: **Multistakeholder Dialogue on Electoral Disinformation.** Internews, 2021, 34 pp.
https://internews.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Internews_Multistakeholder-Dialogue-Electoral-Disinformation_December_2021.pdf

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230. Jonáš Syrovátka, Nikola Horejš, Sarah Komasová: **Towards a model that measures the impact of disinformation on elections.** In: European View, vol. 22, nr. 1, 2023, pp. 119-130
https://doi.org/10.1177/17816858231162677

Fact-Checking & Verification of Sources

GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

231. Robert Nemeth, Marius Dragomir: **The Debunking Effect: Recent and Upcoming Challenges for Fact-Checking Organizations.** Budapest: Center for Media, Data and Society (CMDS), 2022, 50 pp.

"The CEU Democracy Institute's Center for Media, Data and Society (CMDS) embarked in November 2020 on a one-year project aimed at mapping and analyzing the work of the world's fact-checking groups, with a focus on their challenges, needs and successes. The project started with a survey of 30 fact-checking organizations worldwide, which were asked to indicate the importance of certain impact-related challenges. Based on the survey's results and research, CMDS identified four areas of interest, and also groups that have been successful in addressing these challenges. These fact-checking organizations, some of them lesser-known groups established in the past few years, and their modus operandi have been showcased in four articles covering audience outreach, methods to tackle misinformation on social media, fact-checking misinformation about the Covid-19 pandemic and fact-checking for teenagers, which were published over the course of the past year. This booklet collects all these papers in one place, presenting the results of the survey and the articles produced as part of the project, as well as an additional, fifth piece that looks into the future of fact-checking." (Introduction)
https://cmds.ceu.edu/sites/cmcs.ceu.hu/files/attachment/article/2151/thedebunkingeffectfinal.pdf

232. Peter Welchering: **The Problem with Pictures: Source Analysis and Fact-Checking in a Time of War.** In: Journalism Research, vol. 5, nr. 2, 2022, pp. 172-182

"Day in, day out, we journalists receive images from combat zones in Ukraine, without knowing whether they are authentic or have been manipulated. It is our job to find out, conducting analysis that takes both time and basic knowledge of image forensics. There are many testing tools and platforms for this. But many of those working in journalism are unsure about what exactly these tools look at and how to interpret the findings they produce ... Image forensics and source analysis cannot convict war criminals – but they can be used to research initial indications of when and where a crime was committed. And it is vital that people are warned against the error of relying solely on a reverse image search to detect manipulation of videos and photos. This paper examines these problem areas, as well as the urgent need to incorporate these research methods into journalistic

training at all levels." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1453/2569-152X-22022-12309-en

233. Samikshya Siwakoti, Kamya Yadav, Nicola Bariletto, Luca Zanotti, Ulas Erdogdu, Jacob N. Shapiro: **How COVID Drove the Evolution of Fact-Checking.** In: Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, vol. 2, nr. 3, 2021, 23 pp.

"With the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic came a flood of novel misinformation. Ranging from harmless false cures to dangerous rhetoric targeting minorities, coronavirus-related misinformation spread quickly wherever the virus itself did. Fact-checking organizations around the world took up the charge against misinformation, essentially crowdsourcing the task of debunking false narratives. In many places, engagement with coronavirus-related content drove a large percentage of overall user engagement with fact-checking content, and the capacity organizations developed to address coronavirus-related misinformation was later deployed to debunk misinformation on other topics." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-69

234. **Fighting the Spread of False Information: A Fact-Checking and Verification Toolkit.** Johannesburg: Africa Check; Fojo Media Institute, 2020, 13 pp.

"This fact-checking and verification toolkit was developed by Africa Check for African journalists. It aims to equip journalists with the knowledge and practical tips to stop the spread of false information. This toolkit, which was developed as the world was in the midst of its battle against the Covid-19 pandemic, provides an easily understandable overview of fact-checking with a focus on health information." (About this toolkit, p.2)

http://wits.journalism.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Fojo_toolkit.pdf

235. Chokri Ben Nessir, Jocelyn Grange: **La verification des faits dans le journalisme.** Centre Africain de Perfectionnement des Journalistes et Communicateurs (CAPJC); Media Up Programme d'Appui aux Médias Tunisiens, 2020, 104 pp.

"Ce guide présente d'abord le concept de fausse nouvelle dans toutes ses dimensions et la façon dont celles-ci peuvent contaminer l'information aussi bien en Tunisie que dans le reste du monde. Un journaliste a besoin de comprendre les différentes formes que peut revêtir la désinformation ainsi que ses nuances, ses rouages, et ses acteurs s'il veut pouvoir la combattre efficacement ou ne pas se laisser lui-même piéger. La seconde partie du manuel est consacrée aux méthodes et aux outils qui doivent être utilisés pour la vérification des faits, aussi bien dans son approche traditionnelle (traitement des sources humaines et documentaires hors-ligne) que dans son approche renouvelée par l'usage des nouvelles technologies numériques. Enfin, le manuel présente dans une troisième partie une technique de vérification des faits appelée fact-checking. Elle est apparue dans les médias au milieu des années 1990 pour mettre le discours des politiciens à l'épreuve des faits avant d'être utilisée, dans un second temps, comme un instrument de riposte contre la circulation massive des fausses nouvelles." (Introduction, p.11)
https://www.euneighbours.eu/fr/sud/stay-informed/publications/guides-pratiques-du-journaliste-tunisien-la-verification-des-faits

AFRICA, SUB-SAHARAN

236. Jeremy Bowles, Kevin Croke, Horacio Larreguy, Shelley Liu, John Marshall: **Sustaining Exposure to Fact-Checks: Misinformation Discernment, Media Consumption, and its Political Implications.** [authors], 2023, 37 + 27 pp.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4582703

237. Fabíola Ortiz dos Santos: **Fighting Disinfodemic in Central Africa: Fact-Checkers Experience Against Covid-19 Fake News.** In: F. R. Cádima, I. Ferreira (coord.): Perspectivas Multidisciplinares Da Comunicação Em Contexto De Pandemia. Vol I. Coleção ICNOVA, 2021, pp. 144-164
https://doi.org/10.34619/n8sz-0v13

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238. Regina Cazzamatta, Augusto Santos: **Checking verifications during the 2022 Brazilian run-off election: How fact-checking organizations exposed falsehoods and contributed to the accuracy of the public debate.** In: Journalism, 2023, 22 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1177/14648849231196080

239. María-Isabel Míguez-González, Xabier Martínez-Rolán, García-Mirón: **From Disinformation to Fact-Checking: How Ibero-American Fact-Checkers on Twitter Combat Fake News.** In: Profesional de la Información, vol. 32, nr. 1, 2023, 14 pp.
https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2023.ene.10

240. Carlos Rodriguez-Pérez, Taís Seibt, Magallón Raúl et al.: **Purposes, Principles, and Difficulties of Fact-Checking in Ibero-America: Journalists' Perceptions.** In: Journalism Practice, vol. 17, nr. 10, 2023, pp. 2159-2177
https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2022.2124434

241. Lucas Durr Missau, Laura Strelow Storch: **Fact-Checking Initiatives in Portuguese Language Countries: Checking Methods and Financing Strategies.** In: Online Media and Global Communication, vol. 1, nr. 3, 2022, pp. 600-625
https://doi.org/10.1515/omgc-2022-0028

242. Thales Lelo: **The Rise of the Brazilian Fact-checking Movement: Between Economic Sustainability and Editorial Independence.** In: Journalism Studies, vol. 23, nr. 9, 2022, pp. 1077-1095
https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2022.2069588

243. Martín Slipczuk: **Una guía para principiantes para establecer una organización de fact-checking en América Latina y el Caribe.** Montevideo: UNESCO, 2022, 25 pp.
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000380932.locale=en

244. Sakari Nieminen, Valterri Sankari: **Checking PolitiFact's Fact-Checks.** In: Journalism Studies, vol. 22, nr. 3, 2021, pp. 358-378
https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2021.1873818

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245. Hyun Suk Kim, Yoo Ji Suh, Eun-mee Kim, Eunryung Chong, Hwajung Hong et al.: **Fact-Checking and Audience Engagement: A Study of Content Analysis and Audience Behavioral Data of Fact-Checking Coverage from News Media.** In: Digital Journalism, vol. 10, nr. 5, 2022, pp. 781-800
https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2021.2006073

246. Maryam Saeed, Seerat Khan, Muhammad Usman: **Fact-Checking and Source Verification Manual in Times of COVID-19: Journalists and Media Organizations.** Digital Rights Foundation (DRF), 2020, 50 pp.
https://digitalrightsfoundation.pk/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Fake-News.pdf

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247. Maria Kyriakidou, Stephen Cushion, Ceri Hughes,

Marina Morani: **Questioning Fact-Checking in the Fight Against Disinformation: An Audience Perspective.** In: Journalism Practice, vol. 17, nr. 10, 2023, pp. 2123-2139
https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2022.2097118

248. Florian Priming: **The Influence of Media Trust and Normative Role Expectations on the Credibility of Fact Checkers.** In: Journalism Practice, 2022, 21 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2022.2080102

Foreign Disinformation Operations

GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

249. **Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment.** London et al.: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2021, 174 pp.

"This report sets out a new methodology for assessing cyber power, and then applies it to 15 states: Four members of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance – the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia; Three cyber-capable allies of the Five Eyes states – France, Israel and Japan; Four countries viewed by the Five Eyes and their allies as cyber threats – China, Russia, Iran and North Korea; Four states at earlier stages in their cyber-power development – India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. The methodology is broad and principally qualitative, assessing each state's capabilities in seven different categories. The cyber ecosystem of each state is analysed, including how it intersects with international security, economic competition and military affairs. On that basis the 15 states are divided into three tiers: Tier One is for states with world-leading strengths across all the categories in the methodology, Tier Two is for those with world-leading strengths in some of the categories, and Tier Three is for those with strengths or potential strengths in some of the categories but significant weaknesses in others. The conclusion is that only one state currently merits inclusion in Tier One. Seven are placed in Tier Two, and seven in Tier Three." (Back cover)
https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2021/06/cyber-capabilities-national-power

250. Raphael Cohen, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Joe Cheravitch et al.: **Combating Foreign Disinformation on Social Media: Study Overview and Conclusions.** Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2021, xvi, 119 pp.

"Drawing on a host of different primary and secondary sources and more than 150 original interviews from across the U.S. government, the joint force, industry, civil society, and subject-matter experts from nine countries around the world, researchers examined how China, Russia, and North Korea have used disinformation on social media and what the United States and its allies and partners are doing in response. The authors found that disinformation campaigns on social media may be more nuanced than they are commonly portrayed. Still, much of the response to disinformation remains ad hoc and uncoordinated. Disinformation campaigns on social media will likely increase over the coming decade, but it remains unclear who has the competitive edge in this race; disinformation techniques and countermeasures are evolving at the same time." (Back cover)
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4300/RR4373z1/RAND_RR4373z1.pdf

251. Cyrus Newlin, Heather A. Conley, Amy Searight, Tim Kostelancik, Rachel Ellehuus, Jeffrey Mankoff, Devin Stewart: **Countering Russian & Chinese Influence Activities: Examining Democratic Vulnerabilities & Building Resiliency.** Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2020, v, 31 pp.

"With their heavily censored and restricted civil societies at home, China and Russia exploit the asymmetry of democratic systems by targeting open information environments, freedom of expression, participatory civic discourse, and pluralistic and fluid politics. Democracies have unique vulnerabilities to malign influence activities, but they also have unique and durable strengths. Transparency, rule of law, a free press, and democratic norms—hallmarks of democratic states—foster resilience against malign foreign influence. In the near term, it may be more important for democracies to redouble their efforts to build up their strengths than to reduce their vulnerabilities." (Conclusion)
https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200714_Newlin_FullReport_v4_WEB%20FINAL.pdf

AFRICA, SUB-SAHARAN

252. **More-Troll Kombat: French and Russian Influence Operations Go Head to Head Targeting Audiences in Africa.** Graphika, 2020, 83 pp.
https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika_stanford_report_more_troll_kombat.pdf

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253. Fin Bauer, Kimberly L. Wilson: **Reactions to China-linked Fake News: Experimental Evidence from Taiwan.** In: China Quarterly, nr. 249, 2022, pp. 21-46
https://doi.org/10.1017/S030574102100134X

254. Ingram Niblock, Samantha Hoffman, Matthew Knight: **China's Messaging on the Ukraine Conflict.** Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), International Cyber Policy Centre, 2022, 25 pp.
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/chinas-messaging-ukraine-conflict

255. Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato, Hsi-Ting Pai: **Frontier Influencers: The New Face of China's Propaganda.** Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), International Cyber Policy Centre, 2022, 52 pp.
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/frontier-influencers

256. Jakob Bund: **Finding China's Edge: Engineering Influence Operations within the Limits of Social Media Platform Rules.** Zürich: Center for Security Studies (CSS), 2021, 48 pp.
https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2021-07-Finding-China's-Edge.pdf

257. Fergus Ryan, Ariel Bogle, Albert Zhang, Jacob Wallis: **#StopXinjiang Rumors: The CCP's Decentralised Disinformation Campaign.** Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), International Cyber Policy Centre, 2021, 50 pp.
https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2021-12/StopXinjiangRumours-v2.pdf?VersionId=hTow1LcMuU15t67Z8Pzu9f2CJsSjLF Ra

258. Fergus Ryan, Ariel Bogle, Nathan Ruser et al.: **Borrowing Mouths to Speak on Xinjiang.** Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), International Cyber Policy Centre, 2021, 40 pp.
https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2021-12/Borrowing%20mouths%20to%20speak%20on%20Xinjiang-2.pdf?VersionId=cI oPXJ9A67BIjRu5LFr0L8i9yrjp7y_R

259. Aaron Huang: **Combatting and Defeating Chinese Propaganda and Disinformation: A Case Study of Taiwan's 2020 Elections.** Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2020, 63 pp.
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Combatting%20Chinese%20Propaganda%20and%20Disinformation%20-%20Huang.pdf

EUROPE

260. 1st EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats: Towards a Framework for Networked Defence. European Union, 2023, 35 pp.

"Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine dominates observed Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) activity. Ukraine and its representatives have been the direct target of 33 incidents. In 60 out of 100 incidents, supporting the invasion was the main motivation behind the attack. Diplomatic channels are an integral part of FIMI incidents. Russia's diplomatic channels regularly serve as enablers of FIMI operations. They are deployed across wide range of topics. China also uses diplomatic channels, mostly targeting the US. Impersonation techniques become more sophisticated. Impersonations of international and trusted organisations and individuals are used by Russian actors particularly to target Ukraine. Print and TV media are most often impersonated, with magazines seeing their entire style copied. FIMI actor collusion exists but is limited. Official Russian actors were involved in 88 analysed FIMI incidents. Chinese actors were involved in 17. In at least 5 cases, both actors engaged jointly. FIMI is multilingual. Incidents do not occur in just one language; content is translated and amplified in multiple languages. Incidents featured at least 30 languages, 16 of which are EU-languages. Russia used a larger variety of languages than Chinese actors but 44% of Russian content targeted a Russian-speaking populations, while 36% targeted English-speaking populations. FIMI is mostly intended to distract and distort. Russia (42%) and China (56%) mostly intend to direct attention to a different actor or narrative or to shift blame ('distract'). Russia attempts to change the framing and narrative ('distort') relatively more often (35%) than China (18%). FIMI remains mostly image and video based. The cheap and easy production and distribution of image and video material online makes these formats still the most commonly used." (Executive summary)

https://euvsdisinfo.eu/uploads/2023/02/EEAS-ThreatReport-February2023-02.pdf

261. Rumena Filipova, Alexander Gerganov, Martin Vladimirov: **Tackling Kremlin's Media Capture in Southeast Europe: Shared Patterns, Specific Vulnerabilities and Responses to Russian Disinformation.** Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), 2021, 124 pp.

"The current report illuminates the scope, means, and reach of Russia's sharp power influence through the phenomenon of media capture. It traces the regime's malign impact on good governance and democratic development in eight Southeast European countries (EU members: Bulgaria and Croatia, as well as EU aspirants: Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo). An understanding of the Kremlin's media influence has been developed based on the assessment of: (1) the instruments that Russia deploys to expand its influence over public discourses; (2) the channels and narratives of Russian disinformation utilized to sway views of the West and its key institutions, the EU and NATO; (3) the impact of Kremlin narratives on societal perceptions; (4) the amplification of Russian media influence through a convergence with the disinformation activities of other authoritarian states, particularly China. The cross-country regional comparison reveals several key similarities in Russia's media capture tactics. The Kremlin typically deploys informal instruments of influence. These are manifested in the cultivation of opaque local oligarchic networks, rather than through traceable ownership of SEE media companies. To amplify the impact of these informal tools, Russia has also leveraged the dependence of media outlets in the region on advertising revenue from Russian-owned or dependent companies to exert pressure on their editorial policy. In addition, Russian state-owned propaganda outlets make their content freely available for republishing in local languages, which facilitates the uptake of pro-Russian media content." (Executive summary)

https://csd.bg/fileadmin/user_upload/publications_library/files/2021_03/KP5_ENG_WEB.pdf

262. Two Years On: An Analysis of Russian State and Pro-Kremlin Information Warfare in the Context of the Invasion of Ukraine. London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2024, 25 pp.

https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Two-Years-on_ISD.pdf

263. Aaron Erlich, Calvin Garner: **Is Pro-Kremlin Disinformation Effective? Evidence from Ukraine.** In: International Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 28, nr. 1, 2023, pp. 5-28

https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612211045221

264. Adam Fivensen, Galyna Petrenko, Veronika Víchová, Andrej Polešcuk: **Shielding Democracy: Civil Society Adaptations to Kremlin Disinformation About Ukraine.** Washington, DC: National Endowment for Democracy (NED), 2023, 30 pp.

https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/NED_FORUM-Shielding-Democracy.pdf

265. Pia Lamberty, Lea Frühwirth: **Ein Jahr russischer Angriffskrieg: Die Rolle von Desinformation in Deutschland.** Berlin: CeMAS Center für Monitoring, Analyse und Strategie, 2023, 26 pp.

https://cemas.io/publikationen/desinformation-und-angriffskrieg/2023-02-24_EinJahrRussischerAngriffskriegDesinformationInDeutschl and.pdf

266. Lennart Maschmeyer, Alexei Abrahams, Peter Pomerantsev, Volodymyr Yermolenko: **Donetsk Don't Tell: 'Hybrid War' in Ukraine and the Limits of Social Media Influence Operations.** In: Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 2023, 165 pp.

https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2023.2211969

267. Disinformation and Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: Threats and governance responses. Paris: OECD, 2022, 33 pp.

https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/disinformation-and-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine_37186bde-en

268. Tracking the Propaganda and Disinformation About Foreign Influence in Serbia. Case Study: Serbian Media on the Ukraine War. Beograd: CRTA, 2022, 15 pp.

https://crta.rs/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/TRACKING-THE-PROPAGANDA-AND-DISINFORMATION-ON-FOREIGN-INFLUENCE-IN-SERBIA_CASE- STUDY.pdf

269. Moustafa Ayad: **The Vladimirror Network: Pro-Putin Power-Users on Facebook.** London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2022, 11 pp.

https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-Vladimirror-Network_Pro-Putin-Power-Users-on-Facebook_.pdf

270. Thomas Brey: **Russian Media in the Balkans. Case Study: How Moscow's Propaganda Influences Serbia.** Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 2022, 27 pp.

http://bit.ly/3Syi2t6

271. Jakub Ferencík: **Putin's Disinformation & Misinformation Campaign.** EUROPEUM, 2022, 12 pp.

https://europeum.org/data/articles/jakub-ferencik-3.pdf

272. Rumena Filipova, Vladimir Shopov: **Authoritarians on a Media Offensive in the Midst of War: The Informational Influence of Russia, China, Turkey, Iran and the Gulf States in Southeast Europe.** Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), 2022, iii, 127 pp.

https://www.kas.de/en/web/medien-europa/single-title/-/content/new-publication-authoritarians-on-a-media-offensive-in-the-midst-of- war

273. Lóránt Gyõri: **Shadow Forces: Hidden Malign**

Domestic and Foreign "Grey Zone" Media Influence in Central-Eastern Europe. Political Capital Institute, 2022, 39 pp.
https://www.politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/PoliticalCapital_Grey_Zone_CEE_20220529.pdf

274. Lóránt Gyori, Csaba Molnár, Péter Krekó, Patrik Szicherle et al.: **The Kremlin's Troll Network Never Sleeps: Inauthentic Pro-Kremlin Online Behavior on Facebook in Germany, Italy, Romania and Hungary.** Budapest: Political Capital Institute, 2022, 36 pp.
https://politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/pc_ned_study_kremlin_troll_network_2022_web.pdf

275. Tamar Kintsurashvili, Sandro Gigauri: **Russian Information Warfare 2 Months After the Invasion in Ukraine.** Media Development Foundation (MDF), 2022, 46 pp.
https://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads//Russia%20Report-ENG-WEB%20(1).pdf

276. Julia Kling, Neil Thurman, Florian Toepel, Richard Flechter: **Mapping the Website and Mobile App Audiences of Russia's Foreign Communication Outlets, RT and Sputnik, Across 21 Countries.** In: Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, vol. 3, nr. 6, 2022, 17 pp.
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http://bit.ly/41vm21r

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https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1170898.pdf

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https://cepa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/CEPA-Russia-China-9.14.21.pdf

280. Peter Pomerantsev et al.: **Why Conspirational Propaganda Works and What We Can Do About It: Audience Vulnerability and Resistance to Anti-Western, Pro-Kremlin Disinformation in Ukraine.** London School of Economics and Political Science; Internews Ukraine; Cardiff University, Crime and Security Research Institute, 2021, 45 pp.
https://www.lse.ac.uk/iga/assets/documents/arena/2021/Conspiratorial-propaganda-anti-West-narratives-Ukraine-report-light.pdf

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https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/20210202-ISD-US-Crimean-Connection-V3.pdf

282. **Pillars of Russia's Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem.** Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2020, 76 pp.
https://www.state.gov/russias-pillars-of-disinformation-and-propaganda-report/

283. Ognjan Denkovski, Damian Trilling: **Whose**

Fingerprint Does the News Show? Developing Machine Learning Classifiers for Automatically Identifying Russian State-Funded News in Serbia. In: International Journal of Communication, vol. 14, 2020, pp. 4428-4452
https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/13925

284. Mona Elswah, Philip N. Howard: **"Anything That Causes Chaos": The Organizational Behavior of Russia Today (RT).** In: Journal of Communication, vol. 70, nr. 5, 2020, pp. 623-645
https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqaa027

285. Todd C. Helmus, James V. Marrone (et al.): **Russian Propaganda Hits its Mark: Experimentally Testing the Impact of Russian Propaganda and Counter-Interventions.** Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2020, xv, 86 pp.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA700/RRA704-3/RAND_RRA704-3.pdf

286. Susanne Spahn: **Russische Medien in Deutschland: Wie der russische Informationskrieg und Desinformation Einfluss auf Deutschland ausüben.** Potsdam: Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 2020, 27 pp.
subjects: Disinformation, Misinformation, Fake News - Germany; Russia
https://bit.ly/3IuB9jH

Gendered Disinformation

GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

287. Katya Vogt, Elayne Deelen, Jocelyn Young: **Addressing Gendered Disinformation: Review of Current Recommendations and the Case for Broadening Responses.** IREX, 2023, 27 pp.

"This report summarizes and groups the most common recommendations to address gendered disinformation and analyzes gaps between the evidence base and the recommendations made to date. This review is aimed toward those who seek to develop solutions to gendered disinformation in its different forms, although stakeholders across sectors should consider how they can operationalize these recommendations. While reviewers found many actionable recommendations, they also noticed significant gaps and missed opportunities for impact and collaboration." (Executive summary, p.4)
https://www.irex.org/resource/addressing-gendered-disinformation

288. Julie Posetti, Nabeelah Shabbir, Diana Maynard, Kalina Bontcheva, Nermine Aboulez: **The Chilling: Global Trends in Online Violence Against Women Journalists. Research Discussion Paper.** UNESCO, 2021, 94 pp.

"Online attacks on women journalists appear to be increasing significantly, as this study demonstrates, particularly in the context of the 'shadow pandemic' of violence against women during COVID-19. The pandemic has changed journalists' working conditions, making them yet more dependent on digital communications services and social media channels. The emergence of the 'disinfodemic' has also increased the toxicity of the online communities within which journalists work, making journalists "sitting ducks" according to the UK National Union of Journalists' Michelle Stanistreet, interviewed for this study. Our research also highlights the threefold function of disinformation in gendered online violence against women journalists: 1. Disinformation tactics are routinely deployed in targeted multiplatform online attacks against women journalists; 2. Reporting on disinformation and intertwined issues, such as digital conspiracy networks and far-right extremism, is a trigger for heightened attacks; 3. Disinformation purveyors operationalise misogynistic abuse, harassment and threats against women journalists to undercut public trust in critical journalism and facts in general." (Introduction, p.7)
https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/the-chilling.pdf

289. Juliana Alcantara, Juliana Valentim: Gender-Based Disinformation: A Scoping Review of the Literature, 2013-2023. In: ex aequo, nr. 48, 2023, pp. 125-145

"This article examines gender-based disinformation, highlighting findings and research gaps. A PRISMA review method was used, reviewing 143 articles from 2013 to early 2023. Only 14 studies directly assessed gender dimensions in disinformation. Outcomes show that Twitter is the most studied platform, with a focus on content analysis, and Global South perspectives are neglected. Using an intersectional feminist critical approach, our findings suggest three recurring themes: women are the frequent target of disinformation, narratives connect to dark politics, and proposed solutions rely on media literacy programs and regulatory measures." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.22355/exaequo.2023.48.0%209

290. Lucina Di Meco: Monetizing Misogyny: Gendered Disinformation and the Undermining of Women's Rights and Democracy Globally. #ShePersisted, 2023, 34 pp.

"This research aims to understand the patterns, impact and modus operandi of gendered disinformation campaigns against women in politics in Brazil, Hungary, India, Italy and Tunisia. The case studies explore how gendered disinformation has been used by political movements, and at times the government itself, to undermine women's political participation, and to weaken democratic institutions and human rights. Crucially, the research also looks at the responsibilities and responses that both state actors and digital platforms have taken - or most often, failed to take - to address this issue. Despite the regional and cultural diversity of the countries analyzed, several trends and patterns emerge related to gendered disinformation." (Executive summary)
https://she-persisted.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/ShePersisted_MonetizingMisogyny.pdf

291. Malin Palm, Nynne Storm Refsing: Online Gendered Disinformation and Sexist Hate Speech. International Media Support (IMS), 2023, 6 pp.

"This learning brief focuses on the issues of online gendered disinformation and sexist hate speech against women, girls and non-binary people who work or appear in the media and what media development organisations can do to address them." (p.1)
https://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/IMS-Online-gendered-disinformation_final.pdf

292. Policy Papers: Perspectives on Gendered Disinformation. Digital Rights Foundation (DRF); Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2021, 85 pp.

"Through these mediations on gendered disinformation, and the variety of perspectives that the authors bring, we call into question hegemonic structures of knowledge production. The anthology forces us to call into question the very idea of objectivity, blurring lines between 'truth' and 'lies'. The report contains experiences where women have been harmed equally by untrue information, half-truths and narratives that reflect deep-seated biases rather than deliberate lies. For the discourse on gendered disinformation to encompass all these experiences requires a larger contemplation on what we mean by 'objective truth'. (Contribution of report, p.4)
https://digitalrightsfoundation.pk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/HBS-Report-2021-U.pdf

293. Samantha Bradshaw, Amélie Henle: The Gender Dimensions of Foreign Influence Operations. In: International Journal of Communication, vol. 15, 2021, pp. 4596-4618

"Drawing on a qualitative analysis of 7,506 tweets by state-sponsored accounts from Russia's GRU and the Internet Research Agency (IRA), Iran, and Venezuela, this article examines the gender dimensions of foreign influence operations. By examining the political communication of feminism and women's rights, we find, first, that foreign state actors co-opted intersectional critiques and countermovement narratives about feminism and female empowerment to demobilize civil society activists, spread progovernment propaganda, and generate virality around divisive political topics. Second, 10 amplifier accounts—particularly from the Russian IRA and GRU—drove more than one-third of the Twitter conversations about feminism and women's rights. Third, high-profile feminist politicians, activists, celebrities, and journalists were targeted with character attacks by the Russian GRU. These attacks happened indirectly, reinforcing a culture of hate rather than attempting to stifle or suppress the expression of rights through threats or harassment. This comparative look at the online political communication of women's rights by foreign state actors highlights distinct blueprints for foreign influence operations while enriching the literature about the unique challenges women face online." (Abstract)
https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/16332

294. Sharon Goulds et al.: The Truth Gap: How Misinformation and Disinformation Online Affect the Lives, Learning and Leadership of Girls and Young Women. Surrey: Plan International, 2021, 46 pp.

"We surveyed over 26,000 girls and young women in 26 countries. 91% of girls and young women surveyed are concerned about misinformation and/or disinformation online. 40% of those surveyed are extremely or very concerned. Misinformation and disinformation are having a negative impact on 87% of the girls and young women we surveyed. 46% of girls feel sad, depressed, stressed, worried or anxious as a result of online misinformation and disinformation. Misinformation and disinformation restrict girls' activism: 1 out of 4 girls feel less confident to share their views; 1 out of 5 girls stop engaging in politics or current affairs. 7 out of 10 girls and young women have never been taught about how to spot misinformation/disinformation at school or by family members. There was no single online source of information that the majority of girls and young women surveyed actually trusted." (Key findings, p.6)
https://www.planinternational.nl/uploaded/2021/09/The-Truth-Gap-_executive-summary_Plan-International_State-of-the-Worlds-Girls-20 21-1.pdf?x27128

295. Ellen Judson: Gendered disinformation: 6 reasons why liberal democracies need torespond to this threat. Policy brief. Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2021

"Gendered disinformation is a form of identity-based disinformation that threatens human rightsworldwide. It undermines the digital and political rights, as well as the safety and security, of itstargets. Its effects are far-reaching: gendered disinformation is used to justify human rightsabuses and entrench repression of women and minority groups. This policy brief explains whatgendered disinformation is, how it impacts individuals and societies, and the challenges in com-bating it, drawing on case studies from Poland and the UK. It assesses how the UK and EU are re-sponding to gendered disinformation, and sets out a plan of action for governments, platforms ,media and civil society." (Introduction)
https://eu.boell.org/en/2021/07/09/gendered-disinformation-6-reasons-why-liberal-democracies-need-respond-threat

AMERICAS & CARIBBEAN

296. Nina Jankowicz, Jillian Hunchak, Alexandra Pavliuc, Celia Davies, Shannon Pierson, Zoë Kaufmann: Malign Creativity: How Gender, Sex, and Lies are Weaponized Against Women Online. Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2021, 61 pp.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/malign-creativity-how-gender-sex-and-lies-are-weaponized-against-women-online

ASIA & PACIFIC

297. Tamar Kintsurashvili: Gendered Disinformation 2023. Tbilisi: Media Development Foundation (MDF), 2023, 51 pp.
https://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads//Genderl%20Report-ENG.pdf

298. Alex Kunze, Alice Schyllander, Katie Chambers, Nick Zuroski: **Authoritarianism and Gendered Disinformation: A Case Study of the Philippines.** Washington, DC: Elliott School of International Affairs Global Capstone; #ShePersisted, 2021, 39 pp.

https://she-persisted.org/Authoritarianism_and_Gendered_Disinformation_May_2021.pdf

299. Julie Posetti, Diana Maynard, Kalina Bontcheva: **Maria Ressa: Fighting an Onslaught of Online Violence. A Big Data Analysis.** Washington, DC: International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), 2021, 44 pp.

https://www.icfj.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/Maria%20Ressa-%20Fighting%20an%20Onslaught%20of%20Online%20Violence_0.pdf

300. Ellen Judson, Asli Atay, Alex Krasodomski-Jones, Rose Lasko-Skinner, Josh Smith: **Engendering Hate: The Contours of State-Aligned Gendered Disinformation Online.** London: Demos, 2020, 40 pp.

https://demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Engendering-Hate-Report-FINAL.pdf

EUROPE

301. **Unsocial media: Tracing and exposing gendered disinformation in Kosovo.** National Democratic Institute (NDI); USAID; UNDP Kosovo, 2023, 23 pp.

https://d4d-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/01-Gender-Disinformation-ENG10.pdf

302. Liza Kuzmenko, Larysa Kompantseva: **An Underestimated Threat: Gendered Disinformation about Ukrainian Women Journalists.** Women in Media; European Center for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), 2023, 51 pp.

https://cje.org.ua/en/library/an-underestimated-threat-gendered-disinformation-about-ukrainian-women-journalists/

Health Disinformation & Misinformation

GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

303. Nocili Nattrass: **Promoting Conspiracy Theory: From AIDS to COVID-19.** In: Global Public Health, vol. 18, nr. 1, 2023, 13 pp.

"Public health advocates in the US and South Africa emphasise that many of the vaccine hesitant are not hardened conspiracy theorists, may have reasonable fears about side-effects and are potentially open to persuasion, especially if their concerns are taken seriously by interlocuters they trust. But the fact that trusted interlocuters are needed at all is indicative of the scale of challenge posed by conspiratorial moves against scientific medicine. In December 2022 the New York Times reported that medical professionals continued to be frustrated by the persistence of 'outlandish' narratives about COVID-19 vaccines (such as containing injectable microchips for surveillances purposes) that discourage vaccination. That suspicions towards, and even conspiracy theories about, vaccines have social, political, and psychological dimensions makes the task of persuasion more difficult than merely providing correct information about a vaccine or drug. The involvement of organised commercial and/or political interests in spreading misinformation – and the role of social media in amplifying it – complicates the challenge yet further. We have emphasised the persistent synergistic connections, from AIDS to COVID-19, between conspiratorial moves against medical science and the promotion of 'alternative' therapies. Cultropreneurs, dissident scientists and their libertarian funders often imply that the medical establishment (and even science itself) has been corrupted by political and commercial interests. The irony here is that cultropreneurs themselves have commercial interests in spreading misinformation about scientific medicine, and libertarian donors have obvious political agendas. Pointing this out is grist for the mill of pro-science activists, but they face an uphill struggle in today's post-truth social context." (Conclusion)
https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2023.2172199

304. Hendrik Bruns, François J. Dessart, Myrto Pantazi: **COVID-19 Misinformation: Preparing for Future Crises. An Overview of the Early Behavioural Sciences Literature.** Luxembourg: European Union, 2022, 82 pp.

"This report takes stock of the early behavioural sciences literature on COVID-19 misinformation. Specifically, it addresses the following three main questions: (1) Who was most likely to believe or share COVID-19 misinformation? (2) What were the consequences of being exposed to or believing COVID-19 misinformation? (3) Which behavioural policy interventions were effective in countering COVID-19 misinformation? In addition to addressing these core questions, the report also provides a snapshot of the narratives of COVID-19 misinformation and the prevalence and spread of this misinformation. The report provides insights into policies that can help foster societal resilience against misinformation beyond the specific case of COVID-19, thereby contributing to policy preparation for future crises." (Abstract, p. 1)
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC130111/JRC130111_01.pdf

305. Julie Posetti, Kalina Bontcheva: **Disinfodemic: Deciphering COVID-19 Disinformation.** Paris: UNESCO, 2020, 16 pp.

"COVID-19 disinformation creates confusion about medical science with immediate impact on every person on the planet, and upon whole societies. It is more toxic and more deadly than disinformation about other subjects. That is why this policy brief coins the term disinfodemic. Using this frame, the brief helps to make sense of this new menace, and of the many types of responses that are unfolding internationally. To do this, it unpacks nine main themes and four dominant formats of COVID-19 disinformation, and presents a typology that groups the range of responses to the problem into 10 classes." (Introduction)
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000374416

306. Michael Butter, Peter Knight (eds.): **Covid Conspiracy Theories in Global Perspective.** London; New York: Routledge, 2023, xvi, 397 pp.

"Covid Conspiracy Theories in Global Perspective examines how conspiracy theories and related forms of misinformation and disinformation about the Covid-19 pandemic have circulated widely around the world. Covid conspiracy theories have attracted considerable attention from researchers, journalists, and politicians, not least because conspiracy beliefs have the potential to negatively affect adherence to public health measures. While most of this focus has been on the United States and Western Europe, this collection provides a unique global perspective on the emergence and development of conspiracy theories through a series of case studies. The chapters have been commissioned by recognized experts on area studies and conspiracy theories. The chapters present case studies on how Covid conspiracism has played out (some focused on a single country, others on regions), using a range of methods from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, including history, politics, sociology, anthropology, and psychology. Collectively, the authors reveal that, although there are many narratives that have spread virally, they have been adapted for different uses and take on different meanings in local contexts." (Publisher description)
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003330769

307. Katarzyna Czerniak, Raji Pillai, Abhi Parmar, Abhi, Kavita Ramnath, Joseph Krocker, Sahiti Myneni: **A scoping review of digital health interventions for combating COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation.** In: Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, vol. 30, nr. 4, 2023, pp. 752-760

"We provide a scoping review of Digital Health Interventions (DHIs) that mitigate COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation seeding and spread. Materials and Methods: We applied our search protocol to PubMed, PsychINFO, and Web of Science to screen 1666 articles. The 17 articles included in this paper are experimental and interventional studies that developed and tested public consumer-facing DHIs. We examined these DHIs to understand digital features, incorporation of theory, the role of healthcare professionals, end-user experience, and implementation issues. Results: The majority of studies (n=11) used social media in DHIs, but there

was a lack of platform-agnostic generalizability. Only half of the studies (n=9) specified a theory, framework, or model to guide DHIs. Nine studies involve healthcare professionals as design or implementation contributors. Only one DHI was evaluated for user perceptions and acceptance. Discussion: The translation of advances in online social computing to interventions is sparse. The limited application of behavioral theory and cognitive models of reasoning has resulted in suboptimal targeting of psychosocial variables and individual factors that may drive resistance to misinformation. This affects large-scale implementation and community outreach efforts. DHIs optimized through community-engaged participatory methods that enable understanding of unique needs of vulnerable communities are urgently needed. Conclusions: We recommend community engagement and theory-guided engineering of equitable DHIs. It is important to consider the problem of misinformation and disinformation through a multilevel lens that illuminates personal, clinical, cultural, and social pathways to mitigate the negative consequences of misinformation and disinformation on human health and wellness." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1093/jamia/ocad005

308. Jörg Matthes, Nicoleta Corbu, Soyeon Jin et al.: **Perceived Prevalence of Misinformation Fuels Worries About COVID-19: A Cross-Country, Multi-Method Investigation.** In: Information, Communication & Society, vol. 26, nr. 16, 2023, pp. 3133-3156

"Data suggests that the majority of citizens in various countries came across 'fake news' during the COVID-19 pandemic. We test the relationship between perceived prevalence of misinformation and people's worries about COVID-19. In Study 1, analyses of a survey across 17 countries indicate a positive association: perceptions of high prevalence of misinformation are correlated with high worries about COVID-19. However, the relationship is weaker in countries with higher levels of case-fatality ratios, and independent from the actual amount of misinformation per country. Study 2 replicates the relationship using experimental data. Furthermore, Study 2 demonstrates the underlying mechanism, that is, perceived prevalence of misinformation fosters the belief that COVID-19 is spiralling out of control, which in turn, increases worries. Our findings suggest that perceived prevalence of misinformation can have significant psychological effects, even though audience members reject the information as being false." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2022.2146983

309. Tina Purnat, Elisabeth Wilhelm: **How to Build an Infodemic Insights Report in Six Steps.** World Health Organization (WHO); UNICEF, 2023, v, 73 pp.

"This manual provides a quick overview of the steps required to develop an infodemic insights report that can be used during an emergency response or for routine health programming (where so-called low-level infodemics may be more common). The steps are: 1. Choose the question that infodemic management insights could help to answer; 2. Identify and select the data sources and develop an analysis plan for each data source; 3. Conduct an integrated analysis across those data sources; 4. Develop strategies and recommendations; 5. Develop an infodemic insights report; 6. Disseminate the infodemic insights report and track the actions taken." (Manual objectives, p.2)
https://www.unicef.org/media/142771/file/How-to-build-an-infodemic-insights-report-in-six-steps-2023.pdf

310. Philipp Schmid, Sacha Altay, Laura D. Scherer: **The Psychological Impacts and Message Features of Health Misinformation: A Systematic Review of Randomized Controlled Trials.** In: European Psychologist, vol. 28, nr. 3, 2023, pp. 162-172

"What does health misinformation look like, and what is its impact? We conducted a systematic review of 45 articles containing 64 randomized controlled trials (RCTs; N = 37,552) on the impact of health misinformation on behaviors and their psychological antecedents. We applied a planetary health perspective by framing environmental issues as human health issues and focusing on misinformation about diseases, vaccination, medication, nutrition, tobacco consumption, and climate change. We found that in 49% of the cases exposure to health misinformation damaged the psychological antecedents of behaviors such as knowledge, attitudes, or behavioral intentions. No RCTs evaluated the impact of exposure to misinformation on direct measures of health or pro-environmental behaviors (e.g., vaccination), and few studies explored the impact of misinformation on

feelings, social norms, and trust. Most misinformation was based on logical fallacies, conspiracy theories, or fake experts. RCTs evaluating the impact of impossible expectations and cherry-picking are scarce. Most research focused on healthy adult US populations and used online samples. Future RCTs can build on our analysis and address the knowledge gaps we identified." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000494

311. Hannah S. Whitehead, Clare E. French, Deborah M. Caldwell, Louise Letley, Sandra Mounier-Jack: **A Systematic Review of Communication Interventions for Countering Vaccine Misinformation.** In: Vaccine, vol. 41, nr. 5, 2023, pp. 1018-1034

"We conducted a systematic review to identify and describe communications-based strategies used to prevent and ameliorate the effect of mis- and disinformation on people's attitudes and behaviours surrounding vaccination (objective 1) and examined their effectiveness (objective 2) ... Of 2000 identified records, 34 eligible studies addressed objective 1, 29 of which also addressed objective 2 (25 RCTs and 4 before-and-after studies). Nine 'intervention approaches' were identified; most focused on content of the intervention or message (debunking/correctional, informational, use of disease images or other 'scare tactics', use of humour, message intensity, inclusion of misinformation warnings, and communicating weight of evidence), while two focused on delivery of the intervention or message (timing and source). Some strategies, such as scare tactics, appear to be ineffective and may increase misinformation endorsement. Communicating with certainty, rather than acknowledging uncertainty around vaccine efficacy or risks, was also found to backfire. Promising approaches include communicating the weight-of-evidence and scientific consensus around vaccines and related myths, using humour and incorporating warnings about encountering misinformation. Trying to debunk misinformation, informational approaches, and communicating uncertainty had mixed results." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2022.12.059

312. Sihong Zhao, Simeng Hu, Xiaoyu Zhou et al.: **The Prevalence, Features, Influencing Factors, and Solutions for COVID-19 Vaccine Misinformation: Systematic Review.** In: JMIR Public Health and Surveillance, vol. 9, nr. e40201, 2023, 23 pp.

"This review aims to synthesize the global evidence on misinformation related to COVID-19 vaccines, including its prevalence, features, influencing factors, impacts, and solutions for combating misinformation. We performed a systematic review by searching 5 peer-reviewed databases (PubMed, Embase, Web of Science, Scopus, and EBSCO). We included original articles that investigated misinformation related to COVID-19 vaccines and were published in English from January 1, 2020, to August 18, 2022 ... Of the 8864 studies identified, 91 observational studies and 11 interventional studies met the inclusion criteria. Misinformation around COVID-19 vaccines covered conspiracy, concerns on vaccine safety and efficacy, no need for vaccines, morality, liberty, and humor. Conspiracy and safety concerns were the most prevalent misinformation. There was a great variation in misinformation prevalence, noted among 2.5%-55.4% in the general population and 6.0%-96.7% in the antivaccine/vaccine hesitant groups from survey-based studies, and in 0.1%-41.3% on general online data and 0.5%-56% on antivaccine/vaccine hesitant data from internet-based studies. Younger age, lower education and economic status, right-wing and conservative ideology, and having psychological problems enhanced beliefs in misinformation. The content, format, and source of misinformation influenced its spread. A 5-step framework was proposed to address vaccine-related misinformation, including identifying misinformation, regulating producers and distributors, cutting production and distribution, supporting target audiences, and disseminating trustworthy information. The debunking messages/videos were found to be effective in several experimental studies." (Abstract)
https://publichealth.jmir.org/2023/1/e40201

313. Tanvir Ahmad, Eyner Arturo Aliaga Lazarte, Seyedali Mirjalili: **A Systematic Literature Review on Fake News in the COVID-19 Pandemic: Can AI Propose a Solution?** In: Applied Sciences <MDPI>, vol. 12, nr. 12727, 2022, 19 pp.

"This paper aims to unpack a structured overview of previous research topics and findings and identify gaps. Our goal in this systematic review is to (a) synthesize the selected earlier studies, (b) offer researchers a structural framework for future COVID-19 and fake news research, and (c) recommend relevant areas for future research. In this study, we focus on eighty conceptual and empirical studies on misinformation of COVID-19-related news on social media. We identify vital publications and methodological and theoretical approaches that exist in the COVID-19 literature. The articles were systematically analyzed, focusing on the research context and time frame, data collection/analysis procedures, and equivalence issues. While COVID-19 research has been advancing significantly over the past couple of months, numerous questions remain unexplained in the domain of the social media landscape. For example, our review suggests that researchers should begin to concentrate on a process framework blending Artificial Intelligence (AI) to curb the fake news problem. This can be achieved in all three phases, e.g., the study of individual decisions and experiences, the experiences of groups and organizations and the interactions between them, and finally, the interactions at the broadest level (micro, meso, and macro stages)." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.3390/%0D%0Aapp122412727

314. Israel Júnior Borges do Nascimento, Ana Beatriz Pizarro, Jussara M. Almeida, Natasha Azzopardi-Muscat, Marcos André Gonçalves, Maria Björklunde, David Novillo-Ortiz: **Infodemics and Health Misinformation: A Systematic Review of Reviews.** In: Bulletin of the World Health Organization, vol. 100, nr. 9, 2022, pp. 544-561

"Our search identified 31 systematic reviews, of which 17 were published. The proportion of health-related misinformation on social media ranged from 0.2% to 28.8%. Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Instagram are critical in disseminating the rapid and far-reaching information. The most negative consequences of health misinformation are the increase of misleading or incorrect interpretations of available evidence, impact on mental health, misallocation of health resources and an increase in vaccination hesitancy. The increase of unreliable health information delays care provision and increases the occurrence of hateful and divisive rhetoric. Social media could also be a useful tool to combat misinformation during crises. Included reviews highlight the poor quality of published studies during health crises. Conclusion: Available evidence suggests that infodemics during health emergencies have an adverse effect on society. Multisectoral actions to counteract infodemics and health misinformation are needed, including developing legal policies, creating and promoting awareness campaigns, improving health-related content in mass media and increasing people's digital and health literacy." (Abstract)
http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.21.287654

315. Francisco Goiana da Silva, João Marecos, Francisco de Abreu Duarte: **Toolkit for Tackling Misinformation on Noncommunicable Diseases.** Copenhagen: World Health Organization (WHO), Regional Office for Europe, 2022, ix, 93 pp.

"In the first part, Understanding the problem, the Toolkit provides an overview of the health misinformation landscape, particularly in relation to noncommunicable diseases (NCDs), and expands on the roles of gatekeepers and sources before describing the problem as multilayered and requiring comprehensive and coordinated solutions. In the second part, Consulting stakeholders, the Toolkit expands on the roles and initiatives currently taken by governments and international organizations, traditional media and social media platforms, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and experts, to provide an extensive understanding of the angles at which the problem of health misinformation is being approached. In the third and final part, The way forward, the Toolkit describes how different stakeholders have collaborated during COVID-19 to tackle the infodemic, and how that spirit and approach can and should be taken forward to other types of health misinformation." (Executive summary, p.viii)
https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/74972/WHO_Toolkit_for_tackling_misinformation_2022.pdf?sequence=1

316. Julia Haas: **A Treatment for Viral Deception? Automated Moderation of COVID-19 Disinformation.** Universität Innsbruck, 2022, 110 pp.

"This paper examines responses to disinformation, in particular those involving automated tools, from a human rights perspective. It provides an introduction to current automated content moderation and curation practices, and to the interrelation between the digital information ecosystem and the phenomenon of disinformation. The paper concludes that an unwarranted use of automation to govern speech, in particular highly context-dependent disinformation, is neither in line with states' positive obligation to protect nor with intermediaries' responsibility to respect human rights. The paper also identifies required procedural and remedial human rights safeguards for content governance, such as transparency, user agency, accountability, and independent oversight. Though essential, such safeguards alone appear insufficient to tackle COVID-19 online disinformation, as highly personalized content and targeted advertising make individuals susceptible to manipulation and deception. Consequently, this paper demonstrates an underlying need to redefine advertising- and surveillance-based business models and to unbundle services provided by a few dominant internet intermediaries to sustainably address online disinformation." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.25651/2022.01

317. Ingjerd Skafle, Anders Nordahl-Hansen, Daniel S. Quintana, Rolf Wynn, Elia Gabarron: **Misinformation About COVID-19 Vaccines on Social Media: Rapid Review.** In: Journal of Medical Internet Research, vol. 24, nr. 8: e37367, 2022, 20 pp.

"We aimed to synthesize the existing research on misinformation about COVID-19 vaccines spread on social media platforms and its effects. The secondary aim was to gain insight and gather knowledge about whether misinformation about autism and COVID-19 vaccines is being spread on social media platforms ... The search yielded 757 records, with 45 articles selected for this review. We identified 3 main themes of misinformation: medical misinformation, vaccine development, and conspiracies. Twitter was the most studied social media platform, followed by Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram. A vast majority of studies were from industrialized Western countries. We identified 19 studies in which the effect of social media misinformation on vaccine hesitancy was measured or discussed. These studies implied that the misinformation spread on social media had a negative effect on vaccine hesitancy and uptake." (Abstract)
https://www.jmir.org/2022/8/e37367

318. Vera Zakem, Edward Lucas, James Lamond: **Owning the Conversation: Assessing Responses to Russian and Chinese Information Operations Around COVID-19.** Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), 2022, 32 pp.

"Russia and China have created and amplified disinformation and propaganda about COVID-19 worldwide to sow distrust and confusion and to reduce social cohesion among targeted audiences. The United States government, the European Union, and multinational organizations have developed a series of interventions in response. These include exposing disinformation, providing credible and authoritative public health information, imposing sanctions, investing in democratic resilience measures, setting up COVID-19 disinformation task forces, addressing disinformation through regulatory measures, countering emerging threat narratives from Russia and China, and addressing the vulnerabilities in the information and media environment. Digital platforms, including Twitter, Meta, YouTube, and TikTok, have stepped up to counter COVID-19 disinformation and misinformation via policy procedures, takedowns of inauthentic content, addition of new product features, and partner with civil society and multinational organizations to provide credible and reliable information to global audiences. In addition, digital platforms are addressing COVID-19-related disinformation and misinformation stemming from a variety of state and non-state actors, including China and Russia. Several of these initiatives have proven to be effective, including cross-sectoral collaboration to facilitate identification of the threat; enforcement actions between civil society, governments, and digital platforms; and investment in resilience mechanisms, including media literacy and online games to address disinformation. Despite some meaningful progress, gaps in countering COVID-19 disinformation and propaganda stemming from Russia and China and unintentional misinformation spread by everyday citizens still exist. Closing these gaps will require gaining a deeper understanding of how adversaries think; aligning and refining transatlantic regulatory approaches; building coordination and whole-of- society information-sharing mechanisms; expanding the use of sanctions to counter disinformation; localizing and contextualizing programs and technological solutions;

strengthening societal resilience through media, digital literacy, and by addressing digital authoritarianism; and building and rebuilding trust in democratic institutions." (Executive summary)

https://cepa.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/CEPA-Owning-the-Conversation-3.31.22.pdf

319. WHO Public Health Research Agenda for Managing Infodemics. Geneva: World Health Organization (WHO), 2021, xii, 53 pp.

"The five research streams are listed below. For each stream, three top research questions were identified, resulting in a list of 15 top priority research questions for the public health research agenda for infodemic management. Further, we listed for each subcategory a second tier of important research questions, totalling 50 questions ... Research stream 1: Measure and monitor the impact of infodemics during health emergencies ... Research stream 2: Detect and understand the spread and impact of infodemics ... Research stream 3: Respond and deploy interventions that protect against the infodemic and mitigate its harmful effects ... Research stream 4: Evaluate infodemic interventions and strengthen the resilience of individuals and communities to infodemics ... Research stream 5: Promote the development, adaptation and application of tools for managing infodemics ..." (Annex 1, p.19 ff.)

https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/339192/9789240019508-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

320. Aoife Gallagher, Macckenzie Hart, Ciarán O'Connor: Ill Advice: A Case Study in Facebook's Failure to Tackle COVID-19 Disinformation. London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2021, 34 pp.

"Despite detailed policies on mis- and disinformation and promises to enforce them, social media platforms are failing to tackle prominent groups and individuals who spread false claims about COVID-19 and vaccines online. Using the World Doctors Alliance1 as a case study, a group that has spread various problematic, false and conspiratorial claims about COVID-19 and vaccines, ISD found that 78% of the group's 1.2 million online followers are found on mainstream platforms (Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Twitter, TikTok) who claim to prohibit this kind of content. The Facebook pages of World Doctors Alliance members have a following of over 550,000 users, which increased by 13,215% between January 2020 and July 2021. Videos posted by these Facebook pages have been viewed more than 21.1 million times. These pages have accumulated a total of 5.77 million interactions since January 2020, with interaction rates increasing by 85% in the first six months of 2021 compared to the previous six months. Facebook posts mentioning the World Doctors Alliance or its members have attracted more than three million engagements on Facebook and are present in at least 46 different languages on the platform. ISD found that large proportions—often the majority—of the most engaged with content on Facebook mentioning the World Doctors Alliance or its members in English, Spanish, German and Arabic contained false, misleading or conspiratorial claims related to COVID-19 and vaccines. Organisations that are part of Facebook's fact-checking program have debunked false claims made by the World Doctors Alliance 189 times since the beginning of the pandemic. Despite this extensive fact-checking effort, Facebook is failing to take decisive action on the group or its members. Facebook's fact-checking program incorporates organisations from 115 countries, but there appear to be major gaps in fact-checking in non-English languages. ISD found minimal application of fact-checking labels across the four languages analysed, with lower application rates on posts in German, Spanish and Arabic than in English. Content that does contain fact-checking labels is still accumulating tens and sometimes hundreds of thousands of engagements." (Key findings)

https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Ill-Advice_v3.pdf

321. Rachael Jolley: What Works: Addressing COVID-19 Misinformation. Lessons from the Frontlines in 100 Countries. Internews, 2021, 14 pp.

"A global COVID-19 vaccine rollout must be coupled with funding and strategies to support trusted local media worldwide. The experience of communities in countries across the world demonstrates an urgent need to support groups at the local level if misinformation and mistrust is to be tackled effectively." (Summary)

https://internews.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COVIDReport_20210416.pdf

322. Yanis Theocharis, Ana Cardenal, Soyeon Jin,

Toril Aalberg, David Nicolas Hopmann et al.: Does the Platform Matter? Social Media and COVID-19 Conspiracy Theory Beliefs in 17 Countries. In: New Media & Society, vol. 25, nr. 12, 2021, pp. 3412-3437

"While the role of social media in the spread of conspiracy theories has received much attention, a key deficit in previous research is the lack of distinction between different types of platforms. This study places the role of social media affordances in facilitating the spread of conspiracy beliefs at the center of its enquiry. We examine the relationship between platform use and conspiracy theory beliefs related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Relying on the concept of technological affordances, we theorize that variation across key features make some platforms more fertile places for conspiracy beliefs than others. Using data from a crossnational dataset based on a two-wave online survey conducted in 17 countries before and after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, we show that Twitter has a negative effect on conspiracy beliefs-as opposed to all other platforms under examination which are found to have a positive effect." (Abstract)

https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448211045666

323. Combatting COVID-19 disinformation on online platforms. Paris: OECD, 2020, 7 pp.

"Disinformation and misinformation about COVID-19 is quickly and widely disseminated across the Internet, reaching and potentially influencing many people. This policy brief derives four key actions that governments and platforms can take to counter COVID-19 disinformation on platforms, namely: 1) supporting a multiplicity of independent fact-checking organisations; 2) ensuring human moderators are in place to complement technological solutions; 3) voluntarily issuing transparency reports about COVID-19 disinformation; and 4) improving users' media, digital and health literacy skills." (p.1)

https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/combatting-covid-19-disinformation-on-online-platforms-d854ec48/

324. COVID-19 Rumors and Misinformation: A Technical Brief for Breakthrough ACTION Field Teams. Breakthrough Action; USAID, 2020, 14 pp.

"This is a short technical brief with important steps and resources on how country programs can track and address rumors around COVID-19 (as needed). The guide includes a number of great resources and links while also sharing nuggets from global, collective thinking around rumors." (p.1)

https://breakthroughactionandresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Creating-a-Real-Time-Rumor-Management-System-Technical- Brief_v1.0.pdf

325. Real-Time Rumor Tracking for COVID-19: System Design and Implementation Guide. USAID , 2020, 27 pp.

https://www.ghspjournal.org/content/ghsp/suppl/2021/07/01/GHSP-D-21-00031.DCSupplemental/21-00031-Tibbels-Supplement.pdf

326. Understanding the Infodemic and Misinformation in the Fight Against COVID-19. Washington, DC: Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), 2020, 6 pp.

"Misinformation is false or inaccurate information deliberately intended to deceive. In the context of the current pandemic, it can greatly affect all aspects of life, especifically people's mental health, since searching for COVID-19 updates on the Internet has jumped 50% –70% across all generations. Misinformation in a pandemic can negatively affect human health. Many false or misleading stories are fabricated and shared without any background or quality checking. Much of this misinformation is based on conspiracy theories, some introducing elements of these into seemingly mainstream discourse. Inaccurate and false information has been circulating about all aspects of the disease." (p.1)

https://iris.paho.org/handle/10665.2/52052

327. J. Scott Brennen, Felix M. Simon, Philip N. Howard, Rasmus Kleis Nielsen: Types, Sources, and Claims of COVID-19 Misinformation. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2020, 13 pp.

"In this RISJ factsheet we identify some of the main types, sources, and claims of COVID-19 misinformation seen so far. We analyse a sample of 225 pieces of misinformation rated false or misleading by factcheckers and

published in English between January and the end of March 2020, drawn from a collection of fact-checks maintained by First Draft News." (Key findings)

https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/types-sources-and-claims-covid-19-misinformation

328. Rory Smith, Seb Cubbon, Claire Wardle: **Under the Surface: Covid-19 Vaccine Narratives, Misinformation and Data Deficits on Social Media.** First Draft, 2020, 95 pp.

"This research demonstrates the complexity of the vaccine information ecosystem, where a cacophony of voices and narratives have coalesced to create an environment of extreme uncertainty. Two topics are driving a large proportion of the current global vaccine discourse, especially around a Covid-19 vaccine: the "political and economic motives" of actors and institutions involved in vaccine development and the "safety, efficacy and necessity" concerns around vaccines. Narratives challenging the safety of vaccines have been perennial players in the online vaccine debate. Yet this research shows that narratives related to mistrust in the intentions of institutions and key figures surrounding vaccines are now driving as much of the online conversation and vaccine skepticism as safety concerns. This issue is compounded by the complexities and vulnerabilities of this information ecosystem. It is full of "data deficits" — situations where demand for information about a topic is high, but the supply of credible information is low — that are being exploited by bad actors. These data deficits complicate efforts to accurately make sense of the development of a Covid-19 vaccine and vaccines more generally. When people can't easily access reliable information around vaccines and when mistrust in actors and institutions related to vaccines is high, misinformation narratives rush in to fill the vacuum." (p.2)

https://firstdraftnews.org/long-form-article/under-the-surface-covid-19-vaccine-narratives-misinformation-and-data-deficits-on-social- media/

329. Angus Thomson, Gary Finnegan: **Vaccine Misinformation Management Field Guide: Guidance for Addressing a Global Infodemic and Fostering Demand for Immunization.** New York: UNICEF, 2020, 61 pp.

"This guide should help practitioners to: develop an evidence-grounded understanding of misinformation in the context of vaccination, how it spreads and gets traction, what can be done to mitigate its impact; implement evidence-based approaches to address misinformation; develop a comprehensive and tailored national strategy for misinformation management [with case studies on polio vaccination in Pakistan, dengue in the Philippines and HPV in Malawi]. The guide should support practitioners working in immunization programs, including immunization managers, C4D communication for development specialists, behaviour and social change specialists, external and digital communications and health teams." (p.6)

https://vaccinemisinformation.guide/

AFRICA, SUB-SAHARAN

330. Carlotta Dotto, Seb Cubbon: **Disinformation exports: How foreign anti-vaccine narratives reached West African communities online.** First Draft, 2023

https://firstdraftnews.org/long-form-article/foreign-anti-vaccine-disinformation-reaches-west-africa/

331. **Social Listening to Strengthen Vaccine Programs: Leveraging a National Health Hotline in Malawi.** Village Reach, 2022, 5 pp.

https://www.villagereach.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Covid19-Case-Study_Social-Listening-Malawi.pdf

332. Mulugeta Hayelon Kalayou, Shekur Mohammed Awol: **Myth and Misinformation on COVID-19 Vaccine: The Possible Impact on Vaccination Refusal Among People of Northeast Ethiopia: A Community-Based Research.** In: Risk Management and Healthcare Policy Journal, vol. 15, 2022, pp. 1859-1868

https://doi.org/10.2147/RMHP.S366730

333. Anna-Leena Lohiniva, Anastasiya Nurzhynska, Al-hassan Hudi, Bridget Anim, Aboagye, Da Costa: **Infodemic Management Using Digital Information and Knowledge Cocreation to Address COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy: Case Study from Ghana.** In: JMIR Infodemiology, vol. 2, nr. 2: e37134, 2022, 10 pp.

https://infodemiology.jmir.org/2022/2/e37134

334. Aonover Eric Msughter, Bashiru Usman: **Social Media Literacy: Fake News Consumption and Perception of COVID-19 in Nigeria.** In: Cogent Arts & Humanities, vol. 9, nr. 2138011, 2022, 14 pp.

https://doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2022.2138011

335. Felix Olajide Talabi, Ikechukwu Peter Ugbor, Moyinoluwa Joseph Talabi et al.: **Effect of a social media-based counselling intervention in countering fake news on COVID-19 vaccine in Nigeria.** In: Health Promotion International, vol. 37, nr. 2: daab140, 2022, 10 pp.

https://doi.org/10.1093/heapro/daab140

336. **Information Saves Lives: Tackling Rumors, Myths and Misinformation in the COVID-19 Outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo.** Arcata, Calif.; Washington, DC: Internews; USAID, 2021, 24 pp.

https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00XVWZ.pdf

337. Fabíola Ortiz dos Santos: **Myths and Misconceptions on Covid-19: 'Congo Check' and 'Talato' Verification Experiences.** In: Frontiers in Communication, vol. 6, nr. 627214, 2021, 21 pp.

https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2021.627214

338. Philip Teg-Nefaah Tabong, Martin Segtub: **Misconceptions, Misinformation and Politics of COVID-19 on Social Media: A Multi-Level Analysis in Ghana.** In: Frontiers in Communication, vol. 6, nr. 613794, 2021, 13 pp.

https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2021.613794

AMERICAS & CARIBBEAN

339. Patricia Rossini, Antonis Kalogeropoulos: **Don't Talk to Strangers? The Role of Network Composition, WhatsApp Groups, and Partisanship in Explaining Beliefs in Misinformation About COVID-19 in Brazil.** In: Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 2023, 18 pp.

https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2023.2234902

340. Bolanle Olapeju, Camille Adams, Joann Simpson, Lyndsey Mitchum, Sean Wilson: **Addressing COVID-19 Rumors and Behaviors Using Theory in Guyana: A Program Case Study.** In: Global Health: Science and Practice, vol. 10, nr. 4, 2022, 11 pp.

https://doi.org/10.9745/GHSP-D-22-00071

341. Ana Gabriela Ferreira, Débora Lima, Júlia Rocha: **Infodemia e COVID-19: A informação como instrumento contra os mitos.** Artigo 19 Brasil, 2021, 48 pp.

https://artigo19.org/2021/05/17/infodemia-e-a-covid-19-a-informacao-como-instrumento-contra-os-mitos/

342. Michele Goulart Massuchiu, Marcela Barba Santos: **A intersecção entre desinformação, religião e pandemia: A atuação de canais religiosos no**

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343. Xavier Ramon-Vegas, Marcel Mauri-Ríos, Ruth Rodríguez-Martínez: **Redes sociales y plataformas de fact-checking contra la desinformación sobre la COVID-19.** In: Hipertext.net, nr. 21, 2020, pp. 79-92
https://doi.org/10.31009/hipertext.net.2020.i21.07

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ASIA & PACIFIC

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https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9235267/pdf/yjbm_95_2_177.pdf

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https://doi.org/10.1080/16549716.2022.2077536

348. Louisa Lim, Julia Bergin, Johan Lidberg: **The COVID-19 Story: Unmasking China's Global Strategy.** International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), 2021, 7 pp.
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349. Cécile Jacob, Pierre Hausemer, Adam Zagoni-Bogsch, Audra Diers-Lawson: **The effect of communication and disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic.** European Parliament, 2023, 78 pp.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2023/740063/IPOL_STU(2023)740063_EN.pdf

350. Florian Toepfl, Daria Kravets, Anna Ryzhova, Arista Beseler: **Who Are the Plotters Behind the Pandemic? Comparing Covid-19 Conspiracy Theories in Google Search Results Across Five Key Target Countries of Russia's Foreign Communication.** In: Information, Communication & Society, vol. 26, nr. 10, 2023, pp. 2033-2051
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352. Daria Zakharova: **Narrative russischer staatlicher Medien über Corona-Impfstoffe im Westen.** In: Russland-Analysen, nr. 418, 2022, pp. 2-5
https://www.bpb.de/system/files/dokument_pdf/RusslandAnalysen418.pdf?download=1

353. Edward Lucas, Ben Dubow, James Lamond, Jake Morris, Corina Rebegea, Vera Zakem: **Post-Mortem: Russian and Chinese Covid-19 Information Operations.** Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), 2021, 72 pp.
https://cepa.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/COVID-Phase-4-v3.pdf

MIDDLE EAST / WESTERN ASIA & NORTH AFRICA

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355. Noha Atef: **Combating Disinformation in the Arab World. Case Study: The COVID-19 Pandemic.** Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ); Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 2021, 43 pp.
https://en.arij.net/materials/arij-publishes-a-policy-paper-combating-disinformation-in-the-arab-world-the-covid-19-pandemic-as-a-case -study/

356. Moez Ben Messaoud: **Social Media and the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Dilemma of Fake News Clutter Vs. Social Responsibility.** In: Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research, vol. 14, nr. 1, 2021, pp. 25-45
https://doi.org/10.1386/jammr_00023_1

357. Ciarán O'Connor, Moustafa Ayad: **MENA Monitor: Arabic COVID-19 Vaccine Misinformation Online.** London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2021, 19 pp.
https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/MENA-Covid-Vaccine-Misinformation-Monitor-1.pdf

358. Mahsa Alimardani, Mona Elswah: **Online Temptations: COVID-19 and Religious Misinformation in the MENA Region.** In: Social Media + Society, vol. 6, nr. 3, 2020, pp. 1-4
https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120948251

Humanitarian Disinformation, Misinformation & Rumours

GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

359. **Nudging Knowledge: Tackling Health Misinformation in Humanitarian Settings Using Behavioral Science.** Nairobi: Busara, 2023, 46 pp.

"This guide does not require prior knowledge or experience in behavioral science. It will be relevant for you if you are an actor in a humanitarian setting look to: 1. Design a Theory of Change for a program aiming to change people's beliefs or behaviors: This guide can be used by several actors. For instance, program managers seeking to increase the uptake of COVID-19 vaccinations by countering scientifically incorrect information can

rely on the insights provided here. Or it can also be used by a humanitarian who is developing a Theory of Change for promoting preventive health behaviors. This guide offers practical entry points to take into account when identifying what factors will influence how your information might develop the impact you are hoping to have and ultimately achieve the change you are pursuing. 2. Design communication strategies or information campaigns: This guide can be used by anyone who is grappling with the question of how to make an information campaign more effective by outlining concrete steps that new or existing communication interventions can take to effectively change people's perceptions, beliefs and behaviors, within humanitarian settings. 3. Think about how to contextualize behavioral insights to design better information campaigns: It is necessary to ask afresh in each situation how exactly context influences the behavioral insights that determine uptake or dismissal of information. This guide provides a checklist for how to contextualize behavioral insights to specific social, political and cultural situations of humanitarian settings. In program design phase, where feedback is gathered from communities for co-created solutions, this checklist can help with deeper and behaviorallyinformed contextualisation." (How to use this guide)

https://www.elrha.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/EIrha-Playbook-2022.pdf

360. Mel Bunce: **Humanitarian Communication in a Post-Truth World.** In: Journal of Humanitarian Affairs, vol. 1, nr. 1, 2021, pp. 49-55

"When people look online for information about humanitarian crises, they increasingly encounter media content that blurs the line between reality and fiction. This includes everything from rumour and exaggeration to partisan journalism and completely invented stories designed to look like real news (so-called 'fake news'). This article shows that disinformation is causing real and serious harm to those affected by humanitarian emergencies; it can undermine the ability of humanitarian workers to provide relief; and it has exacerbated conflict and violence. Disinformation is also making it harder for journalists to report on the humanitarian sector, and hold the powerful to account, because it undermines audience trust in information more generally. The article concludes by considering interventions that could address the challenges of disinformation. It argues for more support of quality journalism about humanitarian crises, as well as media literacy training. Finally, it is crucial that aid agencies and news outlets commit to accuracy and fact checking in their reporting and campaigning." (Abstract)
http://dx.doi.org/10.7227/JHA.007

361. Dmitry Erokhin, Nadejda Komendantova: **The Role of Bots in Spreading Conspiracies: Case Study of Discourse About Earthquakes on Twitter.** In: International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, vol. 92, nr. 103740, 2023, 11 pp.

"In this paper, we identified seven most widely spread conspiracy discourses about earthquakes. These conspiracy discourses link earthquakes to military activities like secret nuclear bomb testing, God's Providence like the punishment of humans for their sins, space activities like aliens visiting our planet, the US secret weather control program HAARP, tests of the Large Hadron Collider, fracking projects, and freemasonic plots. Following the major earthquake in Indonesia at the end of November 2022, we extracted data from Twitter by keywords using the Hoaxy tool for tracking the spread of information on Twitter. Applying the Bot Sentinel tool, we also got data on the sentiment of the users. The divine and military discourses dominated the conspiracy discussion, followed by the discussions about extraction and HAARP. Though there were more human-like accounts than bot-like accounts, we found a positive correlation between the frequency of tweets on the conspiracy discourses and the bot scores of the accounts, which suggests that bot-like accounts were tweeting more than human-like accounts. It was also found that normal accounts tweeted more than toxic accounts, and there was a positive relationship between the bot score and the toxicity level of an account. It suggests that bot-like accounts were involved more in disruptive activities than human-like accounts." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2023.103740

362. Peter Maurer: **The Digitalisation of Armed Conflicts: Three Humanitarian Priorities.** Brussels: Brussels School of Governance, Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy, 2022, 5 pp.

"States should interpret – and apply – existing rules in a manner that ensures adequate and sufficient protection for civilians and civilian infrastructure, information and communication technology (ICT) systems and data in our ever-increasingly digitalised societies. Academia, tech companies, states and humanitarians should work together to better understand the impact of misinformation, disinformation, and hate speech in contexts affected by armed conflict and violence, and to identify ways to address it. The humanitarian community must join forces – and find partners – to ensure the best possible protection against cyber operations targeting humanitarian operations and personal data entrusted to us." (Key issues, p.1)
https://brussels-school.be/sites/default/files/CSDS%20Policy%20brief_2214.pdf

363. Delphine van Solinge, Mark Silverman et al.: **Harmful Information: Misinformation, Disinformation and Hate Speech in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence. ICRC Initial Findings and Perspectives on Adapting Protection Approaches.** Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2021, 20 pp.

"The present document .. first proposes a working definition of what misinformation, disinformation and hate speech" (MDH) are and how they can be framed conceptually. It then explains why MDH is of such significant concern to the ICRC and the wider humanitarian sector. Next, it outlines the key challenges and barriers faced by ICRC staff in detecting, assessing and responding to MDH. Finally, it offers recommendations and suggests possible actions for addressing these challenges." (Introduction, p.6)
https://shop.icrc.org/download/ebook?sku=4556/002-ebook

EUROPE

364. Sean Healy, Victoria Russell: **The Critical Risk of Disinformation for Humanitarians: The Case of the MV Aquarius.** In: Journal of Humanitarian Affairs, vol. 3, nr. 1, 2021, pp. 28-39
http://dx.doi.org/10.7227/JHA.056

MIDDLE EAST / WESTERN ASIA & NORTH AFRICA

365. Tom Wilson, Kate Starbird: **Cross-Platform Disinformation Campaigns: Lessons Learned and Next Steps.** In: Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, vol. 1, nr. 1, 2020, 11 pp.
https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/cross-platform-disinformation-campaigns/

Identifying & Researching Disinformation

GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

366. Nicola Bruno: **How to Track Online Disinformation Networks.** Tactical Tech, 2024

"This guide is not just a manual; it's a call to action for journalists, activists, and researchers to delve into the murky waters of digital deceit, in order to expose networked disinformation and manipulation campaigns. With a clear, easy-to-use 4-step methodology, the guide empowers you to discover, map, and track these deceptive networks across languages and contexts. Our journey goes beyond mere exposure; it's about understanding the multi-dimensional nature of these campaigns and adopting a networked approach to reveal the 'invisible' forces at play behind manipulation campaigns." (Introduction)
https://kit.exposingtheinvisible.org/en/disinformation.html

367. Esma Aïmeur, Amri Sabine, Gilles Brassand: **Fake News, Disinformation and Misinformation in Social Media: A Review.** In: Social Network Analysis and Mining, vol. 13, nr. 30, 2023, 36 pp.

"This work aims to provide a comprehensive and systematic review of fake news research as well as a fundamental review of existing approaches used to detect and prevent fake news from spreading via OSNs. We present the research problem and the existing challenges, discuss the state of the art in existing approaches for fake news detection, and point out the future research directions in tackling the challenges." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13278-023-01028-5

368. Gillian Murphy, Constance de Saint Laurent, Megan Reynolds, Omar Aftab, Karen Hegarty, Yuning Sun, Ciara M. Greene: **What do we study when we study misinformation? A scoping review of experimental research (2016-2022).** In: Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, vol. 4, nr. 6, 2023, 57 pp.

"We reviewed 555 papers published from 2016–2022 that presented misinformation to participants. We identified several trends in the literature—increasing frequency of misinformation studies over time, a wide variety of topics covered, and a significant focus on COVID-19 misinformation since 2020. We also identified several important shortcomings, including overrepresentation of samples from the United States and Europe and excessive emphasis on short-term consequences of brief, text-based misinformation. Most studies examined belief in misinformation as the primary outcome. While many researchers identified behavioural consequences of misinformation exposure as a pressing concern, we observed a lack of research directly investigating behaviour change." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-130

369. Henry Tuck, Jakob Guhl, Julia Smirnova, Lea Gerster, Oliver Marsh: **Researching the Evolving Online Ecosystem: Telegram, Discord and Odysee.** London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2023, 59 pp.

"Harmful actors use an ever-expanding range of digital spaces to spread harmful ideologies and undermine human rights and democracy online. Understanding their evolving ideas, online networks and activities is critical to the development of a more comprehensive evidence base to inform effective and proportional efforts to counter them. But generating that evidence base can challenge the technical capabilities, resources and even ethical and legal boundaries of research. We are concerned that these issues may be worsening just as the options for spreading harm online increase. This difficulty in conducting digital research systematically, ethically and legally results in a situation where trade-offs have to be made between competing priorities, including the desire to understand and mitigate harmful content and behaviours online, the preservation of privacy and the adherence to legal agreements. We argue in this report that this does not need to be the case; solutions are available, and actions should be taken as soon as possible to ensure a future-proof scenario in which researchers have the tools to monitor, track and analyse harmful content and behaviours systematically, ethically and legally. This report outlines the findings from the research phase of a project by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and CASM Technology; it is funded by Omidyar Network. The aim of the project is to identify and test research methodologies for monitoring and analysing small, closed or hardly moderated platforms. The report provides applied examples and evidence for the limitations and dilemmas encountered by researchers. In three short research case studies, focusing on Telegram, Discord and Odysee (in German, English and French respectively), we seek to apply different methodological approaches to analyse platforms that primarily present technological, ethical and legal, or fragmentation barriers." (Executive summary)

https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/researching-evolving-online-ecosystem-telegram-discord-odysee/

370. João Carlos Correia, Pedro Jerónimo, Inês Amaral (eds.): **Disinformation studies: Perspectives from an emerging field.** Covilhã: Universidade da Beira Interior; LabCom, 2022, 299 pp.

"It all started at the ECREA 2021 Post Conference "Disinformation Studies: Perspectives to An Emerging Research Field", which took place online, on September 10, 2021. The debate there quickly widened and was joined by other colleagues. The book that we bring you here is the result of part of that debate, which does not end with this publication." (https://labcomca.ubi.pt)

https://labcomca.ubi.pt/en/disinformation-studies-perspectives-from-an-emerging-field/

371. Jakob Guhl, Oliver Marsh, Henry Tuck: **Researching the Evolving Online Ecosystem: Barriers, Methods and Future Challenges.** London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2022, 35 pp.

"This report outlines the findings from the initial scoping phase of a project supported by a grant from Omidyar Network and launched by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and CASM Technology to identify online spaces used by extremist, hate and disinformation actors and communities as they increasingly move away from mainstream social media platforms. The report outlines the key barriers posed by these platforms to researching and mitigating harmful content and behaviours, and reviews existing research methodologies and tools to address these barriers. Finally, the report presents possible future scenarios for the evolving online ecosystem, and proposes a series of initial recommendations for policy-makers, platforms and the research community." (About this publication)

https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Researching-the-Evolving-Online-Ecosystem_Main-report.pdf

372. Minal Nirav Shah, Amit Ganatra: **A systematic literature review and existing challenges toward fake news detection models.** In: Social Network Analysis and Mining, vol. 12, nr. 168, 2022, 21 pp.

"This paper aims to conduct a review on fake news detection models that is contributed by a variety of machine learning and deep learning algorithms. The fundamental and well-performing approaches that existed in the past years are reviewed and categorized and described in different datasets. Further, the dataset utilized, simulation platforms, and recorded performance metrics are evaluated as an extended review model. Finally, the survey expedites the research findings and challenges that could have significant implications for the upcoming researchers and professionals to improve the trust worthiness of automated fake news detection models." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13278-022-00995-5

373. Robyn C. Thompson, Seena Joseph, Timothy T. Adeliyi: **A Systematic Literature Review and Meta-Analysis of Studies on Online Fake News Detection.** In: Information <MDPI>, vol. 13, nr. 527, 2022, 20 pp.

"Despite the large number of studies on fake news detection, they have not yet been combined to offer coherent insight on trends and advancements in this domain. Hence, the primary objective of this study was to fill this knowledge gap. The method for selecting the pertinent articles for extraction was created using the preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses (PRISMA). This study reviewed deep learning, machine learning, and ensemble-based fake news detection methods by a meta-analysis of 125 studies to aggregate their results quantitatively. The meta-analysis primarily focused on statistics and the quantitative analysis of data from numerous separate primary investigations to identify overall trends. The results of the meta-analysis were reported by the spatial distribution, the approaches adopted, the sample size, and the performance of methods in terms of accuracy. According to the statistics of between-study variance high heterogeneity was found ... The findings of the meta-analysis demonstrated satisfaction with the effectiveness of the recommended approaches from the primary studies on fake news detection that were included." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.3390/info13110527

374. Aman Abishek: **Overlooking the Political Economy in the Research on Propaganda.** In: Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, vol. 2, nr. special issue, 2021, 14 pp.

"A thematic meta-analysis – of recent literature on online propaganda in the context of the Global South, and 20 Facebook-funded research projects in 2018 – shows that research is overwhelmingly focused on the psychological and behavioral impacts of propaganda. This research advocates for promoting "media literacy" and helping citizens "inoculate" themselves against propaganda. This approach has limited use in tackling propaganda in the Global South. It not only oversimplifies "media literacy," but also fails to examine, quite crucially, how the state, corporations, and media institutions interact – the political economy of propaganda. Further, scholars need to reflect on how entities such as Facebook fund such research to deflect scrutiny of their institutional role in propaganda-related violence in the Global South." (Essay summary)

https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-61

375. Carl Miller, Chloe Colliver: **The 101 of Disinformation Detection.** London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2020, 21 pp.

"Disinformation tactics and the responses in place to try to mitigate them online are changing rapidly. Organisations witnessing or targeted by disinformation therefore require a baseline understanding of the threats posed by disinformation and how to spot them while conducting their work. This toolkit sets out simple steps to do so. The toolkit lays out an approach that organisations can undertake to begin to track online disinformation on subjects that they care about. The process is intended to have a very low barrier to entry, with each stage achievable using either over-the-counter or free-to-use social listening tools." (Publisher description)

https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/isd_101.pdf

376. Irene V. Pasquetto et al.: **Tackling Misinformation: What Researchers Could Do with Social Media Data.** In: Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, vol. 1, nr. 8, 2020, 14 pp.

"We invited misinformation researchers to write a 250-word commentary about the research that they would hypothetically conduct if they had access to consenting participants' social media data. The excerpts below provide concrete examples of studies that misinformation researchers could conduct, if the community had better access to platforms' data and processes. Based on the contents of the submission, we have grouped these brief excerpts into five areas that could be improved, and conclude with an excerpt regarding the importance of data sharing: 1. measurement and design, 2. who engages with misinformation and why, 3. unique datasets with increased validity, 4. disinformation campaigns, 5. interventions, and 6. the importance of data sharing. While these excerpts are not comprehensive and may not be representative of the field as a whole, our hope is that this multi-authored piece will further the conversation regarding the establishment of more evenly distributed collaborations between researchers and platforms." (Introduction)

https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-49

AMERICAS & CARIBBEAN

377. Viktor Chagas, Gabriella Da-Costa: **WhatsApp and Transparency: An Analysis on the Effects of Digital Platforms' Opacity in Political Communication Research Agendas in Brazil.** In: Profesional de la Información, vol. 32, nr. 2, 2023, 14 pp.

https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2023.mar.23

378. Javier Guallar, Lluis Codina, Pere Freixa, Pérez-Montoro Mario: **Disinformation, Hoaxes, Curation and Verification: Review of Studies in Ibero-America 2017-2020.** In: Online Media and Global Communication, vol. 1, nr. 3, 2022, pp. 648-668

https://doi.org/10.1515/omgc-2022-0055

ASIA & PACIFIC

379. Adrian Rauchfleisch, Tzu-Hsuan Tseng, Jo-Ju Kao, Yi-Ting Liu: **Taiwan's Public Discourse About Disinformation: The Role of Journalism, Academia, and Politics.** In: Journalism Practice, 2022, 21 pp.

https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2022.2110928

Migratrion Disinformation

EUROPE

380. Paul Butcher, Alberto-Horst Neidhardt: **Fear and Lying in the EU: Fighting Disinformation on Migration with Alternative Narratives.** Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2020, 51 pp.

"This Issue Paper examines nearly 1,500 news articles from four EU member states (Germany, Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic) published between May 2019 and July 2020. It shows that disinformation narratives about migration seek to exploit readers' fears to polarise public opinion, manufacture discontent, sow divisions and set the political agenda. Disinformation actors link migration to existing insecurities, depicting it as a threat to three partly-overlapping areas: Health (migrants as violent criminals, potential terrorists, or a COVID-19 infection risk); Wealth (migrants as social benefits cheats, unfair competition for jobs, or a drain on community resources); Identity (migrants as a hostile invasion force, a threat to European or Christian traditions, or the subject of a conspiracy to replace white Europeans). An effective communication strategy based on alternative narratives should take account of the following recommendations: The message should aim to reframe the debate. It should resonate with the target audience's lived experience, acknowledging their values and concerns, but avoid amplifying anxieties ... The medium should aim to restore trust among groups. Institutions, which are often subject to discrediting campaigns, should prioritise communication through trusted intermediaries who can get messages to the hard-to-reach ... The selection of the audience should aim to reclaim readers from the fringes. Audiences should be targeted based on their values and what they feel is important." (Executive summary)

https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2020/Disinformation_on_Migration.pdf

381. Maximilian Conrad, Guðmundur Hálfdanarson, Asimina Michailidou, Charlotte Galpin, Niko Pyrhönen (eds.): **Europe in the Age of Post-Truth Politics: Populism, Disinformation and the Public Sphere.** Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023, xvii, 259 pp.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13694-8

382. Jakob Guhl, Julia Smirnova: **Narrative über den Krieg Russlands gegen die Ukraine (NUK).** Bonn; Berlin: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (bpb); Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2023, 30 pp.

https://isdgermany.org/narrative-ueber-den-krieg-russlands-gegen-die-ukraine-nuk/

383. Alberto-Horst Neidhardt: **Disinformation on Refugees from Ukraine: Boosting Europe's Resilience After Russia's Invasion.** Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2022, 35 pp.

https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2022/Disinformation_IP_v3.pdf

Regulating Disinformation vs. Freedom of Expression

GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

384. **Most "Fake News" Legislation Risks Doing More Harm than Good amid a Record Number of Elections in 2024.** Center for News, Technology & Innovation (CNTI), 2024, 18 pp.

"Legislation targeting "fake news" — a contested term used to reference both news and news providers that governments (or others) reject as well as disinformation campaigns — has increased significantly over the last few years, particularly in the wake of COVID-19. This study finds that even when technically aimed at curbing disinformation, the majority of "fake news" laws, either passed or actively considered from 2020 to 2023, lessen the protection of an independent press and risk the public's open access to a plurality of fact-based news. Indeed, governments can — and have — used this type of legislation to label independent journalism as "fake news" or disinformation. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, among the 363 reporters jailed around the world in 2022, 39 were imprisoned for "fake news" or disinformation policy violations. Even within well-intended legislative policies, like Germany's laws which focus on platform moderation of "illegal content" related to hate speech and Holocaust denial, concerns can arise over potential government censorship." (p.1)

"This study included quantitative and qualitative analyses of 32 "fake news" legislative policies. Two content analysis coders compiled case data and coded for a range of variables including country, short and long titles of legislation, dates of legislation draft and latest update, legislation status, definitions of key terms ("news"/"journalism," "fake news," "journalists," "news entities"/"publishers" and "platform"/"news intermediary") and authorities responsible for overseeing each definition. Five test cases were coded by both coders simultaneously to assess intercoder reliability with

99.3% agreement." (Methods and data, p.17)
https://innovating.news/article/most-fake-news-legislation-risks-doing-more-harm-than-good-amid-a-record-number-of-elections-in-2 024/

385. Gabrielle Lim, Samantha Bradshaw: **Chilling Legislation: Tracking the Impact of "Fake News" Laws on Press Freedom Internationally.** Washington, DC: Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA), 2023, 20 pp.

"The proliferation of misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information (MDM) poses serious challenges to democracy, public safety, and national security. Conversely, these very worries could be used as a front for unjustified ends. There is a global trend toward legislation that may risk infringing on press freedoms, civil liberties, and the very democratic and liberal values that protect independent media and safeguard free expression." (Conclusion, p.17)
https://www.cima.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/CIMA-Chilling-Legislation_web_150ppi.pdf

386. Corinne Tan: **Regulating Disinformation on Twitter and Facebook.** In: Griffith Law Review, vol. 31, nr. 4, 2023, pp. 513-536

"The spread of disinformation in recent years has caused the international community concerns, particularly around its impact on electoral and public health outcomes. When one considers how disinformation can be contained, one often looks to new laws imposing more accountability on prominent social media platforms. While this narrative may be consistent with the fact that the problem of disinformation is exacerbated on social media platforms, it obscures the fact that individual users hold more power than is acknowledged and that shaping user norms should be accorded high priority in the fight against disinformation. In this article, I examine selected legislation implemented to regulate the spread of disinformation online. I also scrutinise two selected social media platforms – Twitter and Facebook – to anchor my discussion. In doing so, I consider what these platforms have done to self and co-regulate. Thereafter, I consider the limitations on regulation posed by certain behavioural norms of users. I argue that shaping user norms lie at the heart of the regulatory approaches discussed and is pivotal to regulating disinformation effectively." (Abstract)
https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2022.2138140

387. **A Human Rights Approach to Tackle Disinformation: Submission to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.** Amnesty International, 2022, 16 pp.

"Instead of criminalising or otherwise silencing people to address misinformation and disinformation, States should step up their efforts to ensure credible, reliable, objective, evidence-based and accessible information is disseminated to all." (Back cover)
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior40/5486/2022/en/

388. Courtney Radsch: **Artificial Intelligence and Disinformation: State-Aligned Information Operations and the Distortion of the Public Sphere.** Vienna: OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, 2022, 28 pp.

"In light of the role played by state-aligned actors, the private sector and lawmakers in countries with strong democratic institutions should adopt policies that mitigate the ability of state actors to manipulate AI and weaponize communication platforms. Efforts to combat disinformation must recognize that a range of private companies beyond just tech firms are implicated in information manipulation and must put safeguards in place. For example, registration and financing limits on paid PR firms, domestic and foreign, and better oversight by tech platforms on how their platforms are used by state actors is essential. Furthermore, greater transparency about all types of advertising and paid content promotion is needed, not just about political advertising in a handful of Western countries. This could be implemented through existing election laws and paid advertising regulations ... Any meaningful efforts to combat disinformation will need to address the politicization of social media manipulation and influence operations, and their integration into electoral politics. Lawmakers should implement restrictions on the use of moderation mercenaries, black PR firms, and social media manipulation by those entrusted with public office. Countries should not only require great transparency for the platforms themselves, but should also practice what they preach by adopting transparency requirements for state and government entities related to advertising and outreach on social media and messaging platforms.
Tech platforms must reduce the profitability of intentional and opportunistic disinformation efforts, including by reducing the prevalence and ease of plagiarism or the "recycling" of news content for clickbait. Reducing the economic incentives for click-bait, "churnalism", and regurgitated journalistic content would help deter the profit-driven non-ideological actors in these disinformation networks." (Conclsuions and recommendations, p.24-25)
https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/522166

389. João Brant, João Guilherme Bastos dos Santos, Tatiana Dourado, Marina Pita: **Regulación para combatir la desinformación: Estudio de ocho casos internacionales y recomendaciones para un enfoque democrático.** Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), 2020, 32 pp.

"El análisis revela los desafíos al proceso de construcción de soluciones reguladoras que protejan derechos y sean efectivas para promover el acceso a información confiable. La desinformación está profundamente entrelazada con los procesos políticos y sociales, y no es posible pensar en soluciones legales y reguladoras aisladamente del entendimiento de estos procesos y de los contextos nacionales y locales." (Resumo)
https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kolumbien/18073.pdf

AFRICA, SUB-SAHARAN

390. Caleb Gichuhi, Kate Mytty, Amos Atuya: **Mapping of Legal Framework and Responses by Actors to Address Harmful Content Online in Kenya.** Build Up, 2022, 47 pp.
https://howtobuildup.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Legal_Framework_Responses_to_Harmful_Content_Online_Kenya_Sep_2022.pdf

AMERICAS & CARIBBEAN

391. Tales Tomaz: **Brazilian Fake News Bill: Strong Content Moderation Accountability but Limited Hold on Platform Market Power.** In: Javnost: The Public, vol. 30, nr. 2, 2023, pp. 253-267
https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2023.2201801

ASIA & PACIFIC

392. **Defending freedom of expression: Fake news laws in East and Southeast Asia.** Bangkog; Manila: Asia Centre; Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats (CALD)., 2020, 61 pp.
https://asiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/Defending_Freedom_of_Expression_Fake_News_Laws_in_East_and_Southeast_Asia.pdf

393. Andrea Carson, Andrew Gibbons: **The Big Chill? How Journalists and Sources Perceive and Respond to Fake News Laws in Indonesia and Singapore.** In: Journalism Studies, vol. 24, nr. 14, 2023, pp. 1819-1838
https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2023.2192299

394. Faiz Rahman, Sri Handayani Nasution, Aridiva Firdharizki et al.: **Regulating Harmful Content in Indonesia: Legal Frameworks, Trends, and Concerns.** Yogyakarta: Center for Digital Society, 2022, xi, 120 pp.
https://cfds.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/sites/1423/2022/07/Final-Report-Unesco-Rev-18062022-1.pdf

395. Janjira Sombatpoonsiri: **Labelling Fake News: The Politics of Regulating Disinformation in Thailand.** In: Perspective <ISEAS>, nr. 34, 2022, 14 pp.
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/ISEAS_Perspective_2022_34.pdf

EUROPE

396. Stephan Dreyer, Elena Stanciu, Keno Potthast, Wolfgang Schulz: **Desinformation: Risiken, Regulierungslücken und adäquate Gegenmaßnahmen.** Düsseldorf: Landesanstalt für Medien NRW; Hans-Bredow-Institut, 2021, 97 pp.
https://www.medienanstalt-nrw.de/fileadmin/user_upload/NeueWebsite_0120/Themen/Desinformation/Leibnitz-Institut_LFMNRW_GutachtenDesinformation.pdf

397. Benjamin Farrand: **Regulating misleading political advertising on online platforms: an example of regulatory mercantilism in digital policy.** In: Policy Studies, 2023, 20 pp.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2023.2258810

398. Francisco Javier Cabrera Blázquez, Maja Cappello, Julio Talavera Milla, Sophie Valais: **User empowerment against disinformation online.** Strasbourg: European Audiovisual Observatory, 2022, 66 pp.
https://rm.coe.int/iris-plus-2022en3-user-empowerment-against-disinformation/1680a963c4

399. Katie Pentney: **Tinker, Tailor, Twitter, Lie: Government Disinformation and Freedom of Expression in a Post-Truth Era.** In: Human Rights Law Review, vol. 22, nr. 1, 2022, pp. 1-29
https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngac009

400. Anida Sokol, Maja Calovic: **Regulation of Harmful Content Online in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Between Freedom of Expression and Harms to Democracy.** Sarajevo: Mediacentar; UNESCO, 2022, 108 pp.
https://media.ba/en/publication/regulation-harmful-content-online-bosnia-and-herzegovina

401. Anton Vaganov: **Understanding the Laws Relating to "Fake News" in Russia.** Thomson Reuters Foundation; Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), 2022, 16 pp.
https://cpj.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Guide-to-Understanding-the-Laws-Relating-to-Fake-News-in-Russia.pdf

402. Milica Bogdanovic: **National Regulatory and Self-Regulatory Framework Against Hate Speech and Disinformation: Factsheet Montenegro.** Ljubljana : South East European Network for Professionalization of Media (SEENPM); Peace Institute; Montenegro Media Institute, 2021, 19 pp.
https://seenpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Factsheet-Montenegro-Resilience-project.pdf

403. Jelena Jovovic, Dubravka Valic Nedeljkovic: **National Regulatory and Self-Regulatory Framework Against Hate Speech and Disinformation: Factsheet Serbia.** Ljubljana: South East European Network for Professionalization of Media (SEENPM), 2021, 26 pp.
https://seenpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Resilience-Factsheet-Serbia.pdf

404. Jeton Mehmeti: **National Regulatory and Self-Regulatory Framework Against Hate Speech and Disinformation: Factsheet Kosovo.** Ljubljana: South East European Network for Professionalization of Media (SEENPM), 2021, 13 pp.
https://www.mirovni-institut.si/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Resilience-Factsheet-Kosovo.pdf

405. Anida Sokol: **National Regulatory and Self-Regulatory Framework Against Hate Speech and Disinformation: Factsheet Bosnia and Herzegovina.** Lubljana; Sarajevo: South East European Network for Professionalization of Media (SEENPM); Peace Institute; Mediacentar, 2021, 29 pp.
https://www.mirovni-institut.si/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Resilience-Factsheet-Bosnia-and-Herzegovina.pdf

406. van Hoboken, Joris, Ronan Ó Fathaigh: **Regulating Disinformation in Europe: Implications for Speech and Privacy.** In: UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law, vol. 6, 2021, pp. 9-36
https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucijil/vol6/iss1/3

407. **Notions of Disinformation and Related Concepts (ERGA Report).** European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA), 2020, 93 pp.
https://erga-online.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/ERGA-SG2-Report-2020-Notions-of-disinformation-and-related-concepts-final.pdf

408. Anja Bechmann: **Tackling Disinformation and Infodemics Demands Media Policy Changes.** In: Digital Journalism, vol. 8, nr. 6, 2020, pp. 855-863
https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2020.1773887

409. Flavia Durach, Alina Bârgãoanu, Cãtãlina Nastasiu: **Tackling Disinformation: EU Regulation of the Digital Space.** In: Romanian Journal of European Affairs, vol. 20, nr. 1, 2020, pp. 5-20
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3650780

MIDDLE EAST / WESTERN ASIA & NORTH AFRICA

410. Sinem Aydinli: **National Regulatory and Self-Regulatory Framework Against Hate Speech and Disinformation: Factsheet Turkey.** Ljubljana: South East European Network for Professionalization of Media (SEENPM), 2021, 14 pp.
https://www.mirovni-institut.si/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Resilience-Factsheet-Kosovo.pdf

Reporting on Disinformation, Journalism Training

GENERAL & INTERNATIONAL

411. Cherilyn Ireton, Julie Posetti (eds.): **Journalism, 'Fake News' & Disinformation: Handbook for Journalism Education and Training.** Paris: UNESCO, 2018, 128 pp.

"This handbook seeks to provide an internationally-relevant model curriculum, open to adoption or adaptation, which responds to the emerging global problem of disinformation that confronts societies in general, and journalism in particular. Serving as a model curriculum, the publication is designed to give journalism educators and trainers a framework and lessons to help students and practitioners of journalism to navigate the issues associated with 'fake news'. We also hope that it will be a useful guide for practising journalists. The contents draw together the input of leading international journalism educators, researchers and thinkers who are helping to update journalism method and practice to deal with the challenges of misinformation and disinformation. The lessons are contextual, theoretical and in the case of online verification, extremely practical." (Back cover)

http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0026/002655/265552E.pdf

412. **How freelance journalists can battle mis- and disinformation in news.** Freelance Journalism Assembly; European Journalism Centre, 2021, 4 pp.

"As a freelance journalist, you will often work independently or outside of a newsroom. Sharpening your fact-checking and verification skills is vital to protect both you and your stories from mis- and disinformation. Knowing the networks and resources you can turn to for help means you're not alone in this important fight." (p.1)
https://ejc.net/resources/how-freelance-journalists-can-battle-mis-and-disinformation-in-news

413. Andrés Martínez Zalamea, Daniel Marquínez Fernández, Karen De la Hoz Rodríguez: **El periodismo ante la desinformación.** Cartagena: Fundación Gabo, 2021, 66 pp.

"Este libro digital descargable de la Fundación Gabo es una macro-relatoría, un esfuerzo por sintetizar y difundir el conocimiento emanado de una serie de actividades -talleres, clases magistrales, charlas- que llevamos a cabo en el marco del Festival Gabo 2020, el cual tuvo como uno de sus temas centrales la reflexión y debate sobre el papel del periodismo ante la desinformación organizada. Para diseñar ese programa capitalizamos el seguimiento al tema por varios años desde nuestros talleres de periodismo, iniciativas de promoción de la ciudadanía digital como 'Convivencias en Red', la agenda de contenidos y actividades que desarrollamos ante la pandemia global de la covid-19, y de manera especial el programa de ética periodística, con componentes como el quiz de noticias falsas, el grupo de Facebook 'Esta noticia es falsa' y alrededor de 2.000 preguntas respondidas en el Consultorio Ético en línea. Los valiosos aportes recogidos en este libro nos aclaran aún más el camino y nos animan a profundizar nuestro compromiso con los periodistas y la ciudadanía en general para promover la comprensión, la toma de conciencia y nuevos enfoques de actuación eficaz frente a la desinformación." (Introducción)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1enemzK3uHptSrdr_Tb9i9eCz0BCq2_1p/view

414. Bermet Talant: **How Journalists Can Address Misinformation on Telegram.** Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2021, 35 pp.

"As of July 2021, Telegram had 550 million active users worldwide – more than the individual user bases of Twitter, Snapchat or Discord. It is the fifth most-popular messaging app after Facebook-owned Whatsapp and Messenger, and WeChat and QQ which dominate the Chinese market ... For this paper, I looked at Telegram's policies and functionalities to help understand what made it so attractive to misinformation actors both in the Ukraine, which has a long history of Telegram engagement, and Brazil, Spain and Germany where it has had more of an impact in recent years. According to the journalists and digital researchers I interviewed about investigating misinformation and disinformation on Telegram, there are ways to address the issue, both on and off the platform: by investigating movements and their political or financial interest, by producing more responsible journalism, through clearer communication from governments, and through the continued moderation efforts on other social media platforms." (p.7-8)
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2021-10/RISJ%20paper%20_Bermet_FINAL.pdf

415. **10 Tips for Reporting on Disinformation.** Data & Society, 2020, 4 pp.

"For journalists, disinformation presents a unique challenge; while they are guided by the mission of exposing wrongdoing to hold power to account, they are also one of the most common targets of disinformation campaigns. Without realizing it, journalists can amplify disinformation simply by doing their jobs: reporting on it. To minimize this risk and adhere to their other mission of helping readers make sense of the world around them, journalists should turn to the following tips when reporting on online disinformation." (p.1)
https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/10-Tips-pdf.pdf

ASIA & PACIFIC

416. Waqas Naeem, Adnan Rehmat: **Countering Disinformation in Pakistan: Lessons and Recommendations for Digital Journalism.** Freedom Network; Digital Media Alliance of Pakistan (DigiMAP), 2022, 48 pp.
https://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Countering-Disinformation-in-Pakistan-2023.pdf

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